International Education Journal

International Education Journal

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Designed by Katherine Dix

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JAPANESE EDUCATION IN TRANSITION 2001
Radical Perspectives on Cultural and Political Transformation

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INTRODUCTION

Japan has recently experienced important shifts in what was once seen as a stable, homogeneous, and orderly social environment. Foremost among the challenges facing Japanese society are those involving the educational system, educational concepts, and educational philosophy.

At all levels, from pre-school to elementary, from secondary to university, from lifelong to other learning contexts, Japan faces challenges that would have been inconceivable even ten years ago. The papers which we present here were originally planned for a session in Commission 6 of the Eleventh World Congress of Comparative Education Societies held in the Republic of Korea in July 2001. We were interested in getting together a group of scholars concerned with radical change and transformation in the Japanese educational context, particularly in terms of what it means to be a citizen, and to be educated as a citizen, in Japanese society.

The papers that follow here were thus begun as a series of discussions among ourselves, as researchers working and living in the Japanese educational context, and then planned as a series of presentations from a wide range of perspectives for the Congress in Korea. Our intention was, and is, to inform, provoke, and stimulate fellow scholars of comparative education and comparative cultures.

We especially take up those issues on the sharp edges of change in Japan, issues for all 21st century multicultural societies: citizenship, nationalism, gender, curriculum, literacy, immigrants, transnational exchange, and identity. Japanese education in the 21st century is clearly in transition, and these papers present radical perspectives on Japan's educational, cultural and political transformation.

The first paper, *National education policy and the masses in modern Japan: the origins of a state-oriented mentality and the long detour to a new form of citizenship education* by Satoshi Yamamura, begins our collection of papers by laying out the historical foundations for radical change in Japan. By noting that the enlightened segment of the Meiji State leaders perceived the essential connection between modern education for the masses and modern methods of warfare, he shows us how the nation and the education system were inextricably linked from the very beginning. Untoward consequences were, and continue to be, the result.

In 1872 and 1873 the Meiji Government introduced two new systems, the modern school system and conscription to win their domestic political struggle against other sectors as well as competing with overwhelming western powers. This initial intention of the enlightened bureaucrats who

eventually survived political struggles inside the central government met with a strong resistance from peasants who composed the largest portion of the population of the time.

The government managed to force the masses into the centralised system of education and politics by around the time of the Russo-Japan War. These views and perceptions, ostensibly based on modern western science and carried by enlightened bureaucrats, urban intellectuals and college students, and others, saw their unbreakable victory over the masses by around the early 1930s. This was a sign of the end of the plurality-oriented values of pre-modern Japan in education and politics. The concept of citizenship has had a difficult communication with the bolstered value of subject-conscious ideology ever since. This paper concludes with an exploration of the problematic idea of citizenship in today's Japanese education.

The second paper, *Multicultural or "pure" Japan? Citizenship challenges for Japanese education for the 21ˢᵗ century* by David Blake Willis, continues this theme by examining Japanese education for citizenship at the end of the 20ᵗʰ and beginning of the 21ˢᵗ centuries.

With the so-called Third Opening (or internationalisation) of Japan, the rush of globalisation, and a concern for the direction of national cultural identity in the Japanese nation, courses for citizenship have recently been promoted in schools with titles such as 'Education for International Understanding' and 'Global Education,' among others.

Twin surges, one of an awareness of a diverse, multicultural Japanese society, and the other of an apparent neo-nationalism, have been noted in the mass media. The first speaks for a compelling drive for more openness in Japan and is outward looking, democratic, and inclusive in its conceptualisation of citizenship. The second is exclusive, inward looking, and based on images of a homogeneous canon for Japanese culture. Both have been introduced into school contexts, resulting in considerable tension and dissonance.

Concern has been raised about the dilution of Japanese identity, manifesting itself in enforced singing in schools of the national anthem and required national flag-raising at ceremonies, not to mention on-going controversies about the contents of school textbooks. This paper explores dilemmas and directions for citizenship education in Japan, indicating possible future directions for the roles of educational institutions in this key component in the transmission of values for the Japanese cultural identity.

Key questions for the enactment of democratic education for citizenship are raised. It seems, from what he tells us, that the lessons of the hidden curriculum are, if anything, far more powerful than those of the explicit curriculum. Class and difference are two themes which resonate again and again in surprising and disturbing ways. The dissonance and contrast with messages emanating from mainstream scholarly media on Japanese education are strong and troubling. Where the values and methods for teaching being enacted in classrooms around Kobe come from is the subject of the next paper.

Confucianism as cultural constraint: a comparison of Confucian values of Japanese and Korean university students, the third paper by Ken Tamai and Jonghwan Lee, attempts to analyze the roots of educational values for citizenship by examining students at the end of their educational careers. This paper is a strong, comparative study of beliefs and actions centered around Confucian values.

Both Korea and Japan are countries in which Confucianism has been to seen to have penetrated deeply and widely. Although there is a tendency to regard Confucianism as something homologous everywhere, Tamai and Lee find by examining Confucianism's impact on education and values in

Japan and Korea that this is not the case. Thus, it becomes important to examine and elaborate the differences of Confucian values, especially as they have played out in the education systems and the contemporary values which are held in these two important receiving countries of Confucian philosophy.

This study focuses on Korea and Japan and attempts to examine the differences between the two countries. The research results show that Confucian beliefs in these two countries are not the same. Two unique features of Koreans are "filial piety" and "altruism," while Japan's uniqueness has appeared in "conformity to the group and authority." What accounts for the background of these differences? Through the analysis of present Confucianism we hope we will obtain better views on the social values of Japanese and Koreans and be able to clarify their distinctive features for comparative education from a cross-cultural viewpoint.

Shigehisa Komatsu helps us to understand change in the Japanese curriculum in the next and fourth paper, *Transition in the Japanese curriculum - how is the curriculum of elementary and secondary schools in Japan determined?*

Organising curriculum at the national level is a Japanese tradition and school administrators or teachers have less experience with it. Social, political, and economical trends in Japan have been recently characterised by a move toward diversity, flexibility, decentralisation and autonomy and away from uniformity, rigidity, and central control.

School administrators and teachers are now at a loss as to how they should constitute curriculum in their schools. The most important problem in Japan now may be how educators should cultivate a sense of identity about organising curriculum.

Taeyoung Kim introduces our fifth paper, *"Identity politics" and Korean youth in Japan: a case study of a junior high school student*, with a careful account of what it means to be 'Other' in the Japanese educational system.

The purpose of his study is to search for the breakthrough of "identity politics" around Koreans in Japan by shedding light on the ethnic identities of Korean youths. After World War II Koreans in Japan organised schools using their language and transmitting ethnic culture to children, but the SCAP GHQ and the Japanese Government regarded this movement as harmful and began to suppress it.

Koreans have since then been under the pressure of assimilation and their ethnic education has been marginalised in the Japanese educational system. "Identity politics," which regards ethnic tradition as essential for identity, developed in opposition to assimilation, functioned as resistance and liberation in the first stage, but sooner or later became oppressive to the diversity of Korean society in Japan.

This case study is based on research in Takatsuki, Osaka, where a children's group of Koreans was organised by the school board of the city to foster ethnic identity and transmit ethnic culture among Korean children and youths.

The sixth paper, by Koji Nakamura, discusses an educational program which aims to bridge some of the traditional gaps in the Japanese educational system. *Cultivating global literacy through 'English as an International Language' (EIL) education in Japan: a new paradigm for global education*, examines Japanese students' global literacy as multicultural citizens of the world and their communicative competence in Japanese EFL classrooms.

Since these have been relatively impoverished by the Japanese educational system and its high context culture compared with their counterparts in the rest of the world, he discusses the significance of a four-year empirical study of integrating controversial global human rights issues into a university-level EFL speech communication class in Japan, highlighting the role of English as an International Language (EIL).

Global literacy in this context addresses two essential phases. One is an ability to access and converse with the rest of the world in English as an International Language with computer literacy for internet communication. Another is a literacy of reconceptualised citizenship, called multicultural citizenship, which will enable students to acquire a delicate balance of cultural, national and global identification.

The seventh and last paper, *Psychological struggles of Korean international students in Japan,* by Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, examines the experiences of international students from South Korea at Japanese universities. Koreans now comprise the second largest national group in Japan, numbering nearly 13,000.

Data were gathered from the responses of 96 students at the University of Tokyo to the request to write freely their opinions regarding foreign student life in Japan. Qualitative analysis of the data revealed a major theme centering on reactions to Japanese society and human relations. Four themes were identified: moral vs. prejudiced; diligent vs. inhuman; true feelings vs. facades; and resignation vs. perseverance.

Beginning with a look at the historical foundations of modern Japanese education and ending with a study of the identities of Koreans in Japanese universities is perhaps a fitting sequence, demonstrating the changing nature of education in Japan. Once seen as an instrument solely of national power and its projection, education is now crossing borders in ways unimaginable to the Meiji founding fathers of a hundred years ago.

What this indicates, of course, is the changing nature of values as well as a shifting socio-political-economic context. That Confucian values remain the base is undoubtedly important, yet new values are also being created, especially in classrooms such as those dealing with global issues and using other languages.

When looked at from the perspective of comparative education, the darker sides of the Japanese education system, especially as it reflects a damaged society and particularly damaged youth in their search for identity, are unfortunately also only too well-represented by the papers here. There are signs of hope in changes in the curriculum but even more so in the ways individuals are taking matters into their own hands, educating themselves for citizenship of an entirely different order than that envisioned by centralised ministries of education that are far away and often too slow to react to changing environments. These papers, we hope, will provide a substantive new look at issues of Japanese education from a comparative perspective.

National Education Policy and the Masses in Modern Japan: The Origins of a State-Oriented Mentality and the Long Detour to a New Form of Citizenship Education

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The enlightened segment of the leaders of the Meiji State perceived the essential connection between modern education for the masses and modern methods of warfare. In 1872 and 1873 they introduced two new systems, the modern school system and conscription. These initial designs by the enlightened bureaucrats who eventually won the political leadership inside the central government met with a strong resistance from peasants. The government managed to mobilise the masses into its centralised system of education and politics by around the time of the Russo-Japanese War. The successful mobilisation of the whole nation was completed by the early 1930s together with permeation into the masses of a mind-set based on modern western science that was carried by enlightened bureaucrats and urban intellectuals. The plurality-oriented values of pre-modern Japan in education and politics thus ceased to exist. Today a new concept of citizenship is needed in Japan to foster community and plurality-oriented values with the concept of individuality.

Japan, modernisation, citizenship, history, education

THE MEIJI STATE AND THE MASSES

Meiji Japan is a rare case which tells us what happened when a feudal state, which had been almost completely isolated from other areas of the world for as long as 250 years, suddenly encountered full-scale, highly industrialised bourgeois states such as England, France and the United States of America.

Noteworthy is the Meiji state's rapid concentration of political power, such as *haihan chiken* (Abolishment of Feudal Domains and Establishment of Prefectures). Domestically, this rapid concentration of political power was made easier by the relatively centralised Tokugawa (Shogunate) feudal system. Internationally, the Meiji government did not face any full-scale war with European powers and could preserve its energies for domestic political affairs. The centralised political power that was rapidly achieved in turn made it possible for the Government to discard various systems that hampered economic and national unity. Enforcement of universal mass education, universal conscription and a unified tax system in the early 1870's became possible in this situation.[1]

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[1] Shimoyama Saburo, *Meiji Ishin Kenkyu-shi Ron* (A Discussion on the History of Studies of the Meiji Restoration) chapter 3, section 2. It should be noted that Japan changed its calendar system from the lunar calendar

The political elite, rather than the elites in business or other aspects of national life, dominated the national scene in the early Meiji State, and most of this political elite came from one social class, that is to say, lower-ranking *samurai* (warrior class) or its equivalent. At the time of government reform in July of 1869, after *hanseki hokan* (Return of the Land and People to the Emperor), the nobility and the lower-ranking *samurai* took most Ministers' and Vice-Ministers' positions in the central government and the feudal lords slipped away. With the reform of July 1871, after *haihan chiken* (Abolishment of Feudal Domains and Establishment of Prefectures), the lower-ranking *samurai* established their superior political position. Nearly all of these elite politicians came from selected feudal domains such as Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen that had contributed the most in the civil war against the Shogunate forces. The nobility and *samurai* class attended institutions of higher education during the early Meiji period almost exclusively. Tokyo University, which provided any social class with a systematic route to elitist positions in the national government, was built in 1877, yet the superiority of the *samurai* in gaining admission did not disappear for some time. Commoners were permitted to enter the Tokyo University Preparatory School one year later, but nearly eight out of ten students in Tokyo University were still of *samurai* origin; 73.9% of the students were of *samurai* origin in 1878.[2]

When we discuss foreign influence upon domestic affairs, we have to see if any political or social group effectively transforms such international influence into domestic policy. As for Meiji Japan, we should look into the historical significance of the introduction of modern methods of warfare on the domestic political struggles that gave birth to the group of absolute bureaucrats who wanted to have universal mass education despite unfavourable political and social conditions. Each competing social group had its own idea about education that was related to its political ideas and social position. The political elite during the Meiji Restoration was greatly exposed to European civilization and quickly saw the great advantages of its importation, not only to preserve national independence, but also to strengthen their own political leadership in the domestic arena. With this growth, these absolutist politicians heavily relied upon military force as a political instrument. They recognised the importance of mass participation in the armed forces, which had become competent in the modern methods of warfare. Universal mass education would be required to create soldiers with a certain standard of intelligence for modern military tactics.

From the beginning, the Meiji government never hesitated to crush violently any anti-Government rebellions, whether conservative *samurai* rebellions or peasants' uprisings. Facing increasing social instability, it made every effort to save the core of the feudal ruling class and succeeded in transforming the class of feudal lords into one of its most important political and social supporters. On the other hand, the early Meiji government could not disregard the political significance of winning the masses' support. Indeed, the military and political success of the Meiji oligarchy at the time of the Meiji Restoration owed significantly to the negative attitudes of the masses toward the incompetent feudal system. The new government, which was often viewed as a liberator from the old social system,[3] gradually removed feudal social and

to the solar calendar on December 3, 1872, which turned into January 11, 1873. This paper uses dates of the lunar calendar before the change of the calendar system.

[2] Passin, Herbert, "Japan," Coleman, James S. ed., *Education and Political Development*, p.229.

[3] Kano Masanao, *Shihon-shugii Keisei-kl no Chitsujo-ishiki* (Ideas on the World Order during the Formation Period of Capitalism in Japan), p.214f.

economic regulations. With these moves, popular expectations and demands on the government went hand-in-hand with its own desire to prescribe a new system of control over the nation (a highly centralised nation-state). This trend toward policy-making began a torrent of introducing completely new policies even against the will of the masses after *haihan chiken* (Abolishment of Feudal Domains and Establishment of Prefectures) when the new government felt confident in their governing ability for the first time. *Gakusei*,[4] an unfamiliar school system for the masses, was introduced by the central government as something necessary for mobilising the masses.

MASS EDUCATION AND ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In the early years of the Meiji Period there existed a variety of thoughts and practices concerning mass education. *Terakoya* education (village or town schools, often in local temples) was still the major organ for mass education, though this system began to ebb during this period. But *terakoya* education was virtually inaccessible to tenant peasants without any land. Well-off peasants did nothing to aid poor peasants in obtaining an education. Whether a peasant family sent their children to *terakoya* depended on their social and economic standing as much as their own decision. Further, *terakoya* education was not a significant concern of feudal lords.

Gogaku (semi-official schools for the masses) took a different approach to mass education. They were established by government officials and groups of upper-class peasants and merchants to educate the commoners' adults or children within a community. The government even helped poor peasants send their children to attend *gogaku* by providing financial aid. This new approach was related to the impulse of village leaders to restore the village community in the wake of the mounting economic and political crisis in village communities toward the end of the Edo period. An analysis of subjects and textbooks reveals that *gogaku* put much more emphasis on the instruction of Confucian ethics than did *terakoya* education.[5] Moreover, there were cases in which *terakoya* were transformed to more closely resemble *gogaku*. The number of *gogaku* rapidly increased in the first few years of the Meiji period.

Attitudes of the Meiji government towards these two types of mass education inherited from the Edo period were clearly expressed in *Gakusei*. Many *gogaku* were raised to the status of regular public elementary schools while *terakoya* became *kajuku* (house schools), which were classified as irregular elementary schools opened at private houses and taught by unlicensed teachers. The Meiji government became interested in the public nature of *gogaku,* an approach

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[4] *Gakusei* (The Fundamental Code of Education) was Japan's first national scheme of mass education. Issued in August 3, 1872 this grand design for a national school system was a product of the Meiji government almost five years after it proclaimed *osei fukko* (Restoration of Imperial Sovereignty) on December 9, 1867, and one year after Monbusho (Ministry of Education) was established in July 18, 1871. *Gakusei* was composed of 109 chapters, and with another 105 chapter added in March and April of 1873. Its goal was to establish a university in each of eight university districts, 256 secondary schools, and 53,760 elementary schools throughout the nation. The design called for every 600 Japanese to be assigned to one elementary school and every 130,000 people to one secondary school. *Gakusei* covered the whole range of education, including various kinds of school (elementary and secondary schools, universities, special colleges like medical schools, law schools, business schools, industrial schools, etc.), curriculum, examinations, diplomas, qualifications and the role of teachers and school administrators, regulations of study abroad, school fees, and educational loans. *Meiji-iko Kyoiku-seido Hattatsu-shi* (The History of Educational Systems Since the Meiji Era), vol.1, pp.276-333.

[5] *Nihon Kyoiku-shi Shiryo* (Historical Documents of Education in Japan), ser.7, p.799.

that aimed to educate the whole community and that was under the guidance or the control of domain authorities.

However, the Meiji government modified considerably the form and the content of *gogaku.* It broke down the local nature of *gogaku* by establishing a highly centralised educational system. The *Gakusei* curriculum was heavily weighted with Westernised subjects, especially in the natural sciences such as Western arithmetic, geography and physics. Though a majority of elementary schools during the early years of *Gakusei* were hardly different from *terakoya* and *gogaku* in their physical conditions, the intention of central and local governments was not ambiguous: to establish Westernised public elementary schools.

In the development of traditional mass education from *terakoya* to *gogaku*, the emergence of such Westernised mass education as *Gakusei* was strongly related to the rise of a group of bureaucrats within the central government. They brought with them an imminent sense of crisis about Japan's international relationships, and thought it profitable to let the masses know more about Western civilization and the world situation, in order to encourage them to strive toward the political goals that the bureaucrats set. This group of bureaucrats in particular felt that a centralised state system was necessary to establish a national armed force and a unified system of national finance.

Many leaders of that time had become aware of the tremendous gap in military strength between feudal Japan and the capitalistic Western powers. This was keenly seen as a direct military threat to the feudal ruling class as well as to the general national interest. However, the absolutist bureaucrats in the early Meiji years came to believe first that Westernised mass education was a necessity for the successful transplantation of the modern methods of warfare that had been highly developed by European nations. At the same time, they did not forget to centralise the new mass education system and to appeal to the rising interest in learning, especially among wealthy commoners, by phrasing this education in terms of traditional concepts of learning.

As a latecomer to the competitive market of world capitalism, the Meiji absolutist state was thus forced to assume the role of a bourgeois state for its survival. The society which allowed this absolute government to exist as a polity was naturally in deep contradiction with many of the hasty and enforced bourgeois-type reforms. Conscription at the beginning of 1873 was one of the most incompatible innovations for the existing society.[6] Universal mass education was considered a necessary social measure to fill the gap leading up to the successful introduction of modern methods of warfare. The Meiji oligarchy could neither wait for nor allow the spontaneous growth of local-oriented school systems that were connected with local peculiarities of peoples' lives and were rather independent of the central government's

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[6] A military system and military techniques are basically determined by the characteristics of a nation's political and social system and the degree of its economic development. In early Meiji Japan, on the contrary, military demands played a leading role in causing social and economic change. In the early Meiji era the emergence of an absolute governing body was connected with successive military reforms. However, the Meiji absolutist state did not create a force of mercenary-and voluntary-enlistments, as European absolute states did. Instead, it aimed at constructing a national conscription system and made a tremendous effort to introduce the modern methods of warfare that were first designed by Napoleon Bonaparte at the time of the Napoleonic Wars. But there were wide gaps between the requirements demanded by such and the still-feudal Japanese social system. The central government was forced to fill these gaps with various anti-feudal policies. The Introduction of *Gakusei* must be understood in this military-political context.

intention. The Meiji oligarchy thus devised and enforced bourgeois type policies to establish its political leadership in the nation. Its military force was surely one of the keys to sustaining its political power, which rested precariously on the social and economic cracks produced by its policies.

However, the tradition of *gogaku* education never ceased to exist. It surfaced again in a new form when the Imperial Rescript of Education was proclaimed in 1890. The Imperial Rescript of Education lauded Confucian ethics. It asserted that loyalty and filial piety were the fundamental characteristics of the Japanese Empire and the roots of national education. The utmost objective was to "guard and maintain the prosperity of our imperial throne coeval with heaven and earth."

But the Imperial Rescript of Education was not a simple return to *gogaku* education. Although the rate of school attendance did not rise remarkably at that time, the Meiji government with Mori Arinori as Minister of Education had already established a grand school system encompassing Tokyo Imperial University as well as primary schools, after successive adjustments of the *Gakusei*. The tradition of a local-oriented school system was never to be revived again, however, although the ideological function of *gogaku* education was preserved and developed.

The Meiji powers-that-be realised that a certain standard of intelligence of the masses was required in a modern state, and that a nation-state could not satisfy its imperialistic drives if the people remained ignorant and passive to the goals of the state. The Imperial Rescript of Education demanded the nation to develop its intellectual faculties and to perfect its moral powers. Thus the school system was burdened with the incessant pressure to synthesise a modern curriculum and a feudalistic ideology.

In the midst of economic depression and an intensification of the *jiyu minken-undo* (movement of democratic rights) which aimed to destroy the despotic government and to establish the National Diet and the Constitution,[7] a group of prefectural governors started an educational movement that opposed Westernisation and advocated a strong moral education. This movement was greatly encouraged by Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo, who finally produced the Imperial Rescript of Education.

A full-scale reform in every aspect of the military system had been progressing since the arrival in 1885 of Major Mocker, a military advisor from Prussia. Around 1890 the comprehensive modernisation of the military system was almost completed. This modernisation included the abolition of garrisons, creation of divisions, expansion of strategic studies in the University of Army, establishment of an Army Inspection Department (which was to be in charge of military orders and military training), reform of the conscription law, and self-support of arms. This military system established a foundation for an armed force that could be used for wars against foreign countries.

It is interesting to note that Yamagata Aritomo, who favoured Westernised mass education (*Gakusei*) for the successful introduction of modern methods of warfare, became the strongest

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[7] In preparing a national constitution that was strongly demanded by a nationwide movement of anti-despotic government, the central government succeeded in preserving its absolute power by promulgating a Prussian-style constitution in February, 1889 and by breaking up a movement that favored a British-style constitution.

supporter of the Imperial Rescript of Education. His change in educational policies can be explained because he had almost achieved his initial goal, that is to say, establishment of a modern military system. A new form of national education was required to supply spiritual and material resources for the advanced military system.[8]

The Imperial Rescript of Education was successfully established as the most important national ideology until World War II. Most people regarded successive victories in foreign wars as proof of the "imperial throne coeval with heaven and earth" and became enthusiastic supporters of the imperial state. The wars against Ch'ing China of 1894 and Czarist Russia of 1904 made up the imperialistic sentiment among the masses. The rate of enrolment in primary schools rose to almost 95% at the time of the war against the Russians.[9] This enrolment rate at primary schools is amazing when compared with the masses' strong antipathy toward *Gakusei* for many years after it had been introduced.[10]

However, this is not the end of the story for the central government. The following case demonstrates to us that the public school system, backed up by the government, still met with

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[8] The relationship between the modern methods of warfare and the degree of soldiers' intelligence became an important matter for discussion in the Japanese armed forces. In Okinawa Prefecture, where the Conscription Act was not applied for a long time, a tremendous effort was made to give universal elementary education to the islanders before the conscription was executed for the first time in 1898. The rate of attendance was raised from 16.95% to 92.81% between 1892 and 1907. It is indicated that the rate of attendance of boys was over 50% in 1898. The emphasis on cherishing national sentiment was consciously increased after the Imperial Rescript of Education of 1890 was proclaimed. Because of this, there was an emphasis on ethical training rather than practical, military training after the Japanese-Russo War. Oe Shinobu, *Kokumin-kyoiku to Guntai: Nihon Gunkoku-seisaku no Seiritsu to Tenkai* (National Education and Military Force: Formation and Development of the Militaristic Education Policy in Japan), pp.45-46, 306f.

[9] The rate of attendance did not rise sharply. In 1876 Monbusho (The Ministry of Education) could officially announce for the first time the school attendance rate among children of school age (6 to 13 years old). It was recorded as 38.31%. In 1877 it was 39.9%. In 1878 it rose to 41.3%. The annual rate of daily attendance of those children at school from 1875 to 1878 was 73.21%, 74.85%, 70.77% and 70.26%. It was rather declining. See Kurasawa Takashi, *Shogakko no Rekishi* (A History of Elementary Schools in Japan), vol. l, p.375.

[10] Such antipathy toward *Gakusei* was most directly expressed in peasant rebellions. The number of peasant rebellions in the early years of Meiji peaked in 1873. A remarkable aspect of the rebellions was that 12 of the 37 rebellions were against the conscription that was instituted at the end of 1872. Conscription, which would naturally deprive the peasant families of their major source of labor, ignited accumulated dissatisfaction among the masses. Elementary school buildings and teachers' houses became targets of attacks during the rebellions and many of them were destroyed or burnt. In Hojo Prefecture (the present-day Okayama Prefecture) the number of rebels reached several thousand. They destroyed 15 elementary school buildings and burnt three others; one teacher's house was destroyed. In Nato Prefecture (present-day Kagawa Prefecture), 48 elementary school buildings were burnt. In Fukuoka Prefecture, which had as many as three hundred thousand rebels, 27 school buildings were destroyed and two burnt. Ten thousand peasants in Tottori prefecture assaulted two new school teachers who were taken for conscription officers, destroyed a school building and demanded the abolishment of elementary schools and the permission to open *kajuku* (house school) at their will. The people's antipathy toward Gakusei arose mainly from quite practical aspects of their lives. It was felt that to attend school under *Gakusei* was to degrade further their economic life in several ways, such as having to pay an immediate increase of various fees, and deprivation of the household labor force. Parents had to buy textbooks, slates and slate pencils. New elementary schools were almost ten times as expensive as *terakoya*. See the following resources: Kidota Shiro, "Ishin-ki no Nomin Ikki (Peasant Uprisings at the Time of Meiji Restoration)." *lwanami Koza Nihon Rekishi* (Iwanami Seminars on the History of Japan), Modern Era 2 (1962), p.187; Tsuchiya Tokao and Ono Michio, *Meiji-shonen Nomin Sojo-roku* (Historical Records on Peasant Disturbances In the Early Meiji Years), pp.342-343, p.482, p.523, pp.466 467; and *Meiji-iko Kyoiku-seido Hattatsu-shi* (A History of Education Systems Since the Meiji Era), vol. l, p.464.

strong resistance in the impoverished countryside in the1920s. The next section focuses on a typical joint movement of landless peasants and urban intellectuals that took place in the wave of Taisho (1912-1925) liberal movements of the 1920s.

PEASANT COMMUNITY, URBAN INTELLECTUALS AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN CONFLICTS OVER A PEASASNT SCHOOL: A CASE STUDY OF EBBING SOCIAL CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY-ORIENTED MENTALITY

The central government tried to govern local districts through three pipelines: schools, Shinto shrines and associations of veterans, carrying on this policy called the "Local Improvement Movement" after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to 1905. The policy aimed to disseminate the idea of cooperation between economy and morality.[11] In 1922 a peasant uprising took place beginning in Kisaki village in Niigata Prefecture which demanded reduction by 20% of rents paid in rice. As the struggle intensified, the peasant union started its own school for the children of the union farmers who boycotted public elementary schools in the region.

Local districts were strongly expected to support the emerging "Imperial Japan," confine local disputes within local districts and to not count on help from the central government to solve problems. The Kisaki dispute being publicised through newspapers was most disadvantageous to the Local Improvement Movement because it would hint to the whole nation that the government's policy did not work effectively.[12] The central government was thus driven to step in to this dispute when the situation got worse. In 1929, three years after the most critical moment of the Kisaki uprising, the Prefectural Association for Education made a report titled "Research on How to Prevent Dangerous Thoughts and to Guide Toward Healthy Ones."[13] Its first item was on "Prevention of Unhealthy Thoughts Caused by Poor Economic Life." Local politico-social leaders were most concerned with this poverty question. The Local Improvement Movement tried to preach that poverty was a "sin" because it was caused by an individual's unprincipled behaviour, not by the "society." The Kisaki uprising showed that the Movement had not successfully achieved its aim. A newspaper in Tokyo said, "The Peasants' School casts an important question to the society. This is a gigantic cannonball shot at the national education of Japan. This Farmers' School disclosed to us that primary schools and their teachers were neither devoted to nor competent in their teaching methods and moral instruction."[14]

The educational ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ellen Kay and John Dewey had been introduced to Japan from the 1890s and had inspired liberal education movements of the Taisho Era. The awareness gradually spread that the "child-centered" teaching method and curriculum carried not only an educational criticism against the authoritarian "teacher-centered" national system of education, but also a political criticism against the political-economic structure which was seen as supporting this authoritarian teaching style. Intellectuals and university students,

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[11] See Okada Norio, "Nichiro Sengo no Kyoka Seisaku to Minkan" (The Government Policy of Enlightenment and People after the Russo-Japanese War), *Nihon Kindai Kyoiku-shi Saiko* (Reconsideration on the History of Japan's Education) ed. by Ito Yahiko.

[12] "Shibata Shinbun" (The Shibata Newspaper), Kawase Shinzo, *Kisaki-mura Nomin Undo-shi* (A History of Kisaki Peasants' Movement), p.98.

[13] *Niigata-ken Kyoiku Hyaku-nen shi* (The 100-year History of Education in Niigata Prefecture), vol.2, p.1235.

[14] *Manchoho* (The Manchoho Newspaper) Editorial of August 29, 1926.

mainly from Tokyo, came to Kisaki to help the uprising and worked as union leaders or teachers for children and young farmers. They criticised the political and educational policies of the Government.

The enlightened and absolute bureaucrats of the Meiji and Taisho State had worked hard to boost capitalistic development, solidifying the autocratic structure of the government and at the same time immersing themselves in Western "science" in order to operate the state machine through rational (scientific) management. Even when they devoted time and energies for the Local Improvement Movement with its Confucian philosophical underpinnings as seen through Ninomiya Sontoku,[15] they never forgot their primary professional purpose of conducting a rational management of the state. When they tried to find a solution for the Kisaki dispute, it was easier for them to find a common ground for communicating with individuals or social groups who had already dressed themselves up with Western "science."

Majima, a leading landlord against the peasant uprising, became the vice-chairperson of the Prefectural Association of Education and the chair for the County Association in 1926 when the Kisaki dispute was at its most intense. These Associations and the normal schools in the prefecture played an important role in introducing Taisho liberal education movements.[16] In 1923 the Naka-kanbara County Association invited Oikawa Heiji, a leading figure of Taisho liberal education, who held a lecture with the title "My 16 Year-Experience in Self-Reliant Education." The County was adjacent to the one where Kisaki village belonged, and the Kisaki dispute was escalating that year. In 1927 the Prefectural Association and County Associations invited Ohara Kuniyoshi of Tamagawa Gakuen School in Tokyo, another leading figure of Taisho liberal education movements, to give them a lecture. The Prefecture subsidised and publicised Sato Heihachi's "Practical Methods to Lead Children to Independent Studies," evaluated as an educational research paper of high quality.[17] This attitude of the Prefecture and Associations of Education concerned with Taisho liberal education indicates that they were not necessarily antithetic to it. They probably shared the same cognitive framework of space/time with intellectuals and teachers who supported the movements of Taisho liberal education.

Majima intended to settle the Kisaki dispute by legal procedures in the courts. He rejected the idea of "Master's mercy" that peasants begged him to follow[18] and chose a "modern" action. He was not "feudalistic" in handling the dispute. He was severely condemned by peasants for his "inhuman action," one even a feudal lord would not commit, that is, for his violation of a basic feudal human relationship. They blamed Majima for crushing the "Heaven's Road." Peasants were frequently criticised by their opponents as ignorant, irrational, superstitious and hardheaded. Intellectuals who came to help peasants often held such images of peasants. The terminology of Taisho liberal education and socialism demanded that the landlord-tenant relationship to be humanely "modernised."

The progressive ideas of education from Europe and USA had a strong influence upon intellectuals who were ready to accept these ideas. Through this knowledge the modern

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[15] Ninomiya Sontoku (1787-1856), a most-efficient farming producer in the late Edo period.

[16] *Niigata-ken Kyoiku Hyaku-nen shi* (The 100-year History of Education in Niigata Prefecture), vol.2, chapter 1-1, chapter 2-1.

[17] *Ibid*., p.415, 431.

[18] Goda Shinsuke, *Kisaki Nomin Shogakko no Hitobito* (People at Kisaki Farmers' School), p.275.

(Cartesian) cognitive structure of space/time became something intimate to them. The Taisho liberal education movements, built upon such progressive ideas of education, thus came to Kisaki village together with an intellectual disposition or alignment to Western science. However, this cognitive structure could not easily transform the peasants who felt much more familiar with the world of "Jimbei the Martyr."[19] The cognitive differences hidden within the Kisaki uprising group was therefore quite difficult to be consciously seen by people. "Enlightened" landlords, government bureaucrats, liberalists and socialists already shared a common cognitive framework. Political and social struggles among them were fought on a common ground. The "pre-modern" Kisaki peasants fought their struggle on their own ground, on the other hand, although this ground was then gradually eroded and in its place came the new mind-set. This difference produced different perceptions regarding the peasant school and a critical split developed toward the end of the Kisaki uprising. The Kisaki peasants could not, in the end, win the dispute.

The youth leaders of the uprising asserted that,

> We want to build the peasant school on the foundation of traditional customs of children's company (*kodomo-gumi*) and youth company (*wakamono-gumi*). They are the spiritual community that peasants in Japan have made for themselves when they educate their children in a village community and fulfil their wishes in it. The landlords are not members of the village community. Peasant children have been forced to go to school by the Government. We find nothing but enforcement there. We want to have a new spiritual community of peasants to make it the spiritual foundation for the peasant school. The educational ideas of Noguchi and others are for city dwellers, but not for peasants. We must acquire knowledge in our daily labour and utilise the knowledge for it.[20]

Such a declaration as the above suggests that peasants still looked for a possibility of creating a community-oriented education in the late 1920s. Their perception was directed to the tradition of the past feudal system that might have given them a possibility to return to the status of landholding farmers. However, their social power was quite limited as compared to that of landlords such as Majima who had gained "personal independence founded on material dependence"[21] in this new era of capitalistic development backed up by the central government.

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[19] Kikuchi Kan's "Gimin Jinbei (Jinbei the Martyr)" was very popular among peasants. The time was 1829 (the Edo Shogunate Period). Jinbei was physically handicapped in his legs and was cruelly treated by his stepmother and her three children. He hated them. At a critical moment of a peasant uprising he surrendered himself to the authority pretending that he was the killer of the county magistrate. When he saw his family members being executed altogether according to the law of the Edo period, he said to the villagers who worshipped him as the martyr "... Rejoice, everybody. I have never felt such a good feeling in my life, ha, ha, ha" and was executed. Kikuchi in "Jinbei the Martyr" wrote of a world of concrete space, of blood relationships. He described a unique space in which Jinbei took his revenge on his family by making use of a vicious law of his age. This novel was criticized by writers who supported the movement of proletariat literature. They condemned it as "individualistic," but the peasants liked it very much. The popularity of this novel among peasants suggests that they lived in a differently perceived world from the world of intellectuals such as those in the movement of proletarian literature.

[20] Goda, *op.cit.*, pp.208-211.

[21] Karl Marx, *The Grundrisse*, translated by David McClellan, p.67.

"Relationships of personal dependence (which were at first quite spontaneous) are the first forms of society in which human productivity develops, though only to a slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on material dependence is the second great form: in it there developed for the first time a system of general social interchange, resulting in universal relations, varied requirements and universal capacities. Free individuality, which is founded on the universal development of individuals and the domination of their communal and social productivity, which has become their social power, is the third stage."

INDIVIDUALS AND THE STATE: A LONG DETOUR TO CREATE A COMMUNITY-CONSCIOUS MENTALITY IN JAPAN TODAY

This social and mental centralising trend became stronger along with the modernisation process after the Meiji Restoration. The central government wanted mental boundaries between the State and an individual to be as transparent as possible. Any intermediate social sectors such as families, villages, and cities, counties and prefectures were organised only to be subsidiary organs for the centralised system of the State. Individuals came to face the State directly in their mentality. The initial gears to move the masses toward this centralised mentality were the school system and the conscription that were implemented one after another within half a year around 1872, less than five years after the Meiji Restoration.

Social sentiment in Japan today realises that an active community life is indispensable for an effective citizenship education for children and that school (formal) education alone cannot handle this matter. A grave question is what social element can work as a catalyst to recreate a mentality for an active community life. The rapid economic development after the World War II worked in Japan rather to pull people out of their community life and push them toward universal economic activity. This situation, which has been frequently observed in many countries in the midst of rapid economic development, worked in Japan to maintain or aggrandise the centralised and hierarchical mentality. On the other hand, however, economic universalism has also been creating new social factors that will help recreate a community-oriented mentality. A noticeable factor among these changes is women's changing social status in Japanese society today.

One social studies subject in the high school curriculum today is called "Public Person-ship"(*Komin*). This word was made up for this subject to teach youngsters various social relationships. The word "Citizenship" (*Shimin*) is not used because it merely carries an administrative connotation, one literally meaning to what city people belong as a legal resident. When the word "Public Person-ship" is used at school, it is very likely for Japanese kids to imagine and set aside their "private" space here as the opposite to the public sphere. The "public" sphere may be anywhere outside a family sector or his/her own realm. But it is hardly conceivable for the Japanese that there is another sphere in human relationships, that is, the sphere of individuality. The sphere of individuality stands in many places and is located in both public and private ones.

This topic may be more meaningful when discussed together with the issue of women's social status in Japan today. Women's social status has been a major social issue, especially since the 1980's in Japan. Women realise better than anyone else the necessity to become an "individual" person to gain a fair social status. Gaining individuality means to Japanese women that they stand on a different plane from being simply a private or public person. Being an "individual" person means they overcome the situation both in the private sphere where they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate members to male householders and in the public sphere where they have been traditionally regarded as again a subordinate part of the work force.

As women gain socio-economic or material power today, they are also gaining personal independence. They may be contributing to Japanese society as a rare case in Japanese history of actually materialising the concept of individuality. This materialisation of individuality is made possible by the economic development of Japan today. The Japanese may now be able to

perceive a new sphere of human relationships and construct the mentality of individuality that counterbalances the state-oriented hierarchical mind-set which has been historically consolidated until now. The material foundation women have been obtaining becomes their social power, something the peasants could never capture in the 1920s. Advantageous is also women's closer position to child rearing and the school community in society. Japanese women's struggles for their fair status in the community may be an effective social tool that produces the indispensable foundation for an educational reform that will create a new form of community-oriented citizenship in Japan.

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Citizenship Challenges for Japanese Education for the 21st Century: "Pure" or "Multicultural"? Multicultural Citizenship Education in Japan

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With the so-called Third Opening (or internationalisation) of Japan, the rush of globalisation, and a concern for the direction of national cultural identity in the Japanese nation, courses for citizenship have recently been promoted in schools with titles such as 'Education for International Understanding' and 'Global Education,' among others. Twin surges, one of an awareness of a diverse, multicultural Japanese society, and the other of an apparent neo-nationalism, have been noted in the mass media. Both have been introduced into school contexts, resulting in considerable tension and dissonance. Concern has been raised about the dilution of Japanese identity, manifesting itself in enforced singing in schools of the national anthem, required national flag-raising at ceremonies, and the contents of school textbooks. This paper explores dilemmas and directions for citizenship education in Japan, indicating possible future directions for educational institutions in the transmission of values for the Japanese (multi-) cultural identity.

Multicultural Education, Diversity, Citizenship Education, Nationalism, Identity

CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP: JAPAN AND THE GLOBAL STAGE

With the so-called Third Opening of Japan, the rush of globalisation, and a concern for what national cultural identity means and how to promote it in Japanese society, courses for citizenship have recently been promoted in Japanese schools with titles such as *Education for International Understanding (Kokusai Rikai Kiyoiku)*, *Ethnic Education (Minzoku Kiyoiku)*, *Education for Newcomers (Newcaama no Kiyoiku)*, and *Global Education (Gurobaru Kiyoiku)*, among others. Courses which have long been in the schools such as *Civics (Komin*, or "public person-hood," a word made up by the Ministry of Education to teach this subject), *Values Education (Dotoku Kiyoiku*, sometimes called Morals Education), *Human Rights Education (Dowa Kiyoiku,* Dowa being the Burakumin "untouchable" community), and *Returnees' Education (Kikokushijo Kiyoiku)* could also be considered as belonging to the realm of citizenship education in Japan.[1]

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[1] Japanese scholars who have recently written on these issues include Nakagawa, K. (Ed.) (1997). *Chikyu shimin o hagukumu kyoiku.* [Global teacher, global learner.] Tokyo: Akashi Shoten; Nishioka, N. (1996). Kaihatsu kyoiku no susume. [Development education.] Tokyo: Kamogawa; Uozumi, T. (1995). Guro-baru kyoiku: Chikyu shimin o sodateru. [Global education: developing world citizens]. Tokyo: Reimei Shobo; Otsu, K. (1992). Kokusai rikai kyoiku. [Education for international understanding.] Tokyo: Kokudosha; and Minoura, Y. (1997), Chikyu shimin o sodateru kiyoiku [Education for raising world citizens]. Tokyo: Iwanami.

What distinguishes all of these courses from those concerned with citizenship education in other countries, however, is their marginalisation. Sited on the peripheries of the Japanese curriculum, almost as an after-thought it seems rather than at its core, these courses have targeted specific constituencies other than "main-stream" Japanese.

This is now about to change as serious political and demographic challenges involving immigration and gender equality face Japan. There will most certainly be a major change with regard to the 'Other' in Japan. Immigration will begin on a large scale and women will play increasingly important roles in the society. The greying of the population and subsequent massive retirements mean a serious loss in the numbers of people in the labour force. In order to maintain the present standard of living, new workers will have to be brought into the labour force. In 1999 the UN and the Japanese government estimated a shortfall of 600,000 workers a year beginning in the early 21st century. The only viable way to address this need is more immigrants, what the UN calls replacement migration, and more women in the work force.[2] The implications for education, especially citizenship education, are serious and far-reaching.

Debates on curriculum, which have been focused around global competition and national identity, are increasingly being impinged upon by race, language, and ethnicity. The model of assimilation is being seriously questioned and multiculturalism, with its twin needs of respect and inclusion, has appeared throughout Japan in various forms.

Two surges, one of an awareness of a diverse, multicultural Japanese society, and the other of an apparent neo-nationalism, have at the same time been noted in the mass media. The first speaks for a compelling drive for more openness in Japan and is outward looking, democratic, and inclusive in its conceptualisation of citizenship. The second is exclusive, inward looking, and based on images of a homogeneous canon for Japanese culture. Both have been introduced into school contexts, resulting in considerable tension and dissonance.

Concern has been raised about the dilution of Japanese identity, manifesting itself in enforced singing in schools of the national anthem and required national flag-raising at ceremonies, not to mention on-going controversies about the contents of school textbooks. Dilemmas for citizenship education abound in Japan, indicating possible future directions for the roles of educational institutions in this key component in the transmission of values for the Japanese cultural identity.

What is a citizen? What is citizenship? These two questions are not so easily answered in the Japanese context. The words themselves, those words ostensibly used to describe citizens and the concepts of duties, rights, and responsibilities associated with individuals, are fraught with divisiveness, oppression, and considerable historical baggage (much of which has been

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[2] See Junji Nishihata, *Japan must leave backward ways behind: Survival in IT requires equal footing for women, foreigners: panelist*, The Japan Times Online, October 26, 2001. Scenarios call for between 10-30% of the Japanese population to be composed of immigrants by the year 2050. For the UN Report see the Japan report on this website: United Nations, Population Division, Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and ageing populations? 28 September 2001, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ migration/japan.pdf Also, K. Koshiro (1998). *Does Japan Need Immigrants?*, in M. Weiner and T. Hanami (Eds.) *Temporary Workers or Future Citizens: Japanese and U.S. Migration Policies.* New York: New York University Press, pp. 151-176; T. Kajita (1998), *The Challenge of Incorporating Foreigners in Japan*, in M. Weiner & T. Hanami (Eds.) *Temporary Workers or Future Citizens: Japanese and U.S. Migration Policies.* New York: New York University Press pp. 120-147; and Mike Douglass and Glenda Roberts, eds. *Japan and Global Migration.* London: Routledge, 2000.

conveniently forgotten, in an impressive amnesia). Those western ideas so dear to the concept of democracy have simply fallen on fallow ground, at least if we expect to see them being enacted in ways similar to those of Europeans or North Americans. What is needed is a careful analysis of the historical antecedents, of the compelling concepts, and to determine which concepts resonate and why in the Japanese context.

We need a new look at the radical challenges to the Japanese educational and political system. Especially with the advent of neo-nationalists adored by at least some of the masses, like the Mayor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, who has warned of the dangers of foreigners in the midst of Japanese society. It is a new culture in Japan, but one not nearly so simple as the mass media portray it.[3] Like many nations and societies in the world today, Japan is depicted as grappling with a wrenching transition, either to a new/old national system or to a global system of dissolved cultures and vanished traditions. The reality will likely be far more complex, as we shall see.

At the outset, too, I would like to note my position as a scholar of cultural studies (especially educational/cultural anthropology), my central concerns for education, and my status as a permanent resident of Japan (though American), and the father of two Japanese children schooled through primary and middle school in the Japanese public school system. Since my children are Japanese citizens, too, and because I, also, could easily become a Japanese citizen if I so chose, I am not a disinterested party to this discussion.

THE OTHER VOICE IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

Japan is a country the size of the American state of Montana. Five-sixths of this country is mountains too steep to be used. On the remaining one-sixth of this land are 130 million people, living, working, farming, producing, studying. It is a nation which is resource-poor yet has achieved spectacular economic success and is now the second most powerful economy on earth.

Japan astonishingly transformed itself from traditional feudal state to modern powerhouse in a generation. Reduced to ashes by a devastating war of its own making, Japan rapidly rebuilt, transforming itself to economic superpower and a society which is by far the most peaceful and orderly of all rich, developed nations. A society which has put education first, which has emphasised again and again the importance of the power of what it sees as its greatest natural resource: its people.

Japan is the 'Other' for Western conceptualisations of citizenship and citizenship education. It is *not white, not Anglo, and not Western*. Historically the source of powerful civic transformations throughout history, Japan is the source of numerous paradoxes, problems, and possibilities in the study and practice of citizenship education. Clearly, Japan has much to teach us about citizenship and citizenship education.

On the one hand Japan provides us with powerful alternative suggestions for looking at citizenship and citizenship practices. On the other hand there are here in Japan also strongly suggestive examples of how *not* to approach citizenship, areas where Japan must change, particularly regarding issues of diversity. As the largest economy on earth after the United States, as a nation of enormous influence and prestige, as a society of great harmony, order, stability, and prosperity, Japan *is* the other voice in citizenship education in multicultural societies.

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[3] Ishihara has been called Japan's Le Pen. See *Japan's Le Pen is bad news for foreigners*, http://www.iht.com/articles/56132.htm

We should also note that Japan gives us a fresh look at concepts of the citizen and citizenship education. There is a special transformative power that Japan has brought to bear on critical social issues. This transformative power of the Japanese example has been most effective in the context of educating citizens by providing Japanese people with cultural, national, and global identifications which have generated, facilitated, and smoothed difficult social and economic transitions.

Japan is full of paradoxes, especially for those of us who are multicultural educators. A nation of seemingly great homogeneity, Japan's treatment of issues of diversity and pluralism can hardly be called admirable. Yet on the world stage, where Japan is a minority (non-white, non-Western, non-Christian), the power of Japan's voice and example has been undeniable. The brutal discrimination against Japanese immigrants to the United States and elsewhere and the devastation of atomic warfare come to mind. Within Japan there has sometimes been another story, one of rigid demarcation of inside and outside, of purity and pollution, of bully and victim.

In multicultural societies like the United States there are many complex issues involved in educating highly diverse student populations for both academic excellence and active participation as citizens. In Japan diversity is less visible, less obvious, and has traditionally been downplayed. This is now changing, as the Japanese realise the great need that they have for individualism and individual values, as traditional gender roles (undoubtedly the most rigid in the developed world) are breaking down. Diversity in Japan is coming from within, from the assertion of individuality and especially from the surfacing of once-taboo issues of gender roles.

Japan is *not* highly diverse, not at least from traditional perceptions of diversity as ethnicity and/or class. Japan *is* highly diverse in terms of severe gender role differentiation. In the past 15 years there has been growing acknowledgment of diversity in schools, first with Japanese returnees from abroad and the challenges they presented to a traditionally homogeneous school system, and more recently as large numbers of Brazilian-Japanese students enter the school system.[4] More particularly, traditionally taboo issues of diverse populations in Japan (Koreans, Chinese, Untouchables) are now being more openly discussed. Koreans (600,000), Burakumin (3 million), mixed children (large indeterminate numbers, especially of Japanese/ Korean background), returnees, and others are some of these communities.

Japan can thus offer new dimensions, disturbing secrets, and surprising advances in the study of citizenship education in multicultural societies. Japan's society has been the envy of the world for many years. *Japan*: the premier example of a country and a society which has offered the Other view, which has defied the West and the power and hegemony of white Western culture. *Japan*: long known, both inside and outside, as a society of solid homogeneity, of a singular language, and of a singular consciousness. And, indeed, of great insularity. *Japan:* land of "purity," Land of the Gods.[5]

Will a "citizenship" based on this mythical purity (and the implicit citizenship education associated with it) now move towards one formed from a society of great diversity and difference? Will Japan move from a "pure" to a "multicultural" concept of citizenry and citizenship education?

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[4] The work of Haruo Ota concerning newcomers is instructive here: *Nuukamaa no kodomo to Nihon no Gakko (Newcomer Children and Japan's Schools)* (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2000). The activities of Kobe Sho-Gakko, Kobe Elementary School, particularly the Global Educator Kumiko Hattori, a teacher in the school who has been instrumental in pushing for recognition of the needs of newcomers, founding a nation-wide society for global education, and for promoting an education for global, international understanding for children, should also be recognised.

[5] The Japanese emphasis on purity (and its obverse, pollution) also has great echoes of the discourse of caste distinctions and discrimination in the South Asian context.

CITIZENSHIP IN JAPAN: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Historically, Japanese people were *shinmin* (subjects), not *shimin* (citizens). There was no thought given, certainly not critically, towards the concept of the independent and responsible citizen. You were loyal to your country as a member of the *kokumin* (nation-people), a term still frequently used, in a larger, abstract way,[6] but your real loyalties and sense of self and place were associated with your *mura* (village), the community that protected and nurtured you and your family. Except for those who lived in a small number of pre-modern cities like Edo (Tokyo), Kyoto, and Naniwa (Osaka), Japanese people have traditionally been *mura no hito-bito* (people of the village). Citizen as *person of the city* was almost an unknown concept for the Japanese.

Citizenship education is thus a moot point until the end of World War II and should more likely be termed 'subject education.' We do find, however, many of the basic components for what is thought to be a good citizen in the discourse of what it is to be 'a good person,' much of which is tied to traditional Confucian values. The Japanese value of loyalty is an important addendum to this, though commitment might be a more appropriate English word. The zeal for this commitment entered a mind-numbing madness in the era just before and during World War II (the dark ravine, as the Japanese refer to these years). Militarism and martial samurai values held everyone in terror and, let us be frank, civic commitment.

The MacArthur Constitution of 1946 had as one of its focus points a democratic and peace-oriented school system. The Americans abolished one of the main courses in the pre-war curriculum, *Shushin,* moral/patriotic/imperial education. In its place courses in Civic Education (*Komin*, literally 'public person education' in Japanese) were introduced at the end of the compulsory educational system (the American Grade 9) and Moral Education (*Dotoku Kiyoiku*) in the earlier years.

The first, *Komin*, aimed at the study of the new constitution (Article 9 of which explicitly bans war as an instrument of state policy thus making this the so-called 'Peace Constitution'), the structure/function of government, political participation by 'citizens,' and study of the nation's economy. As Rohlen noted in his classic study of Japan's high schools (1983), this 'civic education' never quite caught on with the public or educators, and the contemplated shift from educating subjects to educating citizens slowly faded from the public imagination. Despite opposition from the Japan Teachers' Union, by the late 1950s moral education was reintroduced by the Ministry of Education as a subject area, with homilies and stories of 'right' and 'wrong' behaviour for 'discussion' in classes. Civic education was then relegated to the higher reaches of elective courses at the end of high school. Rohlen found that teachers' attitudes towards citizenship was not about teaching it directly but by example, guidance, discipline, and self-control.

Dotoku Kiyoiku (moral education, literally, the way of virtue) is the other course of study whose contents cover areas we might think of as connected with citizenship. *Dotoku* is now taught one period a week in all schools in all required grades (1-9). The Ministry of Education recommends values that should be taught, but in practice local teachers exercise autonomy in how these lessons are enacted. Far more important are those local arrangements of duties and expectations for students.

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[6] *Kokutai* (the national polity or national essence), an even more abstract term that implies imperial and divine blessing, was a common term for the citizenry before and during World War II. It has since fallen out of favour, except for right-wing politicians, who frequently have seemingly intentional slips of the tongue along these lines describing the people of Japan. Former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori caused a considerable furor during his term by often using the expression.

Every class has an assignment board at the front of the class naming small groups of students who are in charge as a responsible group of such duties as *kyoshoku toban* (a group which dons masks and collects and then serves lunches from the common kitchen area to the class), *shoji toban* (a group which cleans the classroom), and other groups in charge of the class garden or the class animals, arrangements for sports and music days, and so on. Sudden cancellation of classes in order to hold a *gakkyu-kai* (special class meeting) add drama, concern, and excitement to the regular schedule. These meetings are usually held when there are special problems such as bullying.

The word for citizen in Japanese, *shimin,* directly translates into English as 'person of the city.' This word does not carry the larger nuances of duties and responsibilities for nation and community that the English word citizen has. In fact, *shimin* usually only has to do with those legal requirements one has as a resident of a city. There are similar words in use as well: *kenmin* or *tomin* (person of the prefecture) and *jumin* (resident, though whether of a locality or the nation is not clear). Most Japanese have a paradoxical approach to being citizens: disenchantment on the one hand with government and politics in general but a sense of following one's duties as members of a group when there are local needs to be met. Low voter turnouts show widespread feelings of political alienation, but the society moves along in an efficient and reasonably stable manner.

MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION, CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION, AND JAPAN

Japan, on the other hand, offers a challenge to multicultural educators. It is often the foil, the example used by those of the far and near right in countries like Australia, France, and America, of the dangers of multiculturalism. Japan, they say, has succeeded because the Japanese are all alike, because they do *not* have diversity. This chorus of the right has unfortunately received support from top Japanese politicians, prime ministers included, who have echoed these racist thoughts with racist aspersions against peoples of colour and the whole idea of diversity as benefit not deficit.

In 1986 Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made explicit remarks about Blacks and Hispanics being responsible for dragging American educational standards down. The clear implication for Japanese was that their 'purity' and homogeneity were signal reasons for their success as a people, a nation and a society. It should be noted that these remarks were only intended for domestic consumption, having been uttered in the context of a political rally, and then picked up by international newsmen.

The study of citizenship education in Japan as a multicultural society is thus exceptionally complicated, yet it offers special deep insights into our collective future just as it is at the same time lagging far behind in certain basic human rights issues, particularly those of gender and nation, and more especially those of consciousness of the Other just as they are a prime example of the Other in the midst of our human community.

Not least because it is not Western, not Christian, not White, Japan challenges us to think in radically different ways about the meanings of citizenship, citizenship education, and multicultural societies. Japan is the Orient. How we in the West see Japan is the primary example of Orientalism. Japan is the antithesis of the West. In many ways Japan's example challenges us to think in new ways about our values, our social practices, and ourselves.

The study of Citizenship Education has almost exclusively been a discourse of Western thought, values, and consciousness: the Greek and later the Renaissance 'city-state', the 'Age of Enlightenment', the 'Age of Reason'; the Roman ideas of empire and ideology in service to a larger proto-nation collective. Canada, Australia, Israel, Britain, and Germany all share the same roots, the same wellsprings of citizen and society, of rights and responsibilities. Japan does not.

Steeped in the Western tradition and Western values myself, but having lived in Japan and India for nearly 25 years of my adult life, approaching the study of Citizenship Education in Japanese society is a delicate task. I began this study with the intention of understanding 'citizen,' 'citizenship education,' and 'multicultural society' from Japanese points of view. All of these are difficult concepts in the Japanese context. *Citizen* can be viewed in numerous ways in Japan, but none of the words or concepts used precisely capture the Western sense of the citizen. Citizenship Education exists as a class at the end of high school, as we have mentioned, but this is an elective class taken by few students and that focuses almost exclusively on economics and politics.

There really is no mainstream movement in the Japanese educational world similar to what is happening with regard to citizenship education as conceptualised in North America and Europe. When a group of fifteen eminent scholars of Japanese education were surveyed in the spring of 2001, their responses tended to be: *Citizenship Education? Not really much interest in this in Japan. Diversity and Multicultural Education? Yes, some interest, but scholars who are few and far between, mainly case studies of local, specific areas.*

If we see Citizenship Education as knowledge construction, in Japan at least there is not much interest in the topic. For the Japanese, what they are doing in the classroom is already seen as adequate as citizenship education. The society, at least until recently, has been seen as stable, and until now the graduates who come out contribute well to that society. What problems there are tend to be not very large in scale (with the possible exception of school refusals). So how to educate a citizen does not need to be formed and re-formed, from a Japanese perspective. The Japanese are thus, at least from a world perspective, behind the times.

There is thus no discourse on citizenship education as much of the rest of the world conceives of it. No one has really looked at citizenship education in Japan with a global view in mind, targeting mainstream Japanese society. There are few entries in books on Japanese education on citizenship education per se, though of course this subject overlaps with areas of concern in educating children to be members of the Japanese society. It is, so far, just not the same discourse as what we see in America, Europe, and other parts of the world.

What we do have that touches on issues of concern related to citizenship education are a number of specifically targeted programs for ethnic consciousness in schools. But these programs are small and have little impact on mainstream discourse. They include programs for:

a) *Kokusai Rikai Kiyoiku* – Education for International Understanding, a response to Japan's potential isolation from the world scene. Related discourse is heavy in the society in general on kokusaika (internationalisation) and *kyosei shakai* (symbiotic, by implication international, society)

b) *Jinken Kiyoiku* – Education in Human Rights, usually about *Dowa*, the Japanese untouchables; or about Zainichi Koreans ("staying in Japan" Koreans brought during the colonial era). Both of these communities are basically Japanese culturally.

We have to keep in mind that difference does not loom large in Japanese minds. There is no large-scale immigration constantly swelling classrooms as in the USA and many European countries. Thus, citizenship education is not much of an issue either.

Citizenship in Japan is simply assumed: you are born with it *naturally* if you are Japanese. The word for this is *kokuseki*, the assumed right of citizenship, which translates as "duty to the country." This is a more or less organic view, which means that educational interventions and other program creations are not seen as necessary. The Japanese see themselves as naturally born as

citizens. The *koseki tohon* or family register system, which is the basis for all citizen obligations and rights, is the basis and fountain from which all these ideas spring. To be rather blunt, the citizenship education concept is not an exciting one for Japanese scholars.

A web search on the Ministry of Education's website using the word 'citizenship' turned up only one reference and that was to a G8 Summit of Educational Ministers. And it was not about citizenship education. The only mention of citizenship in the Fundamental Law of Education is…

> Article 8
>
> "The political knowledge necessary for intelligent citizenship shall be valued in education."
>
> "The schools prescribed by law, shall refrain from political education or other political activities for or against any specific political party."

This would seem to support citizenship education, yet in the very same Article is a proscription from political participation. For most people concerned with citizenship education today this would indeed seem to be a contradiction, denying critical thinking and active participation. Fostering a narrow sense of citizenship as duty to the nation would seem to be the main lesson implied by this sole mention of citizenship by the Ministry of Education.

Japan as a multicultural society is the most interesting challenge of all to ideas about citizenship. By official definition Japan is 99% Japanese, the 1% of minorities being largely so-called 'living-in-Japan' Koreans whose ancestors were forcibly brought or who migrated to imperial Japan during the colonial era or New Immigrants who are not immigrants at all from a Japanese perspective but a combination of legal and illegal labour from Asian countries and overseas Japanese communities in Latin America needed for the 3 Ks industries (*kitanai, kusai, and kiken*: dirty, stinking, and dangerous) which Japanese do not want to do themselves.

Gender boundaries and gender distinction/discrimination are the most rigid in the world. It is a curious fact that most Japanese-English dictionaries translate the Japanese word for discrimination first as 'distinction', and then as 'discrimination' Age boundaries and discrimination exist in all aspects of Japanese society. And yet Japan is multicultural in surprising ways.

Recently a number of important works on Japan as a multicultural society have appeared. Like the 'pioneers' of America, Russia, and other expansionist national societies, Japan conquered, massacred, and largely assimilated indigenous First Nation populations, including the Ainu, Nivkh, and Ulita. Remnant populations of these First Nation peoples are now active in recovering their heritage and lands. It is a powerful mark of the influence of these First Nation peoples on the Japanese that the Japanese word for 'God' (*Kami*) is apparently derived from the Ainu root *Kamui*.

Caste distinctions rigidly observed in Japan for 1500 years (samurai, farmer, craftsman, merchant, and untouchable) were abolished but not completely ended with the Meiji Revolution and Japan's transition to a modern era. Japan's most significant social problem remains the large numbers of 'formerly' untouchable populations of Burakumin ('people of the hamlet'), who number about three million. Add to this those Japanese who are from mixed backgrounds, returnees, and the poor. One of the most striking groups of all for the Japanese are the so-called 'haafu' who are usually from a white/Japanese mix, many of whom have become entertainers and other media personalities, but in fact the largest numbers of mixed peoples are those of Asian/Japanese, especially Japanese/Korean mixed backgrounds.[7]

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[7] The work of Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, whose essay also appears here, has been extensive and thoughtful on this subject.

Japan does not celebrate diversity. Far from it. But there is a move afoot to recognise individuality and that could be seen as celebrating diversity, particularly with regard to gender. Critical thinking has also become part of that agenda. There is nothing about challenging the status quo, which is a component of that critical thinking, however. Yet the approach to citizenship in Japan is if anything still in the nationalistic mode of civics education: for the society; for the nation.

One way that the changing times and the tide of globalisation has been broached is to "import diversity," as David McConnell has so aptly put.[8] A large-scale program for importing foreigners, many of whom are inexperienced at teaching, to the public schools as AETs or Assistant English Teachers (or JETs, Japan English Teachers, as they were originally called), has been carried out so that most high schools and junior high schools now have access to a foreign, usually native, speaker. These teachers are expected not only to teach English but to help promote international understanding and global education. Is this a new component of citizenship education in Japan, in this case for global citizenship?

Unfortunately, this may be an idealistic interpretation. The construction of boundaries and borders is sometimes done best through proxies. The official rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s of internationalisation (*kokusaika*) was often a way to delineate and reinforce the boundaries of Japaneseness. It is not surprising that this same era saw a huge increase in the popularity of *Nihonjin-ron* (theories of Japaneseness). A more likely explanation for the official rationale for the JET/AET program is to help students prepare (as citizens of the nation) for the era of global economic competition. Know thy enemy, perhaps?

Much of what is done that results as citizenship education in Japan is implicit or as part of the "hidden curriculum." There *is* awareness of the need to do citizenship education on the part of some scholars and teachers, but there is a great reluctance to participate in that discourse because it has been so co-opted by the Ministry of Education. Most scholars read civics education as the attempt by Monbusho (the Ministry of Education) to push top-down their version of national patriotism. This traditional conception of citizenship education as a top-down directive from the Ministry of Education is not very different from what existed before World War II, and there has been a running battle that continues even today between the Ministry and scholars of education.

We cannot underestimate the forces of the right, and of fascism really, that continue in power from the time of pre-war cliques who were never really dissolved by MacArthur and the US Occupation. So most scholars in Japan see the real need for their energies to be directed in confronting the Ministry of Education. The recent controversies about textbooks echo these concerns right into the early years of the 21st century.

Let us extend these arguments further now, into the realm of cultural processes that have a very direct impact on citizenship education.

CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND CITIZENSHIP

The most important aspect of any education is, in fact, cultural transmission, the passing down of cultural values and cultural systems from one generation to the next. Some of this cultural transmission is about valued traditional ways, some of which are accepted without question for their resonance and utility, others clearly contested and in the process of transformation, be those from the outside or the inside. This new view allows us to see education and educational systems in

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[8] David McConnell, *Importing Diversity: Inside Japan's JET Program* (Berkeley: U of California P, 2000).

a somewhat different light, as one more inclined to expose larger processes at work and conceivably harder choices in process.

Japan, today, for example, has severe challenges facing its education system in terms of issues of… (not necessarily in order here)

1) Nation, Nationalism, National/Cultural Pride - a 'national socialist' renaissance?
2) Diversity – Difference and Confrontations with Traditional Hegemonies
3) Gender – which is rapidly changing the face of Japan
4) Identity
5) Curriculum – efficacy and appropriateness for the 21st century
6) Economy – intrusion of the dismal science on real-life concerns in classrooms
7) Literacy
8) Immigrants
9) Transnational Exchange
10) Critical Thinking
11) Creativity

Which direction will Japan take in addressing these challenges? Will this course be characterised by exclusion or inclusion? Will it be "Pure" or "Multicultural"?

Here I would like to take a somewhat different tack than simply addressing each of the issues above, describing them, and then documenting their course (or lack thereof).

What I would like to do first is to propose a shift of emphasis, a shift of gaze towards phenomena of connections, towards what can be called ***Creolisation*** or ***Hybridity***. We will see here that even for a nation supposedly as homogeneous and exclusive as Japan there really is no other choice but that of embracing difference and diversity.

This ***Hybridity/Creolisation*** is in fact reflected historically and in multiple manifestations throughout Japanese society, traditionally thought to be a so-called homogeneous society.

On close inspection we realise that this perspective of sameness, of the group, of homogeneity, has been one of the strongest in the hegemonic catechism of ideas which Western social scientists, heavily steeped in the dogma of individualism, have brought with them when looking at Japan.

In the Japanese context any cultural transmission being enacted throughout the educational system has been predicated more or less on a pre-war structure, very much dominated by Confucian ideas (in practice if not name), with an overlay of modernistic rhetoric. Class sizes remain large, like the pre-war era. School rules are strict, more or less, for secondary students. Patterns of authority and obedience have shown little change. At the same the outside world is now intruding into this closed and shuttered scene.

Globalisation, or 'internationalisation' (*kokusaika*) as it has often been called in Japan, has made many Japanese uneasy about the future, suggesting to them the limits to a national cultural autonomy and national culture rather narrowly defined as distinct, 'pure,' bounded entity. There is an increasing tension, fear, and worry concerning the potential 'loss' of Japanese culture, society, and identity, and an active discourse on these issues in the Japanese media. At the same time, the parameters of Japanese citizenship have been loosened, though when non-Japanese attempt to acquire citizenship this is often contested at the local level by bureaucrats carrying out policy directives in narrow ways. Still, what is or is not Japanese is no longer as clear-cut as it might once have been.

Culture in Japan is becoming an increasingly contested terrain as new hybrid forms and identities emerge which synthesise multiple, older, more traditional forms. Uncertainty and fear have given rise to neo-nationalist projects on the one hand and a resignation to what is seen as a culture-dissolving, amorphous globalisation on the other. We now need to shed light on the key problems and challenges facing this contested terrain of Japanese education and culture as they relate to the idea of who is a citizen and who can be considered Japanese.

NEW APPROACHES TO JAPANESE EDUCATION?

New globally informed images of educational socialisation are now in the landscapes of Japanese society. This series of new narratives of transnational/ transcultural interactions, transnational/transcultural contexts and transnational/transcultural processes that are institutional, societal, and cultural. These changes are taking place before our very eyes. [9]

They are not, as many have seen them, westernisation or Americanisation or some other form of global homogenising and assimilation.[10] The context is one of *border thinking*. It emerges from the cracks between civilization and culture, between what the Creole philosopher Edouard Glissant has called globalisation and 'mondialisation', between global designs and local histories.[11]

It is in these spaces that we find the intersections of Japan and the world, the networks and connections of what we might call *the JA-global crossroads*. Moreover, the communities in these spaces, and especially the individuals living and working there, tell us much about their nature as crossroads and how cultural exchange/interchange/production is enacted. We need more exploration of these borders and border crossings, of identity/identities in the context of where these two societies meet each other, where connections are established and maintained. It is, after all, on the subject of boundary construction where much of the world's contemporary discourse is red-hot, alive with the spectacular creation of new forms of human societies and human consciousness. Borders are not where something stops. Borders are where something begins.

Although Japan can be seen historically (not only in terms of relations with China and Korea, but in terms of Europe) as a society of active hybridity and borrowing, the primary emphasis in the academic literature in the modern era has actually been on *assimilation* or *syncretism,* which

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[9] Ulf Hannerz, Arjun Appadurai, and others have shown us that what is happening is actually strikingly different. Appadurai, Ibid., Hannerz (1996), Ibid, and Takeshi Matsuda, *Conference on "Exploring Emergent 'JAmerican Culture'"* (San Francisco: 2000). See also Sherry Ortner, ed. *The Fate of Culture - Geertz and Beyond*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1999; Ulf Hannerz, *Cultural Complexity* (New York: Columbia UP, 1992); Ulf Hannerz, *Transnational Connections* (London: Routledge, 1996); Ulf Hannerz, et al., *Considering Creolization. A Transnational Communities ESRC Programme of Oxford University*, *Fall 1999* http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/wwwroot/mich99.htm; Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large* (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996); Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Globalization as Hybridization*. In Featherstone, Mike, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds. *Global Modernities* (London: Sage, 1995), 45-68; and Iain Chambers, *Migrancy, Culture, Identity* (London: Routledge, 1994).

[10] Sklair's discussion of globalisation is useful here, delineating four approaches to its study: 1. *The world-systems approach*; 2. *The global culture approach*; 3. *The global society approach*; 4. *The global capitalism approach*. My approach, one of creolisation, actually touches on all of these but underlines the second, the approach towards a global culture, with a clear understanding that it is the fourth, the globalisation of transnational capital, which has set the stage. The role of the nation-state is reduced but not eliminated, as some have feared. Instead, a more sophisticated pattern of identity/ identities is suggested that allows people to maintain a national identity alongside other, more complex identities. See Leslie Sklair, *Competing Conceptions of Globalization,* in *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Volume 5, Number 2 (Spring 1999) http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html

[11] Walter D. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000).

continue to privilege one side over the other. Defined on the planes of hierarchy/ hegemony and the dominance/subordination of values, of Japan's eclectic 'borrowing' for the reconstitution of an ever-purer Japan, which always resulted in a more powerful Japan (and which continued to fear the Other in her midst or around her perimeters), this form of hybridity is not creolisation, in the sense of more even-handed horizontal relations, of a levelling and a borrowing that is two-way and which establishes a new creation.[12]

The stranger and the strange in the Japanese context have, in Bauman's felicitous phrase, *served as borderlines for the advancing boundary of order-under-construction.*[13] Here we get some clues as to the nature of citizenship in Japan. In the global cultural flow taking place in Japan (*ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financecapes, ideoscapes, and eduscapes*[14]) the defining of who is or is not a Japanese has been an important part of the discourse.

Reading the text of education (and the subtext of citizenship education) as Hybridity/Creolisation, I note how signally important it is for our understanding of human beings and the changes in cultural environments experiencing rapid social change. Moreover, hybridity deconstructs the notions of pure, singular cultures and their inevitable assumptions of superiority and their sanctioning of human rights violations. Through this concept we come to understand Japan and Japanese cultures, as well as Korean, European, South Asian, African, Latin American, and American cultures, in new, more powerful, and more provocative ways.

We can no longer view education and culture as having a meaning and form linked simply to territory or of the people of that land as necessarily linked to it culturally. What may be education or culture for locals (daily interaction anchored around one-on-one relationships in one place, without much moving around) is becoming less and less the norm in the world.

Yet the truly dynamic cultures are those that transcend space and place. The anchor of their cultural identity is not in a place but in social relationships and interactions. Those cultures which are territorially defined are literally 'losing ground' to those which have collective networks of meaning extending into space and across time. The globalisation of culture is not the same as its homogenisation, demonstrating that the shapes of cultures are less bounded, more fluid, and more of a daily challenge. This emphasises the importance of a key skill for a new world: *the flexible re-negotiation of mutual understandings and spatial arrangements.* In other words, being radically context-dependent.

Transformations we are seeing entail, at both the local and transnational levels, 1) reduced cultural homogeneity, 2) increased cultural disorder, and 3) the formation of true transnational cultures

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[12] The "making and unmaking of strangers," as Zygmunt Bauman has noted, in coping with strangers and the strange, is the central focus of the issue at hand. There are three strategies (viz. Claude Lévi-Strauss): *anthropophagic*, annihilating the strangers by devouring them, a strategy of assimilation, or *anthropoemic*, vomiting the strangers by banishing them, a strategy of exclusion or ghettoisation. When neither of these works, *destroying* the strange and the stranger physically is the final option. What we are trying to do here is resist all three of these strategies by putting forth a new way of seeing the interaction of the strange and the familiar, by a focus on process and action as they are manifested by creolisation. Rather than seeing strangers and the strange as anomalies to be rectified or as temporary, we put them on equal footing as engaged participants in the making of new cultures together. See Zygmunt Bauman, *The making and unmaking of strangers*, in Pnina Werbner and Tariq Modood. *Debating Cultural Hybridity* (London: Zed Books, 1997), 46-57.

[13] Bauman, Op.cit., 54.

[14] Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy, in Public Culture, Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 1990. I have added eduscapes here.

(sometimes called third cultures). It is less and less likely that we will see cultures that are isolated pockets of relative homogeneity. Linkage is the key and with it the creation of increasingly diverse portraits of The Other. For the Japanese there are two paths, one that was followed before of exclusion, isolation, violence, and poverty, and the other of a powerfully conscious recognition of *the dynamism of Japanese as a creolised language*, *Japanese society as many creolised societies*, and *Japanese culture as an active world culture*.

We need to examine human resources, both as individuals and as networks, as Zachary has discussed recently.[15] With the global movements of millions of people, their cultures, and identities immigration is rapidly emerging as a key theme of the 21st century. To be more precise this is a phenomenon of movement and mobility *both ways,* not one way. The word immigration itself, encumbered as it is with linear concepts of place and peoples, does not tell us as much as those sites of *créolité* appearing throughout the world landscape. Now numbering over 100 million people, these moving populations reinforce the idea of diasporic communities in our midst. These are different diaspora, however, from previous times.

These global movements and processes and subsequent diasporas are a result of transnational capitalism, especially in an era that has moved from traditional Fordist to flexible modes of accumulation. Time-space compression has resulted in new ways of seeing and combining our worlds.Given its transnational scope, creolisations and diaspora today "directly challenge the long held correspondence among nation, culture, identity, and place."

The uneasiness of the modern era, the dominant sentiment of the feeling of uncertainty about the future, the new world disorder, is no longer a temporary nuisance to be overcome or reduced. Uncertainty is now permanent and unmitigated. What we can do to understand this uncertainty is to view the locus of its action and its variations taking place in the many locales and stages of cultural interaction.

In the global space of the 21st century there are no longer any unbroken local traditions with their isolated stamps of authenticity. This is a particularly hard concept to grasp when we look at Japan and Japanese society, so used are we (both Japanese and non-Japanese) to the discourse of Japanese uniqueness, singularity, and exceptionalism. But what we thought was Japan has turned out on closer examination to be a realm of magnificent and profuse creolised encounters, some blatantly obvious, many hidden under the masks of these continuing wooden stereotypes. What we thought was *'Japan'* we now find to be shifting under our feet as we speak. This is especially true for the concept of citizenship.

Ethnicity and citizenship can now be seen, at least in the Japanese context, in three ways as residents who are either *Natural Japanese*, *Naturalised Japanese*, or *Non-Japanese*. Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, Takamichi Kajita, Takeshi Matsuda, and others have given explicit voice to this idea of a truly multicultural Japanese society, one which admittedly has encountered serious resistance from a portion of the *Natural Japanese* population, notably the political leadership. His exploration of these issues notes the rise of a movement from the grassroots, similar to what is happening in Europe and North America, for the rights of all *denizens*. Those people who live in a place are increasingly seen as all deserving the same sets of rights and responsibilities. One does

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[15] See Gregg Pascal Zachary, *Dualing multiculturalisms: the urgent need to reconceive cosmopolitanism.* Paper presented at the Conceiving Comopolitanism conference, University of Warwick 27-29 April 2000. April 20, 2001. http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/ working%20papers/zachary.pdf; *The Global Me: New Cosmopolitans and the Competitive Edge: Picking Globalism's Winners and Losers* (Washington: Public Affairs, 2000); *A Global Triangle*. October 20, 2000, *The Globalist*. April 15, 2001.

not necessarily have to acquire nationality to have these rights (the responsibilities, such as taxes, have of course long been there).[16]

It is now change, not static cultural structures, which captures our attention and interest as researchers of Japanese education. Rather than seeing culture and its attendant processes of transmission through the educational system as an enormous, permanent, and complex social machine, we find the river a more apt metaphor. With its swirls and eddies, its sometimes swift change and at other times slow, ponderous course, the river presents a new view of culture, with its flows and changes, some predictable, some not. The river focuses us on processes that are liquid rather than structure that is unmovable. It is no longer the rules but the actions that are taking place in transforming human relations that reveal the importance of cultural activity. It is a view of the river, not from far-off as eternal and unchanging, but up close with change as an implicit aspect of culture.

Sometimes there is reaction and resistance from transient, fleeting Japanese cultural structures of supposed authenticity, but more often what we see is interaction and transformation. The concept of the flow of cultural complexity shows us that cultural meanings, and in many ways the definitions of cultural citizenship (which can be seen as even more basic than state citizenship), are formed through interaction.[17] And it is cultural praxis, the action of making meaning, the practice of a transnational literacy, which we will likely see as an increasing mode of identification for issues of citizenship.[18]

We should begin to try to understand those many people in this global zing world whose cultures and homes are multiple. These people, who actually include far more of us than we might think, live in transnational public spaces. Their examples calls for a new vision of *flexible citizenship*.[19] What is called for now, in Japan and elsewhere, is a new politics, a *cosmopolitics*.[20] Meanings are negotiated directly, and we can no longer describe change as a shift from one cultural system to another, to westernisation, Americanisation, or McDonaldisation. Culture is not a given but is always being negotiated. In the realm of citizenship education in all diverse societies this may be the real starting point for *an education for humanity, a citizenship education for all.*

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[16] Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, *Expanding the borders of the nation: ethnic diversity and citizenship in Japan*, Unpublished Manuscript, 2002. As another symbol of the changing times in Japan and the attention to new perspectives on Japanese society, the recent prolific work of Takamichi Kajita, symbolised by his edited volume *Kokusaika to Aidentiti (Internationalisation and Identity)* (Tokyo: Minerva Shuppan, 2001) should be noted. The most radical perspectives on difference and mixing, however, are those concerned with Creolisation in Japan: see Takeshi Matsuda, ed, *The Age of Creolization in the Pacific: In Search of Emerging Cultures and Shared Values in the Japan-America Borderlands.* Keisuisha: Hiroshima, 2001; and Imafuku Ryuta, *Cafe Creole*. April 15, 2001. http://www.cafecreole.net

[17] Hannerz, Op.cit., 1992.

[18] Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Teaching for the times, in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, eds. *The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and Power* (London: Zed, 1995), 177-202.

[19] Aiwha Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham: Duke UP, 1999).

[20] Pheah and Robbins, eds, *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1998.

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Confucianism as Cultural Constraint: A Comparison of Confucian Values of Japanese and Korean University Students

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Although the influence of Confucianism over the behaviour and thought of people in East Asia has often been discussed, not much reference has been made with regard to differences in Confucian orientations between countries. This paper examines the proposition that observable Confucian orientations today vary from country to country and that clarifying their differences would help account for the variance of communication styles and attitudes in East Asia. We outline today's Confucian beliefs in Korea and Japan, and then compare beliefs in these two societies based on results from a survey carried out among university students in the two countries. Analysis was carried out from two perspectives: characteristic differences and level of strength in belief. The results of factor analysis suggest the presence of differences in Confucian values between the two countries. Further comparisons concerning the strength of beliefs, based on the values of 48 items using ANOVA, clarified these differences and suggested important educational implications which are presented in this paper.

Confucianism, communication, values, Japan, Korea

INTRODUCTION

Studies in intercultural communication have discussed cultural influences over behaviour and values. Hofstede (1991), for example, claims that culture is the collective programming of a mind, which distinguishes one group or category of people from another. Strong influences which social/cultural values have over individuals are discussed in such works as Bellah (1970[1]) and Bond (1992).

Confucianism is a philosophy that considers proper behaviour and human relationships as the basis of the society. In pursuit of ideal moral goals, Confucianism sets forth principles that define "appropriate" manners or attitudes toward other people as well as toward oneself. As pointed out by Ock Yum (1988), Confucianism has a strong influence on communication patterns in East Asia. Not only that, in discussing the quick economic development of East Asia, Confucianism has been an unavoidable cultural factor to be considered. A closer look

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[1] Bellah believes that social values show what is a good society, good social action, good social relations, and a good person as a member of society. Moreover, such values regulate individual attitudes and the way social relationships are revealed in any society.

at each country, however, finds various Confucian traits throughout the history of East Asia, and interesting differences in social values emerge. When we come across such anecdotes about Japanese who do not mind sacrificing family life for the company and yet do mind giving up their seat for the elderly in the train, or about Koreans who usually look very self-assertive suddenly becoming modest in front of the elderly, we see the need to try and know what lies behind these behaviours. A hypothetical proposal here is that while countries in East Asia share Confucianism as a common moralistic framework, the types of behaviours expected or acceptable vary by community.

The aim of this research is first to outline today's Confucian beliefs and second to examine which are cherished or emphasised, and which are less emphasised or barely existent. Korea and Japan were chosen as targets of the research on the ground that both countries have a long history of Confucianism but have gone through different processes. Clarifying these differences will provide us with many hints for understanding the two countries. To approach this study, we measured values and beliefs using a questionnaire and applied statistical analysis on the data. The analysis and results are discussed below.

CONFUCIANISM IN KOREA AND JAPAN

In Korea, Confucianism was adopted as the official philosophy of the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) and was developed during its 500-year reign. Even today, it is taught as the basis of morality. In local communities there are special schools where Confucian thoughts are exclusively taught by spiritual leaders who themselves practice Confucianism (Ito, 1993). The tendency to emphasise "filial piety" is pointed out as being the characteristic feature of Korean Confucianism (Moon, 1992; Honda, 1997).

In Japan, on the other hand, although Confucianism was adopted by the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867) its influence was limited to certain private schools and never permeated through all levels of society. The Meiji government (1868-1911), however, used Confucianism to build a nation with the emperor as its supreme authority. The *Imperial Rescript of Education* (1890) tells us how uniquely Confucian thoughts were used to advocate nationalism. The relationship between the emperor and the people was compared to that of father and son, and thus loyalty was emphasised. The total ban on Confucian education by the US Occupation Army after World War II and the waves of westernisation afterward, however, flushed away the roots of traditional values in Japan. Although there is a tendency to attribute Asia's economic success to the moral qualities of Confucianism, the shapes and forms of Confucianism in the society have become very vague at their edges, and there is no denying that the role of Confucian values is on the decline.

In this way, Confucian moral values have gone through different processes of history in each country. Thus we think it is of great importance to determine how much of Confucianism still remains within the consciousness of people and to examine the differences in beliefs between the two nations.

RESEARCH GOALS

1) To find the characteristic features of Confucianism in Korea and Japan

2) To contrast Confucian currents in Korea and Japan and to examine the differences in terms of strengths in beliefs.

METHODOLOGY

A survey was designed using Likert rating scales so that it would reflect participants' attitudes in responding to given statements. First, a literature survey was carried out to search Confucian values in East Asia, and 51 statements were adopted for the final survey sheet. Data collection was carried out from July to August in the year 1999 at two universities in Korea, and from September 1999 to November 2000 in Japan at three universities. As a result, 346 sets of data were collected in Korea and 212 in Japan. In order to examine generic Confucian orientations in the two countries, a factor analysis was administered. To further compare the levels of Confucian orientations of each item in the two countries, ANOVA was used. The results are discussed in the following sections.

CONFUCIAN ORIENTATION OF THE KOREANS: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The principal component procedure with Varimax rotation yielded 12 factors, which explained 51.3 per cent of the variance. Items with loadings greater than 0.40 were marked and reordered. The pattern matrix, using a loading greater than 0.40 as a criterion of factor salience, appears in Table 1. Factors 10 to 12 are not shown in Table 1 because items with salient levels of loadings were not seen. The Chronbach α that shows overall reliability of the whole survey was 0.847.

Among 9 factors listed above, those with an adequate level of reliability measure (greater than 0.6 of Chronbach's α) are F1, F2, F3 and F4. Consequently, we adopted these four as exemplifying the Confucian orientation in Korea, and will interpret them in examining content.

As for Factor 1, S27 and S29 reflect the importance of polite manners that one must bear in mind as a person, particularly with elders, and S33 and S32 suggest the importance of education in the course of development as a person. S25 refers to the importance of reciprocating "favours" one receives from others, which is considered as a due manner to others. These five seem a little scattered in a way, but they all represent qualities one hopes to obtain in order to become a respectful member in the society. Therefore, Factor 1 is going to be labelled as "knowledge and propriety as desired qualities of a person."

Next is Factor 2: S37 and S38 indicate the importance of respecting persons of higher ranking or age, and S39 and S44 reflect the ordered ranking within the family. S19 reflects why it is important to honour the ranking within the group: the importance of belonging to the group. Therefore Factor 2 seems to indicate sensitivity toward whom to obey and respect in different contexts. We shall label this second factor "filial attitude writ large."

With regard to Factor 3, all four items are heavily related to having a respectful attitude toward one's ancestors. Therefore, the third factor is labelled "ancestor worship."

The commonality discovered in S46 and S45 is the attitude of cherishing and caring about others, which does not necessarily fit S35. A negative attitude toward cheating or lying, however, can be construed as an instance of the attitude not to inflict harm upon others. Therefore, it seems appropriate to summarise this Factor 4 as "altruism."

The identified factors through the labelling process are thus listed as follows:

Factor 1: Knowledge and propriety as desired qualities of a person (Chronbach's α=0.725)

Factor 2: Filial attitude write-large (Chronbach's α=0.672)

Factor 3: Ancestor worship (Chronbach's α=0.662)

Factor 4: Altruism (Chronbach's α=0.556)

Table 1.   Factor Analysis Results on the Korean Confucian Belief (n=346)
(Chronbach α=0.847)

Summary of statements	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8	F9
S27 Be careful with manners when invited	**0.78**	0.00	-0.07	0.03	0.02	-0.08	0.03	0.03	0.057
S33 Education is more important than status	**0.74**	-0.04	0.03	0.06	-0.09	0.06	0.03	-0.0	-0.0
S32 Knowledge is very important for growth	**0.69**	0.01	0.06	0.06	-0.12	0.11	-0.08	0.02	0.02
S29 Be polite to seniors	**0.69**	0.06	0.20	0.04	0.12	0.15	0.02	0.01	-0.01
S25 Favors need to be repaid	**0.5**	0.1	-0.18	0.09	0.15	-0.19	0.22	0.17	0.104
S37 Follow boss's opinion	0.04	**0.79**	0.06	0.03	-0.04	0.00	0.04	0.01	-0.01
S38 Juniors should obey seniors	-0.02	**0.78**	0.12	0.15	0.07	0.03	0.17	0.03	-0.11
S19 Conform to the group	0.09	**0.5**	0.13	-0.11	0.15	0.12	-0.13	0.35	0.12
S39 Wife should be obedient to husband	0.01	**0.44**	-0.02	0.05	0.26	0.48	0.00	-0.1	0.102
S44 Respect older siblings	0.05	**0.43**	0.08	0.34	0.11	0.05	-0.1	0.05	0.30
S10 Visit family cemetery	-0.06	0.12	**0.74**	0.11	0.11	0.07	0.08	-0.0	0.01
S9 Respect ancestors	0.13	0.05	**0.7**	0.07	0.01	0.19	0.00	0.09	0.11
S7 Worship ancestors	0.04	0.27	**0.56**	0.02	0.1	-0.09	-0.15	0.22	-0.05
S8 I owe what I am to ancestors	0.09	0.06	**0.49**	0.03	0.21	-0.01	0.27	0.16	-0.02
S46 Contribute to welfare of others than yours	0.05	0.08	0.12	**0.73**	0.11	-0.03	-0.12	0.09	0.05
S35 Deceiving is shameful	0.12	0.08	0.00	**0.69**	0.05	-0.08	0.09	0.04	0.11
S45 Leaders need compassion to others	0.05	0.15	0.10	**0.42**	-0.04	0.05	0.33	0.17	-0.22
S15 Company should care workers as parents	-0.04	0.03	0.13	0.01	**0.83**	0.06	0.09	0.00	-0.02
S14 Government should care people as parents	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.12	**0.8**	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.03
S4 Live up to parents' expectation	0.17	-0.13	0.13	-0.05	0.02	**0.67**	0.05	0.14	-0.03
S16 It is not good to criticize government	-0.11	0.19	0.11	-0.1	0.13	**0.49**	0.13	0.00	0.10
S41 Women stay home and men work outside	-0.08	0.25	0.20	-0.06	0.08	**0.46**	0.13	-0.06	0.16
S40 Respect the father	0.20	0.19	-0.08	0.07	0.29	**0.44**	-0.06	0.09	0.06
S51 Obey what bosses say	-0.04	0.27	0.16	-0.12	0.04	0.11	**0.62**	-0.08	0.13
S47 Be generous to others	0.10	-0.07	-0.11	0.05	0.09	-0.04	**0.58**	0.32	-0.11
S23 Group harmony precedes private opinions	0.12	0.15	-0.03	-0.16	0.25	0.07	**0.47**	0.02	0.17
S42 Help friends in trouble at any cost	0.01	-0.02	0.12	0.20	0.05	0.02	0.07	**0.73**	0.14
S43 Consult anything with friends	-0.01	0.13	0.1	0.01	-0.12	0.09	0.09	**0.63**	-0.02
S31 Seniors and juniors should be equal	0.09	-0.22	0.16	0.01	-0.04	-0.05	0.01	0.142	**0.54**
S49 The boss need not admit his faults	-0.13	0.01	0.05	0.07	-0.1	0.29	0.23	0.05	**0.51**
S24 Look after old parents	0.31	-0.0	-0.04	0.27	0.08	-0.05	0.07	0.06	**0.47**
S36 We should not bring shame to the family	0.17	0.16	0.01	0.18	0.19	0.10	-0.19	0.28	**0.41**
S26 I feel obligated to the boss who hired me	0.20	-0.04	0.05	0.21	0.14	-0.04	0.24	-0.02	-0.05
S34 Studying should not be neglected	0.16	0.12	-0.04	0.18	0.11	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.05
S21 Individual opinions are to be cherished	0.13	0.01	0.07	-0	0.05	-0.07	-0.08	0.00	-0.02
E.V. Eigenvalue	3.34	2.80	2.50	2.33	2.26	2.15	2.03	1.97	1.79
R.V. Rate of Variance	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04

Note: Only items with loadings equal to or over 0.40 are shown in the table.

CONFUCIAN ORIENTATIONS OF THE JAPANESE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The same analysis was applied to the data collected from Japanese college students, as presented in Table 2.

After reordering the six factors, the sixth turned out to be inappropriate as all items with significantly high loadings (greater than 0.4) were accounted for by other factors. This factor therefore was discarded from the next stage of analysis.

Table 2. Factor Analysis Results on Japanese Confucian Beliefs (n=212)
(Chronbach α= 0.930)

Summary of statements	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5
_S45 Leaders need compassion to others	**0.82**	-0.03	0.11	0.14	-0.05
_S29 Be polite to seniors	**0.79**	0.02	-0.1	0.09	0.24
_S27 Be careful with manners when invited	**0.76**	-0.13	-0.03	0.09	0.29
_S33 Education is more important than status	**0.72**	-0.07	-0.0	0.01	0.29
_S25 Favors need to be repaid	**0.72**	-0.01	-0.09	0.07	0.33
_S35 Deceiving is shameful	**0.67**	0.01	0.22	0.12	0.01
_S42 Help friends in trouble at any cost	**0.67**	0.14	0.15	0.13	-0.13
_S36 We should not bring shame to the family	**0.63**	0.16	0.13	0.13	-0.04
_S43 Consult anything with friends	**0.59**	0.17	0.39	-0.15	-0.01
_S30 Juniors should greet seniors in school	**0.55**	0.17	-0.06	0.182	0.27
_S48 To solve personal problems, show sincerity	**0.53**	0.06	0.34	-0.02	-0.01
_S46 Contribute to the welfare of others than yours	**0.52**	0.24	0.22	0.18	-0.05
_S47 Be generous to others	**0.45**	0.18	0.49	-0.03	0.12
_S34 Studying should not be neglected.	**0.45**	0.13	0.10	0.22	0.37
_S5 Love and respect parents regardless of faults	**0.43**	0.07	0.19	0.31	0.00
_S10 Visit family cemetery	**0.41**	0.09	0.03	0.46	0.02
_S39 Wife should be obedient to husband	-0.13	**0.79**	0.07	0.03	0.18
_S38 Juniors should obey seniors	0.13	**0.75**	0.07	0.03	0.02
_S37 Follow boss's opinion	0.15	**0.74**	0.02	0.10	0.00
_S51 Obey what bosses say	-0.15	**0.7**	0.19	0.09	0.08
_S41 Women stay home and men work outside	-0.0	**0.7**	0.29	-0.1	0.15
_S16 It is not good to criticize government	-0.28	**0.62**	0.17	0.16	0.141
_S44 Respect older siblings	0.23	**0.6**	0.21	0.06	-0.08
_S28 Respect teachers regardless of quality.	0.14	**0.57**	0.05	0.13	0.45
_S26 I feel obligated to the boss who hired me	0.03	**0.54**	-0.07	0.23	0.33
_S22 Avoid conflicts in opinions with others	0.18	**0.54**	-0.2	0.07	0.41
_S19 Conform to the group	0.11	**0.48**	0.05	0.12	0.04
_S23 Group harmony precedes private opinions	0.16	**0.48**	-0.12	0.05	0.43
_S18 Don't stand out alone in group	0.24	**0.47**	-0.02	0.00	0.09
_S49 The boss need not admit his faults	0.07	**0.46**	-0.02	0.03	-0.07
_S24 Look after old parents	0.33	**0.46**	-0.1	0.16	0.08
_S50 Respect opinions of seniors and elders	0.19	**0.45**	0.36	-0.09	0.04
_S4 Live up to parents' expectation	0.14	**0.44**	0.22	0.06	0.01
_S40 Respect the father	0.19	**0.43**	0.312	0.25	0.08
_S20 Don't object to the group's opinion	0.12	**0.42**	-0.04	0.00	0.58
_S17 Cooperate with government decisions	-0.02	**0.42**	**0.43**	0.07	0.19
_S12 Be a useful person to the nation	0.15	0.12	**0.56**	0.263	0.06
_S11 I'm happy working hard for the group I belong to	0.19	0.08	**0.54**	0.17	0.20
_S15 Company should care workers as parents	0.02	0.2	**0.42**	0.331	-0.05
_S7 Worship ancestors	0.31	0.05	0.01	**0.72**	0.04
_S8 I owe what I am to ancestors	0.06	0.07	0.05	**0.67**	0.06
_S9 Respect ancestors	0.17	0.08	0.21	**0.53**	0.19
_S6 Old people deserve respect	0.39	0.32	0.03	**0.52**	-0.1
_S14 Government should care people as parents	-0.03	0.16	0.33	**0.41**	0.09
_S32 Knowledge is very important for growth	0.37	0.14	0.16	0.05	**0.7**
_S31 Seniors and juniors should be equal	0.22	0.23	0.22	-0.02	**0.64**
_S21 Individual opinions are to be cherished	0.39	0.05	0.17	0.13	0.37
_S13 I am prepared to go fighting in the war.	0.03	0.34	0.39	0.21	-0.09
E.V. Eigenvalue	7.64	7.2	3.03	2.79	3.00
R.V. Rate of Variance	0.15	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.06

Note: Only items with loadings equal to or over 0.40 are shown in the table.

The qualities found in Factor 1 greatly varied and it is difficult to narrow them down to a particular tendency. S45 focuses on compassion, S29 and S30 on respect toward elders and

persons in higher positions, S27 on politeness, S33 on education, S25 on reciprocity, S35 and 36 on shame, S 42 on trust, S 43 on friendship, S48 on sincerity, S46 on altruism, S47 on benevolence, S34 on knowledge, S5 on filial piety, and S10 on ancestor worship. These are all qualities advocated in the *Imperial Rescript* and emphasised in morality textbooks prior to 1945. Lumping these varied qualities together, however, shows that Japanese young people do not necessarily distinguish differences between these moral qualities. Therefore Factor 1 is defined as "generic moral values in life."

Basically, two important tendencies are observed here. S38, S37, S51, S50, S44, S4, S40, S28, and S17 all carry some message regarding respect toward persons or organisations having a higher position in the social context. S22, S19, S23, S18, and S20, on the other hand, have something to do with conformity to groups. This tendency is interpreted to be in accord with the first tendency since the group itself functions as an authority to which members are expected to be subservient. Factor 2, in this sense, may be defined as "conformity with and respect toward authority."

S12, S11and S15 indicate the close relationship between the individual and the organisation to which one belongs. The expected values to support this relationship seem to be those of patriotism and/or filial piety. We would like to summarise Factor 3 as the "individuals' sense of belonging to the group."

S6 is about respecting the elderly, and the common feature of S7, S8 and S9 is ancestor worship. S14 extends the application of the parent-child relationship to the level of people and government. As a whole, Factor 4 can be defined as "respect toward ancestors and the elderly."

S32 refers to the importance of education for the development of an individual; S31 is a reverse item that emphasises individual quality rather than fixed social relationships. Although it may look a bit contradictory to have conflicting Confucian values coupled together, these share "individual quality" as a common feature. Then the values are not in conflict. This factor may be defined as "focus on individual quality," which, however, is not a value advocated in Confucianism but rather one observed in the western individualism. We believe that this factor should be discarded from consideration, since it does not seem to reflect Confucian values. The identified four Confucian orientations are as follows:

Factor 1: Generic moral values in life (Chronbach's α=0.903)

Factor 2: Conformity with and respect toward authority (Chronbach's α=0.905)

Factor 3: Individuals' sense of belonging to the group (Chronbach's α=0.609)

Factor 4: Respect toward ancestors and the elderly (Chronbach's α=0.678)

 Extracted Confucian moral orientations of Korea and Japan are shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Significant Confucian Moral Orientations in Korea and Japan

	Japanese university students		Korean university students	
1	Generic moral values in life	(15%)	Knowledge and propriety as desired qualities of a person	(7%)
2	Conformity with and respect toward authority	(11%)	Filial attitude writ-large	(6%)
3	Individuals' sense of belonging to the group	(6%)	Ancestor worship	(5%)
4	Respect toward ancestors and the elderly	(5%)	Altruism	(5%)

Note: (%) = rate of variance explained

DISCUSSION

From the results of the factor analysis, it has become clear that trends of Confucianism in Korean and Japanese students are not the same. Analysis of the distinctive features above will carve out the similarities and the differences between the two peoples. As a common stream, 'ancestor worship' was found on both sides. Examination of items that appeared to contribute to this factor tells us two things: that a strong attachment to ancestors seems to have influenced the formation of identity and that the notion of 'filial piety' is closely connected with ancestral worship.

Korean students tend to value 'quest for knowledge' along with 'propriety.' These two values may be taken as inseparable qualities for young Koreans and pursued in the course of human development.

'Filial attitude' came out quite clearly as an independent orientation on the Korean side, while in Japan relevant values appeared in Factor 2 and Factor 4 along with other values. This strong orientation among Korean students for 'filial piety' supports the statements of such researchers as Moon (1992) and Honda (1997).

One other quality found in Korean students but not in Japanese students is "altruism"— an attitude of compassion toward, and a tendency to contribute to the welfare of others. Although this will not go beyond speculation, Korean students may tend to regard part of their 'self' as a presence for the welfare of others, and this notion explains well the Koreans' self-sacrificing attitude to help other people and may also explain the difference of public manners between Japanese and Koreans.

What seems unique with the Japanese is that various moral values such as propriety, knowledge, benevolence, respectful attitude toward elders and so on are grouped together into one category as Factor 1. Although still a hypothesis, one observation is that Japanese distinctions between generic moral values are not so clear as those of Koreans, who, on the other hand, seem to possess clearer ideas on each respective moral value.

The Japanese attitude of conforming to authority and identifying themselves with the group stood out. A similar tendency, meanwhile, did not come out in Koreans. Interpretation of Japanese Factor 2 provides suggests that conforming attitudes are in the same line as filial piety among Japanese, while those two are rather distinguished in Korea. In other words, respecting elders and seniors does not necessarily mean conformity to the group in Korea. Koreans may carry a stronger level of awareness as individuals than do Japanese.

The attitude of Japanese conforming to the group, on the other hand, cannot be discussed without referring to the emphasis on harmony, since conformity functions as a means to achieve harmony. Thus, in Japan, it is likely that "self-expressiveness" is suppressed in the course of conforming to the group under the name of "harmony." Different responses regarding harmony in the two countries may account for the different attitudes toward "self-expressiveness." Whether or not there is any relation between the attitude of cherishing group harmony and the negative attitude toward free expression in a group will be the central theme of subsequent research.

Also, attitudes such as Japanese sensitivity to mutual social positions have much to do with hierarchical group relationships demanding rigid conformity. Whether or not this rigidity has a negative effect on self-expressiveness needs to be examined as part of the next research.

COMPARISON OF CONFUCIAN BELIEFS BY ITEMS: JAPANESE STUDENTS AND KOREAN STUDENTS

Table 4 compares the results for each item between the Japanese and Koreans. The scores show the strengths of belief. ANOVA was carried out on each item to determine whether there are any meaningful differences between the strength of beliefs of the two peoples. The results are considered to reflect differences in the degree of attitude. These results are discussed below.

Table 4. Results of ANOVAs for the Items in the Survey

Item	Summary of Statements	Korea (n=346)		Japan (n=211)	F ratio	p
S4	Live up to parents' expectation	3.67	>	3.44	4.61	*
S5	Love and respect parents regardless of faults	4.30	>	3.68	27.1	**
S6	Old people deserve respect	3.77	>	3.49	5.9	*
S7	Worship ancestors	4.00	=	3.80	2.26	-
S8	I owe what I am to ancestors	3.25	<	**3.94**	12.7	**
S9	Respect ancestors	3.47	<	**3.79**	3.5	-
S10	Visit family cemetery	3.81	=	3.82	0	-
S11	I'm happy working hard for the group I belong to	**3.94**	>	3.62	6	**
S12	Be a useful person to the nation	**3.97**	>	3.65	7	**
S13	I am prepared to go fighting in the war.	**4.62**	>	3.51	29.7	**
S14	Government should care people as parents	3.26	=	3.44	1.2	-
S15	Company should care workers as parents	3.11	=	3.28	1.3	-
S16	It is not good to criticize government	1.72	<	**2.41**	44.4	**
S17	Cooperate with government decisions	**3.47**	>	3.08	8.1	**
S18	Don't stand out alone in group	2.84	<	**3.09**	3.8	*
S19	Conform to the group	2.82	<	**3.04**	2.6	*
S20	Don't object to the group's opinion	2.71	<	**3.09**	8.9	**
(S21	Individual opinions are to be cherished	3.36	=	3.56	2	-)
S22	Avoid conflicts in opinions with others	2.75	<	**3.01**	4.5	*
S23	Group harmony precedes private opinions	2.90	<	**3.22**	5.8	*
S24	Look after old parents	3.62	=	3.76	1	-
S25	Favors need to be repaid	**4.05**	>	3.65	12.3	**
S26	I feel obligation to the boss who hired me	3.69	=	3.44	2.6	-
S27	Be careful with manners when invited	**4.26**	>	3.80	19.8	**
S28	Respect teachers regardless of quality	2.34	<	**2.93**	20.3	**
S29	Be polite to seniors	**3.93**	>	3.49	19.9	**
S30	Juniors should greet seniors in school	3.00	<	**3.46**	13	**
(S31	Seniors and juniors should be equal	3.72	<	**3.25**	13.8	**)
S32	Knowledge is very important for growth	**4.18**	>	2.41	269	**
S33	Education is more important than status	**4.36**	>	3.57	57.3	**
S34	Studying should not be neglected	3.79	=	3.61	1.9	-
S35	Deceiving is shameful	**4.36**	>	3.41	91.5	**
S36	We should not bring shame to the family	3.67	=	3.49	2.2	-
S37	Follow boss's opinion	2.67	<	**3.12**	14.1	**
S38	Juniors should obey seniors	2.55	<	**3.10**	19.3	**
S39	Wife should be obedient to husband	2.19	<	**2.61**	12.8	**
S40	Respect the father	**3.53**	>	3.05	15.7	**
S41	Women stay home and men work outside	1.90	<	**2.63**	36.1	**
S42	Help friends in trouble at any cost	**3.89**	>	3.39	15.2	**
S43	Consult anything with friends	3.48	=	3.62	0.8	-
S44	Respect older siblings	**3.71**	>	3.45	4	*
S45	Leaders need compassion to others	**4.15**	>	3.45	43.5	**
S46	Contribute to the welfare of others than yours	**4.09**	>	3.37	48.3	**
S47	Be generous to others	**3.76**	>	3.48	4.6	*
S48	To solve personal problems, show sincerity	**4.07**	>	3.55	18.1	**
S49	The boss need not admit his faults	2.26	<	**2.99**	30	**
S50	Respect opinions of seniors and elders	3.17	=	3.34	1.2	-
S51	Obey what bosses say	2.01	<	**2.61**	28.1	**

Notes: *: $p < 0.05$ **: $p < 0.01$ ( ): reverse Confucian item

Figures 1 through to 14 are graphic presentations of the data presented in the Tables above.


S4.   It is good to live up to parents' expectations.
S5.   Although you find many faults in your parents, you should love and respect them.
S6.   Old people in the community (always) deserve respect.

Figure 1. Filial Piety

In the group of items concerning "filial piety," S4~S6, Koreans show a higher level of belief than the Japanese. This supports not only the result of the factor analysis in Table 3, but also the widely shared notion that Koreans have a strong moral tendency toward filial piety. Particularly striking was the difference in the attitude toward parents: S5. Koreans present more respectful attitude toward parents.

For items on "ancestor worship," on the other hand, the Japanese show a higher rate in two items out of four. The strong Japanese attachment to ancestors may be the influence of an amalgamation of Buddhism and Confucianism (Kaji, 1990).

S7.   It is important to thank and pay respect to ancestors.
S8.   I owe what I am to my ancestors.
S9.   It is the duty of descendants to honour and worship ancestors.
S10.   I think it is important to pay a visit to the family cemetery.

Figure 2. Ancestor Worship

As for items on 'the sense of belonging to groups or organisations,' Koreans show a higher rate in four items. In S12 and S13, regarding patriotic attitude or the sense of identification with the nation, Koreans demonstrated a high level of identity with a score of 4.62, compared with 3.51 for the Japanese. Loyalty in the form of patriotism seems far stronger in Korea than in Japan. S16 and S17 presented interesting results. Although a higher Japanese rating in S16 suggests an accepting and generous attitude toward the government, Japanese are not necessarily cooperative with their government. Koreans, on the other hand, are more critical towards the government, but at the same time they cooperate with it.

S11.   Working hard for the company or the school I belong to gives me a sense of satisfaction.
S12.   I would like to become a person who is of use to the nation.
S13.   If a war breaks out, I am prepared to go for the fight.
S14.   The ideal relationship between the government and the people should be as close as that between parents and the child.
S15.   The relationship between the company and the workers should be as close as that between parents and the children.
S16.   Even if the government makes mistakes, people should not criticize it.
S17.   It is important for the people to cooperate with government decisions.

Figure 3. Sense of Belonging

S18 to S23 reflect values about group harmony. Interestingly the Japanese rated higher in five items out of six. The results of S20, S22 and S23 suggest that Japanese tend to control their behaviour in order to maintain a smooth relationship within the group. This tendency is quite similar to the behaviour pattern called "secondary control"(Tou, Majima, and Nomoto, 1998), in which people adapts their ideas or behaviour to the external stimulus even though they are against his or her internal desires.

A significant difference was seen only in S25. Korean students' feeling of indebtedness for the favours they receive seem to be greater than that of Japanese students.

A significant difference is seen between Korean students and Japanese students. It seems that Korean students have a higher level of consciousness concerning the importance of manners.

S28 to S31 are attitudes towards people in different social contexts, which are considered to be related to the notion of filial piety, but the results are varied. Although Japanese tend to show a higher rate of obedience to teachers, this does not necessarily mean that Korean students are less respectful to teachers, since the statement refers to an absolute respect regardless of teachers' quality. Koreans, on the other hand, rated higher in politeness toward

elders and people in higher positions. This result coincides with one of the extracted factors in Table 3: filial piety writ-large. When it comes to the senior-junior relationship, the Japanese show a definite distinction between *Senpai* (seniors) and *Kohai* (juniors), while the Koreans do not necessarily recognise an importance in differences between the two.

S18.   When we work in a group we need to be careful not to stand out alone.
S19.   It is important not to become isolated from the group at any cost.
S20.   When you are in a group, it is wise not to object to what many of the group members agree on, even though your thinking is different.
S21.   Even at a cost to the group, individual opinions are to be cherished.
S22.   It is important to avoid conflicts in opinions with others as much as possible.
S23.   You cannot help having your opinions restricted for the sake of group harmony.

Figure 4. Harmony

S24.   In the future, I'd like to repay my parents by taking care of them.
S25.   One has an obligation to repay others for favours rendered.
S26.   Another company offers me a better salary. Although I'm interested in it,
         I can't quit the present company because the current president hired me.

Figure 5. Sense of Obligation

The response in S28 and S31 may tell us that the person's personality or quality matters a lot for Korean students, while Japanese respond rather blindly regardless of the person's personality or quality. The strong Japanese respect towards *Senpai* (seniors) came out as a strong tendency.

S27.   When you are invited to somebody's house, it is important to be careful with your manners.

Figure 6. Manners

S28.   Teachers should always be respected regardless of their ability and personality.
S29.   It is natural that we should speak politely to our bosses and the elders.
S30.   I make it a rule to greet seniors in school from my side first.
S31.   Since in school or at the office, the difference between seniors and juniors is merely that of age,
   the official status between them is equal.

Figure 7.   Filial Piety and Social Order

S32 to S34 are about the value of education. Korean students rated higher than Japanese students in two items out of three with significant differences in S32 and S33. This may show that Korean students consider education to be more important than Japanese students, which supports Factor 1 in Table 3.

S35 and 36 are about 'shame.' Koreans rated higher in S35 and this may suggest that their moral behaviour is strongly influenced by a sense of shame.

S37 to 41 are about people's attitude toward social positions in different contexts. Japanese rated higher in four items out of five; the exception was S40 regarding the authority of the father. This distinctive difference between Korea and Japan may need careful consideration, but one interpretation of this tendency is that the Japanese have a fixed notion about the role or the attitude of people in reciprocal relationships; therefore they may tend to respond with blind obedience to them. Koreans' higher rating on father's authority demonstrates that

fathers are in a special position in the family. Higher ratings in the respect for older siblings is also understandable given the strong emphasis of filial piety in the family.

S32.   Gaining knowledge by working hard is important to develop yourself as a person.
S33.   I think education is more important than a high level of social status and income.
S34.   Regardless of how poor you are or how painful your life might be, you should not neglect your studies.

Figure 8. Knowledge

S35.   It is shameful to deceive or cheat somebody.
S36.   Bringing a shame onto my family is the last thing I want.

Figure 9. Shame

Blindly obedient attitudes would mean that their critical attitudes are also weak in such reciprocal relationships as the boss and his staff, the husband and the wife, seniors and juniors, the father and the son/daughter.

A notable difference was seen in S42 between the two peoples. It is interesting that Korean students have demonstrated stronger belief in the attitude of helping friends in trouble, while little difference was observed in the openness towards friends between the two.

S45 to 47 are about 'benevolence and generosity.' Korean students rated higher in all items, and this implies that there is a difference between the two peoples in the level of benevolent

attitude and generosity. This result eventually verifies the results of the factor analysis, which yielded "altruism" as one of the typical features of Korean Confucianism.

S37.   It is natural that you should follow your boss's opinion.
S38.   It is natural for juniors to obey their seniors.
S39.   The wife is supposed to be obedient to her husband.
S40.   In the family, the father's authority should be cherished.
S41.   Women should be in charge of the household and men should work outside.
S44.   Younger siblings are supposed to love and respect their older siblings.

Figure 10. Obedience

S42.   I am happy to help my friend at any cost if he/she is in trouble.
S43.   I can talk to and consult about anything with my friends.

Figure 11. Trustfulness

Another significant difference was observed in sincerity, which implies that sincerity is a very important factor in resolving problems for Korean students.

Differences were seen in S49 and S51. Both Korean and Japanese students have shown their negative attitude in these two, but Korean students seem to be more independent of opinions of those in higher ranks. Here again, less critical attitudes against different opinions were seen among Japanese.

Benevolence (45-47)

S45.   The most important quality of a leader is whether he/she has a caring and compassionate attitude toward the people who work for him/her.
S46.   Contributing to the welfare of the people and society is more important than pursuing one's own happiness.
S47.   When you find mistakes by your staff or juniors, it is more important to be generous than to severely blame them.

Figure 12. Benevolence

Sincerity (S48)

S48. In order to resolve any personal problem, it is most important to cope with it with sincerity.

Figure 13. Sincerity

CONCLUSION

It has become clear that the current Confucian values of Korean and Japanese college students are not the same. Several differences emerged from this study.

Filial attitudes are seen in both countries. However, the ways in which 'filial' attitudes are practised are different. A filial attitude is widely seen in Korea, particularly between father and son/daughter as a relation in the family context. In Japan, on the other hand, filial attitudes are more likely to be observed outside the family such as in junior-senior relationships in school and in boss-staff relationships in the work site.

Another feature of the Japanese filial attitude is conformity with authority. There is a context-specific obedience tendency to authority, which means that Japanese obedience depends on social contexts. It thus presents quite different responses. These are reflected in the results of S 16, S28, S37, S38, S39, and S51. The rates in S16 and S51 may add

"blindness" to the quality. In other words, the flip side of Japanese filial piety is obedience and this may explain why a critical attitude of Japanese towards authority remains low.

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         Conservativenesss of, and blind obedience
                      to, authority
                        (49-51)
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

S49.   Even though your staff's opinion is right, you cannot accept it because it is different from your own as his/her boss.
S50.   Even though you think the opinion of your seniors and elders are wrong, it is still useful to listen to them.
S51.   It is natural that you should obey the opinion of those in higher positions because they are always right.

Figure 14.   Conservativeness of, and Blind Obedience to, Authority

The results of S18 to S23 entail a notable Japanese tendency to control one's self-expressiveness for the sake of the group. Although this does not negate the presence of a similar tendency in Koreans, it can be the consideration for a harmony that inhibits communication among Japanese and between them and others.

A unique feature found in Korean students is 'altruism,' the attitude to care about others and to go and help them if necessary. This presence of strong altruism may be the reason for the seeming high standard of public morality. The heroic death of a Korean student in Japan who jumped onto a railway track in Tokyo in 2001 to save a drunken man may be a good example of this (*This incident was seen as obviously the right thing to do in Korea, while in Japan it was heavily-remarked upon in the media as something Japanese students are incapable of doing these days – editors*).

The results from this research have presented a variety of differences as well as similarities between the two countries of Japan and Korea with regard to Confucianism and its influences on the respective societies. It is no longer appropriate to simply apply the word "Confucian" in accounting for characteristic moral behaviours of people in East Asia without trying to understand the complexity and depth of Confucianism and Confucian beliefs which each individual culture and society carries. Although Confucianism has survived throughout a long history in East Asia, it has also developed differently from country to country. Now that these countries are exposed to the waves of globalisation, we may have doubts if Confucianism will survive another hundred years. The attribution of whatever characteristic Asian feature one sees in Asia to Confucianism is dangerous and may invite unnecessary misunderstanding. An attitude of knowing and understanding the differences between cultures and an awareness of the changes taking place in the world today are needed now more than ever.

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Transition in the Japanese Curriculum: How Is the Curriculum of Elementary and Secondary Schools in Japan Determined?

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Japan is in the midst of school reform. Though national curriculum standards are determined by the national Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, and Technology (MEXT), local education authorities and schools recently have more authority concerning the determination of what is the best curriculum for students. For the success of school reform, whether schools and teachers can establish their independence is the key point. In this paper, the author reviews the Japanese curriculum administration system and concludes that in curriculum administration new attempts such as school-based curriculum decision-making should be adopted. Moreover, for such efforts to succeed, teachers should be trained about curriculum in Japan, something that has previously been the exclusive purview of the state.

Japan, curriculum, curriculum administration, national curriculum standards,
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, and Technology (MEXT)

THE JAPANESE SCHOOL CURRICULUM

The Japanese school curriculum is the educational program designed by the Japanese Ministry of Education (now, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, and Technology or MEXT) to achieve the schools' targets, taking into account the developmental conditions of the students, in accordance with the laws and regulations concerned. At present, curriculum as it is understood in Japan includes three areas: subjects, moral education (except for senior high schools), and extra-curricular activities (see Tables 1 and 2).

THE NATIONAL STANDARD CURRICULUM

MEXT, as an organ of the national government, enacts curriculum standards. These cover the standards for all types of schools, from kindergartens to senior high schools as well as schools for the visually handicapped, the hearing impaired, and otherwise handicapped students.

To be specific, MEXT prescribes the scope and sequence of each subject of each age group for the school year. Herein lies one of the characteristics of Japanese curriculum administration compared to western countries. For examples, teachers in England and the United States have much more autonomy than those of Japan in determining the curriculum. This has traditionally been seen as exclusively top-down in Japan with little if any room for questioning.

The national curriculum is prescribed in the law concerning Organisation and Operation of Local Educational Administration. Local boards of education are to enact regulations

concerning standards of curriculum and individual local boards of education are to prescribe curriculum standards in their areas in accordance with the national standard of curriculum. In the course of organising the curriculum, necessary guidance, advice and assistance flow from the MEXT to prefectural boards of education and from prefectural boards of education to municipal boards of education. Even private schools have been very much a part of this system, partly because of funding they receive from the centre. Following the prescribed national curriculum has been traditionally strictly enforced by the national government in Japan, with the consequence that the MEXT has had a very direct and especially powerful role in Japanese schooling.

Table1. Standard number of yearly school hours in primary schools

Subject	Grade					
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Japanese	306	315	280	280	210	210
	272	**280**	**235**	**235**	**180**	**175**
Social Studies	-	-	105	105	105	105
	-	-	**70**	**85**	**90**	**100**
Arithmetic	136	175	175	175	175	175
	114	**155**	**150**	**150**	**150**	**150**
Science	-	-	105	105	105	105
	-	-	**70**	**90**	**95**	**95**
Life Environment Studies	102	102	-	-	-	-
	102	**102**	-	-	-	-
Music	68	70	70	70	70	70
	68	**70**	**70**	**70**	**70**	**70**
Drawing and Handicrafts	68	70	70	70	70	70
	68	**70**	**60**	**60**	**50**	**50**
Homemaking	-	-	-	-	70	70
	-	-	-	-	**60**	**55**
Physical Education	102	105	105	105	105	105
	90	**90**	**90**	**90**	**90**	**90**
Moral Education	34	35	35	35	35	35
	34	**35**	**35**	**35**	**35**	**35**
Extra-Curricular Activities*	34	35	35	70	70	70
	34	**35**	**35**	**35**	**35**	**35**
Period for Integrated Study	-	-	-	-	-	-
			105	**105**	**110**	**110**
Totals	850	910	980	1015	1015	1015
	782	**840**	**910**	**945**	**945**	**945**

Note: One school hour lasts forty-five minutes
*Such as classroom activities, student council activities, club activities, school events

CURRICULUM IN SCHOOLS

In accordance with the School Education Law, enforcement regulations for this law, and the national standards of curriculum, individual schools organise their own curriculum, taking into account the actual circumstances of each school and each community, and the stage of mental and physical development of the children enrolled, as well as their characteristics.

The typical steps and procedures involved in determining the curriculum are as follows: clarification of the aims of the school; determining the schedule; investigating the standard curriculum and establishing a connection between the curriculum and the aim of the school; and organising the curriculum in terms of course selection and allocation of school days and hours.

Table2. Standard number of yearly school hours in junior high schools

Subject	Grade		
	1	2	3
Japanese	175	140	140
	140	105	105
Social Studies	140	140	70-105
	105	105	85
Mathematics	105	140	140
	105	105	105
Science	105	105	105-140
	105	105	85
Music	70	35-70	35
	40	35	35
Arts	70	35-70	35
	45	35	35
Health/Physical Education	105	105	105-140
	90	90	90
Industrial Arts and Home Economics	70	70	70-105
	70	70	35
Foreign Language	105-140	105-140	105-140
	105	105	105
Elective Subjects	0-35	0-105	35-175
	0-30	50-85	105-165
Moral Education	35	35	35
	35	35	35
Extra-Curricular Activities*	35-70	35-70	35-70
	35	35	35
Period for Integrated Study	-	-	-
	70-100	70-105	70-130
Totals	1050	1050	1050
	980	980	980

Note: One school hour lasts fifty minutes
*Includes classroom activities, student council activities, school events, etc.

Although the principal of each school is formally responsible for the curriculum of his or her school, it is impossible for him or her to determine the curriculum without assistance. This means that the curriculum is usually developed in cooperation with his or her colleagues. Teachers aim to provide this assistance based on research concerning teaching materials, teaching methods, and their efficacy.

School level administrators have dual responsibilities. The first responsibility is that they have to keep satisfactory procedures for maintaining interrelatedness between learning and curriculum. Another responsibility is that they have to distribute the scarce resources of teacher expertise and time devoted for curriculum development to achieve the goals of the curriculum. Unfortunately, they do not have ample discretion and power to exercise these responsibilities. Teachers, at the same time, would like to have more flexibility within the curriculum so they can deviate in content and can go at a pace appropriate to their students.

REVISION OF NATIONAL CURRICULUM STANDARDS

In July 1998 the Curriculum Council submitted a report concerning the new curriculum to the Minister of Education. The new national curriculum standard will be put into effect from the year 2000 in kindergartens, the year 2002 at primary and junior high schools, and the year 2003 at senior high schools. Historically, the MEXT has renewed the national curriculum standards regularly at a pace of about once in every ten years. This is the seventh time since World War Two.

The characteristics of this renewed curriculum are as follows. First, the system of a five-day school week was introduced. In accordance with this reduction, the scope of content that students will learn in the classroom will be reduced by about thirty percent. As the new national curriculum standards have became more flexible than ever, each school is now also able to devise educational programs on their own. To develop students' individuality, more elective subjects are to be provided at the junior high schools. This trend is more likely at the senior high schools. The "Period for Integrated Study" is introduced as the fourth area in addition to subjects, moral education, and extra-curricular activities to encourage individual schools providing interdisciplinary and comprehensive programs.

The general principle of curriculum organisation is changing from the idea of providing a common education for all children to one of providing different education for various children. This marks a revolutionary change in the history of education in Japan because Japanese educators have believed ever since the war that all children can enormously benefit from a common educational experience, and that providing different types of education would be discriminatory.

The new national standard of curriculum seems to emphasise the principle of developing individuality and of realising one's full potential. When these new national curriculum standards are put into effect, this may cause confusion in schools. As MEXT has tended to supervise all aspects of education all over the country, many teachers are too accustomed to think that all students learn within the same curriculum and through a very similar approach to teaching. They are also accustomed to the expectation of meeting the same performance levels, regardless of students' ability. In order to attain the purpose of curriculum reform, there will have to be drastic changes in the Japanese education system, especially in terms of teachers, as the 21st century begins. Teachers' philosophy, teaching practices, the system of teacher education and so forth will be important factors in seeing changes in Japanese schools in terms of the goals and objectives of curriculum and reaching children with the new vision of education. It will not be easy, particularly in terms of the roles of curriculum. What follows are some direct prescriptions concerning curriculum.

EDUCATIONAL GOALS OF LOCAL SCHOOLS AND CURRICULUM ORGANISATION

What is the aim of curriculum organisation? To attain the local schools' educational goals is the important aim. How are the schools' goals determined? Generally, each school discusses their own school goals based on provisions in the Fundamental Law of Education and the School Education Law. Both Laws include "educational aims," "educational guidelines," and "purposes of elementary, junior high and senior high schools."

All schools in Japan set (these) goals but when we survey them, we can find that almost all are very metaphysical or simply empty rhetoric. For example, "educate students with fertile mind for future creativeity," "educate students luminous mind, supporting and raising each other," "educate self-thinking, self-determining and self-behaving students," "educate students with compassion through rich human relations," and so on.

Then, for teachers, school goals lie behind teachers' daily work and do not direct their daily activities towards these goals. This situation makes school goals a mere formality. Some researchers insist that setting school goals is very difficult by its very nature, because the outcomes of schooling cannot be presented during periodic intervals and the outcome cannot

be shown numerically immediately. This is different from business where people work for maximising profit and the outcome that is profit is very clear numerically.

Discrepancies between school goals and teachers' daily work occur everywhere. Though school goals must be set as directed from local school authorities, teachers are heavily involved in completing textbooks or solving students' discipline problems. Teachers cannot have time to think about the relationship between school goals and daily work. If we keep this discrepancy intact, the function of schools as organisational and systematic educational institutions is not ensured.

We have to reform this situation when we make up curriculum. At the time of curriculum organisation we have to take into account developmental and educational needs of students, what parents and community hope for in terms of schools and teachers' expertise. Above all we have to pay special attention to the close relation between curriculum and school goals.

These past several years many schools are facing classroom disorder, especially at elementary schools. If schools make up curriculums with flexible classroom organisation, discipline problem may decrease. Each school has its own educational problems. Some schools are confronting lower academic performance. If those schools adopt such a curriculum, one which allocates much time to academic subjects, basic academic performance may improve. Some schools face poor interpersonal relations among students and do not have much experience of interaction with various kinds of people, yet schools can organise a curriculum which enables students to participate in volunteer activities.

In addition to effective leadership by principals, all faculty members have to be involved in curriculum organising, The people who understand most about the problems schools face are faculty members, not prefectural or municipal board members.

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE OF CURRICULUM ADMINISTRATION

At present, there is considerable conflict between the national, local, and school levels concerning curriculum, especially as to whether it should unified or not. The MEXT asserts that the setting of the national curriculum standards is meant to secure an optimum national level of education based on the principle of equal educational opportunity for all. No one may doubt that this principle is very important and worthy of being a universal ideal.

However, the more the national government regulates rigid curriculum standards, the less local school boards and individual schools have autonomy to devise what they see as the best curriculum for their students. Organising curriculum at the national level is the Japanese tradition and school administrators and teachers have less experience with it.

Social, political, and economical trends in Japan of late have been characterised by a move toward diversity, flexibility, decentralisation, and autonomy and away from uniformity, rigidity, and central control. The fundamental tendencies of educational reform are the same as those of social, political, and economical reform in the larger society. We have entered a period of radical change in the Japanese school curriculum.

Recently, MEXT issued a new guideline concerning curriculum: "The national curriculum standards will be generalized and more flexible so that each school will be able to show ingenuity in making a distinctive timetable" (Available online at http://www.mext.go.jp/ english/news/1998/04/980405.htm).

In curriculum administration, new attempts such as school-based curriculum decision-making will need to be adopted. In these attempts, the three tasks of development, implementation, and evaluation of curriculum will have to be undertaken by people based within the local school (the principal, teachers, parents, students, and community members who desire to participate in decisions about their own school).

In order to attain the aims of the newly introduced "Period of Integrated Study," for example, schools will have to organise the curriculum with parents and community members. This "Period of Integrated Study" is being introduced for elementary schools and middle schools from January 2002.

One of the aims of this "Period of Integrated Study" is that it has to be adjusted to community characteristics. Now some schools are perplexed about how to teach this, especially as the national government or local boards of education do not regulate the content. Japanese schools will now see their ability of organising their own curriculum put to the test.

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"Identity Politics" and Korean Youth in Japan: A Case Study of a Junior High School Student

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There are approximately 630,000 North and South Koreans living in Japan. Today, 90 per cent of the Korean children in Japan go to public and private Japanese schools, and the remaining 10 per cent go to Korean schools. Some schools, mostly in the Kansai area, give classes for Korean students after regular school lessons are finished. These ethnic studies were offered as a measure against discrimination, but they have actually resulted in creating racial images of Koreans. These images may result in restricting their activities, while at the same time young Koreans insist on flexible ethnicity that cannot be restricted by ethnic essentialism. This article uses an example of a Korean in Japan to examine the possibility of ethnic minorities asserting their identity and approving the notion of flexible identities.

Koreans in Japan, ethnic minority, identity politics,
multicultural education,cultural essentialism

INTRODUCTION

There are approximately 630,000 North and South Koreans living in Japan. They are descendants of Koreans who were brought over to Japan as the result of the Japanese colonial rule of Korea. The term "Koreans in Japan" can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. Narrowly, it refers to North and South Koreans in Japan. Broadly, it goes beyond Koreans in Japan to include Korean ethnicity, and refers to Japanese and North and South Koreans with Korean ethnicity. This article uses the term in the broad sense. During the colonial period, Koreans on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan were prohibited from inheriting their own culture. They were forced to use Japanese names and to speak in Japanese. After the Second World War, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule. The Koreans in Japan built schools to pass on their culture, but they were oppressed by the Japanese Government and the American G.HQ. Today, 90 per cent of Korean children in Japan go to public and private Japanese schools and the remaining 10 per cent go to the Korean schools.

Some schools, mostly in the Kansai area, give classes for Korean students after regular school lessons are finished. These classes aim at making the students feel proud of themselves as Koreans and to change their negative images of themselves, which the host society implanted in them, into self-esteem. These ethnic studies were carried out as measures against discrimination, but they have actually resulted in creating racial images of Koreans. These images may result in restricting their activities, while young Koreans insist on a flexible approach to ethnicity that cannot be restricted by ethnic essentialism.

KOREANS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

At the end of 2000 there were 1,686,444 registered "aliens" in Japan, those residents who identified themselves as non-Japanese. This figure was the greatest in history and remarkable also in comparison with those of the previous years. The number of non-Japanese at the end of 1999, for instance, had been 1,556,113. That is, there had been as much as an 8.4 per cent increase in a single year. Of the non-Japanese residents, Koreans were the largest group. Those identifying themselves as "Korean nationals", whether as North Koreans or as South Koreans, accounted for 37.7 per cent of all non-Japanese residents. The rest consisted of Chinese, Brazilians, Peruvians, Americans, and so on, from as many as 167 countries. According to statistical data of the Ministry of Justice,[1] the number of Korean nationals is decreasing while those of Brazilian and Chinese nationals are increasing. However, Koreans' majority status among the non-Japanese residents remains unchanged. While Japanese society is becoming increasingly multiethnic, the situation of Korean "nationals" in Japan continues to be proportionately problematic.

This problematic situation was especially affected after 1985 by the revision of the Nationality Law. Until then, by law, a child from a Japanese and non-Japanese couple assumed his or her father's nationality. The 1985 revision, however, allowed the child to choose either of the parents' nationalities. This impacted directly on Korean residents. While about 90 per cent of the married Koreans had been married to a Japanese spouse, many children of such marriages now chose Japanese nationality. In effect, about 11,000 Koreans renounced their Korean nationality within a year after the revision (see Table 1 for more recent numbers) and commenced a new life as "a Japanese" with a Japanese name.[2]

Table 1: Naturalisation Applications, 1996-2000

	Applications	Reviewed	Granted	Rejected		
				Koreans	Chinese	Others
1996	14,944	14,495	9,898	3,976	621	97
1997	16,164	15,061	9,678	4,729	654	90
1998	17,486	14,779	9,561	4,637	581	108
1999	17,067	16,120	10,059	5,335	726	202
2000	14,936	15,812	9,842	5,245	725	215

Source: Ministry of Justice Department of Civil Affairs, http://www.moj.go.jp/TOUKEI/t_minj03.html

This was a significant movement because for a long time Koreans in Japan, even second- and third-generation Koreans, had not been willing to renounce their Korean nationality. In their view, doing so meant acknowledgement of defeat in their fight against discrimination and, more importantly, betrayal to those compatriots who still adhered to Korean nationality. On the other hand, those who chose to acquire Japanese nationality did so mostly to sidestep discrimination.

During recent years Korean residents have begun to exhibit a new, interesting movement. While more and more third- and fourth-generation Koreans are acquiring Japanese nationality, simultaneously more and more of these Koreans are deliberately revealing their "ethnic" origin by such means as using Korean names. Those new Japanese nationals consider their conversion to be

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[1] Ministry of Justice, "Changes in the Number of Registered Aliens according to Nationality, 2000," http://www.moj.go.jp/TOUKEI/t_minj03.html
[2] Korean and Japanese names are readily distinguishable. While Korean names consist mainly of one syllable, Japanese names involve many syllables, for instance.

a conversion in nationality but not in ethnicity, unlike their parents and grandparents who had considered ethnicity to be identical with nationality.

This is an interesting phenomenon in the sense that those new Japanese nationals are now viewing Japan not as a monoethnic but as a multiethnic society and are defining themselves as members of such a multiethnic society. A close examination of the educational aspects of Korean residents in Japan reveals some useful hints of the complex processes in which the myth of a monoethnic Japan, a myth which was created as part of the nation building effort at the turn of the twentieth century, now crumbles.

ETHNIC STUDY FOR KOREAN CHILDREN AND ESSENTIALISM

At the present time about 90 per cent of Korean children in Japan, that is, those children whose nationality still remains North Korean or South Korean, go to a Japanese public or private school. Only 10 per cent of them attend schools operated by their "national" organisation: the South Korean Mindan or the North Korean Chongryun (See Table 2 for examples from Osaka, the area with the largest concentration of Korean residents).

Table 2: School Attendance: Korean Children in Osaka (1997)

	Element.	Middle	High	Total
Public Schools	8,239	5,425	2,595	16,259
Choson Hakkyo (NK)	1,190	650	652	2,492
Paegdu Hagwon (SK)	186	165	169	520
Kumgang Hagwon (SK)	123	59	52	234
Total	9,738	6,299	3,468	19,505

Notes: "NK" for "North Korean" and "SK" for "South Korea."

Meanwhile, many Japanese schools with Korean children operate after-school "ethnic classes." Many such classes are operated in the Kansai region, in Osaka and vicinity in particular, where there is a heavy concentration of Koreans. The content of education of such extra-curricular classes are typically demonstrated in the annual activity plan of the Moriguchi Number Two Middle School (see Table 3).

The objectives of such classes are mainly to accommodate pupils of foreign origins into the larger society of Japan rather than, literally, to help them maintain or preserve their "ethnic identity." Such classes are organised and operated within the legal framework of the Basic Law of Education (*Kyoiku kihon ho*), which stipulates that "Japanese schools are organizations for educating Japanese." Underpinning this legal stipulation is the monoethnic view of the Japanese nation that "the nation of Japan is a body of individuals who share a common culture and lineage."[3] This view is so firmly entrenched in Japanese society that even the accommodative ethnic classes invite reluctant public support and sometimes even demonstrated opposition. The ethnic classes of public schools are especially vulnerable to this view, because teaching non-Japanese language(s) and culture(s) in public schools can appear to run counter to the monoethnic mission stipulated in the Basic Law of Education.

Educators engaged in such programs are not satisfied, either. As apparent in the Moriguchi Number Two Middle School's annual activity plan, the ethnic classes in Japanese schools pursue a form of "multicultural education" which is, seemingly, comparable to those in Canada and in the

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[3] Eiichi Oguma, Taiintsu minzoku shinwa-no kigen (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1997).

United States. They embrace the values of "respecting differences" in a pluralist society and the resultant desirable outcomes of "richness with differences."[4] With this in view, those ethnic classes incorporate the language, history and culture (such as clothes and food) of the ethnic minorities concerned into their programs, encouraging both minority and majority pupils to participate. Overall, such "ethnic" components are organised in such a way as to promote ethnic identity among minority children and "a deeper understanding of heterogeneous cultures" among majority children.[5]

**Table 3. Objectives and Class Activities of Korean Ethnic Classes
(Moriguchi Number Two Middle School, Osaka)**

Monthly Theme	Targets of Education	Hours
May Opening ceremony Ethnic names	Understand the importance of coming to ethnic classes. Write one's name in *Hangul* Korean writing system. (Produce name-tags) Know friends' Korean names. Learn about historical background, especially Japanese prewar policy of conversion from Korean to Japanese names. Learn the importance of calling each other by proper Korean names.	3
June Urimal [Our language] *Ryori* [Cooking] *Norae* [Songs]	Learn about greeting idioms in Korean. Using such idioms, introduce oneself to others in class. Learn about the history and structure of *Hangul*. Produce a *kagya-pyo* (a table of consonant-vowel combinations). **Identify the Korean words that children already know.** Learn how to cook simple Korean dishes. Have opportunity of exposure to the culinary culture of Koreans.	5
July Ethnic Culture Summer School	Using traditional musical instruments, get familiar with a few typically Korean rhythmic patterns.	3
September Ethnic culture (Prepare for a concert)	Get familiar with *nong-ag* (a typical Korean folk art). **Practice in rhythmic patterns. Develop skills. Develop love of ethnic culture. Develop solidarity with friends.**	4
October Concert	Develop ethnic self-awareness and pride.	4
November Ryori (*Kimchi*-making) Eating kimchi	Get familiar with Korean food by making *kimchi*. Deepen understanding of the Korean food culture and table manners by eating Korean food together with others. Promote interaction between children.	3
December Geography	Learn about the provinces, mountains, rivers of the Korean peninsula. Identify the places of family origin.	2
January History	Cultural heritage, individuals of historic significance, etc.	3
February History	The modern history of the Korean nation. Cultural heritage via audio-visual media. Understand the excellence of Korean culture.	4
March Anthology	Write essays about the year activities. Produce anthology of such essays. Reflect on the past year and look forward to the upcoming year.	2

The reason for the educators' discontent is primarily that such classes embrace only selected elements of ethnic culture into the established curriculum, which seeks to enhance the "national" identity of the majority group. For this reason, it is pointed out, such elements do not, and cannot,

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[4] Osaka-fu zainichi gaikokujin kyoiku kenkyukai, *21-sekini muketa tabunka kyoiku-no kihon koso* (Osaka: Author, 1996).
[5] Ibid.

really promote ethnic identity among the minority children concerned, nor can they ensure "a deeper understanding of heterogeneous cultures" among majority children.[6] For minority children, the critics elaborate, such limited, superficial elements may well help them be somewhat aware of their cultural backgrounds. Given the history of Japan's colonisation of Korea between 1910 and 1945, and the subsequent years of discrimination against Koreans in Japan, nevertheless, such elements may actually end up enhancing, rather than reducing, among Korean pupils, a feeling that they are still being discriminated against due to their cultural and ethnic background. As well, they add, the ethnic language brought into ethnic classes may in fact enhance the existing prejudices associated with such cultural traits. The point at issue here is what is called in Japan "cultural essentialism," grasping a culture by a few typical elements of the culture.

Further problems can be identified in the context of the minority group's cultural self-perception. Unless a cultural group lives in isolation from other cultural groups, it is improbable that grasping a few traits of one's own culture automatically lead to pride in the culture. On the other hand, if the cultural group has lived in a constant contact with other cultural groups, it would be likely that the cultural traits of the various groups are judged in relative and comparative terms. If so, then it would be unlikely that all cultures, represented in their typical elements, generate an understanding that all other cultures are valuable in their unique ways. If the power relationships between the many different cultural groups are not those of equality but of inequality and of domination and subordination, it would be very likely that the cultural traits of the subordinate group are perceived to be inferior in quality to those of the dominant group. In this context, lesson plans prepared within the framework of cultural essentialism can actually promote a negative self-image involving assessments such as, "My culture is imperfect," "My ethnic group is imperfect," and so on.[7]

An attempt to sidestep these troubles is "identity politics." The essence of this concept is teaching and learning about selected cultural traits -- ethnic language, music, food, and so on -- as part of an enterprise to build a "perfect ethnic identity" - a self-assertive frame of cultural identity put forward regardless and in spite of the superior-inferior prejudices based on the relationships of domination and subordination.[9] Here, minority groups' cultural elements may well continue to be brought into ethnic classes selectively; such elements, however, are not isolated, incidental pedagogical factors. They are, rather, integral parts of the larger project of building an assertive self-image in the mind of the minority child. For this reason, ethnic classes embracing identity politics employ additional measures for helping children form an assertive self, their history, tradition, and, more importantly, their personal experiences, without implicating it to the existing biases. This identity politics has generated a new enthusiasm in multicultural education but it, too, has resulted in frustrations and disillusions. A good way of showing such unexpected consequences may be to examine the case of Rangja.

CULTURAL ESSENTIALISM AND THE DILEMMA OF IDENTITY: A CASE STUDY OF A KOREAN STUDENT

The context of Rangja's story is the city of Takatsuki in the metropolitan Osaka area. Takatsuki is located in the northern part of the metropolitan Osaka area and neighbours the Kyoto region. In Takatsuki, school-aged Korean children attend ethnic classes operated by the local board of

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[6] Masami Sekine, Esunishitei-no seiji shakaigaku (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 1994), p. 224.

[7] Taeyoung Kim, Aidentiti poritikusu-wo koete (Kyoto: Sekaishisosha, 1999).

[8] The phrase "perfect ethnic identity" is borrowed from So Kyong Shig's works. "Idendity politics" has been widely in use in Japan since roughly 1993. This phrase comes from Todd Gitlin, "The Rise of Identity Politics," *Dissent* 40 (Spring 1993), pp. 172-175.

education. There are both community programs and in-school programs. The former are operated in community centres three days a week while the latter take place once a week after the school day. The Takatsuki Board of Education operates community programs for Korean children in the districts of Nariai, Bessho and Chuuou, and in-school programs in three elementary schools and five middle schools. All of these schools are located in communities with concentrations of Korean residents.

The contents of the programs, both community and in-school programs, are predominantly Korean and include subject learning about Korean culture, sports activities and recreation. Both Korean and Japanese children partake in the programs. The given purposes of the programs include the fostering among Korean children of ethnic identity and the improvement of self-esteem, as well as the promotion among Japanese children of toleration regarding cultural differences. For this, the teachers and instructors of the programs annually select a few children as "models of promising children" in order thereby to encourage Korean children to come forward proudly with their ethnic identity and not to conceal their ethno-cultural background. Also, by mixing Korean children with Japanese children, the programs stimulate children of different cultural backgrounds to approve of each other's culture and drop prejudices. The implementation of such programs, however, has revealed obstacles unforeseen by the program developers and even by the teachers/instructors involved in the delivery process. Rangja's experience shows tellingly about the obstacles.

Rangja was born as a third-generation Korean child in the dominantly Korean district of Bessho. When I first met her, she was a middle-school girl, and Rangja had lived in Bessho since her birth. The Board of Education's community programs there had been already in operation at Rangja's birth. Rangja joined some of these "ethnic classes" soon after she entered elementary school. Since both parents were working, she stayed with other children until her ethnic class ended for the day. She liked the activities of learning about Korean culture and indeed developed an interest in the Korean drum, *changgo*, when she was an elementary-school girl. By the time she became a third grader, she had made a substantial progress in the handling of the musical instrument.

Rangja was enthusiastic in ethnic studies. This was apparent in her weekly schedule. For her, Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays were group activity days in the community program. Tuesdays were *changgo* days. Then, on Fridays Ranja joined group activities in the in-school program. She thus spent the entire week in various ethnic class activities. Through the activities Rangja indeed became proud of her ethnic background. Upon this, while she was still an elementary school child, Rangja was hit by an idea that she would like to use her Korean name at school instead of the Japanese name that was then in use. Since her parents did not approve in the fear that doing so would invite harassment, she gave up the idea. Instead, she decided to use her Korean name once she became a middle-school girl. She indeed did so, without consulting with either of the parents upon entering middle school.

The influence of the ethnic classes on Rangja was not confined to this matter, however: it was extensive. As one of her instructors pointed out, she "embodied a character commensurate with group life" and maintained a strong sense of responsibility in associating with group peers. She grasped quickly what the teacher or instructor expected of her and worked seriously to meet the expectation. For her, therefore, the community-based and school-based ethic classes endorsed her self-esteem as a Korean girl.

Indeed, Rangja thus became a "model of promising Korean children," full of pride and self-assertiveness. At the beginning of each academic year, she told her classmates about her personal history as a Korean child as well as how she felt about herself, as she was requested by her teacher or instructor. In the view of the latter, her candid talk about herself would back up her ethnic

identity and self-esteem. Gradually, however, Rangja became uncomfortable about her role as a model student. While talking to her classmates as a model student, according to her, she came to feel that she was showing all of herself to others only to "inflict pain" on herself.

As she said,

> The teacher asks me to tell the friends in class all about myself. But the friends do not listen to me. Sometimes some of them get asleep while I am trying hard to talk. It is obvious that at least some of them do not have interest in my story. I am sure about this by a simple glance at their faces. I don't want to tell them about myself when they have no interest. Telling them about myself is just an unpleasant "ritual" that I have to perform each year. So I became reluctant. When the teacher asks me why, I only feel pain.

Rangja's pride in her ethnic background has gradually turned to a painful duty unmistakably due to the short sight involved in identity politics of multicultural education. The discourse on "respecting the ethnic identity of Korean children" has run into an unspoken logic of functionally disrupting those children's already troubled life. In the end, Rangja abandoned her Korean name and restored her Japanese name when she advanced to a high school. And she stopped participating in ethnic class activities. For the Korean children who reside in Japan, their Korean name means discrimination in reality no matter how hard they try to ignore it. She has come to learn about this plain reality after years of exposure to identity politics.

Many of her classmates advanced to the same high school. Although Rangja now used her Japanese name instead of her Korean name, many of her friends knew that she was a Korean. So, in a sense, her switch from the Korean name to the Japanese name was a pointless effort to sidestep discrimination. Rangja's perception was quite otherwise, nevertheless. While using her Japanese name, Rangja energetically participated in the activities of the high school's Korean student group. She did not abandon her perception of herself as a Korean. All that she abandoned was the restrictions imposed on her by the essentialist elements that survived in the ethnicity politics of multicultural education. What she had pursued was a sense of ethnic identity that was flexible enough to safeguard her whenever she was in a discriminatory environment.

CONCLUSIONS

The flexible ethnic identity Rangja thus acquired was a scheme for coping with such a discriminatory environment as a vulnerable youth. It is in the same context that we can make sense of the new movement to retain Korean names among those who have changed their nationality. Like Rangja, they too have not given up their identity as a Korean; they have chosen a device which can protect them when their identity as a Korean alone is insufficient to do so.

To summarise, the educational programs for children of ethnic minorities in Japan is still ultimately running according to the old logic of a monoethnic Japan or, at least, the logic of cultural essentialism (which is in fact its modified version). Identity politics was brought in as a way of fighting this logic by guiding minority children to self-confidence and self-assertion. This politics, however, has turned out to be no cure for the problems of minority children.

What is necessary is the embracing by Japanese society at large of a culture of toleration. It is also necessary that minority children are guided to develop a flexible ethnic identity unrestricted by the narrow pedagogical discourse of cultural essentialism or by the pedagogical division of students in opposing groups: majority and minority, or Koreans and Japanese. Such necessities may be met fully only when we all begin to move beyond the strait-jacket of modern nationalism.

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Cultivating Global Literacy Through English as an International Language (EIL) Education in Japan: A New Paradigm for Global Education

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This paper discusses the significance of a five-year empirical study of integrating global human issues into a university-level EFL education in Japan, highlighting the role of English as an International Language (EIL). The study explores the need for raising students' global literacy which includes inter/cross-cultural competence with transcultural and transnational perspectives. It also sees communicative competence in EIL as necessary in order to have a global and peaceful dialogue with people of the world. The following example of integrated global education practiced at Konan University in Kobe, Japan, involving 200 Japanese University students, provides evidence for the merits of the acquisition of cognitive, affective, social and linguistic skills in, and the knowledge leading to, local and global action with global perspectives. The integration of global human issues into EIL education is an invitation to be challenged and enlightened for all language/culture instructors.

globalisation, global literacy, Japan, education, communication

INTRODUCTION

As language and culture are symbiotic, cultivating global literacy for a peaceful world is one of the most urgent tasks for educators and researchers. For multicultural citizens of the world, in a more sustainable global village where borders play such a minor role, global awareness, respect for other cultures and communication skills, especially communicative competence in English as an International Language (EIL) will be more vital. This paper discusses the significance of an empirical study of integrating global human issues into a university-level EFL class in Japan, highlighting the need for global literacy and the role of English as an international language.

The study explores the need for raising students' global literacy. Global literacy includes cross-cultural competence/sensitivity with transcultural and transnational perspectives to get along with the rest of the world. It also requires communicative competence in EIL to have a global and peaceful dialogue with people of the world.

GLOBALISATION

Globalisation is not one-way, but has many interactive and transcultural paths. Globalisation is neither the convergence of westernisation nor Americanisation. Globalisation is neither Euro-centred homogenisation nor American-centred assimilation. It is true that we cannot look away from the fact that many countries have been influenced by American and European explicit cultures and their financial systems, but the implicit cultures of some

countries seem to remain substantially unchanged and more defensive. We have seen fundamental movements in some cultural and religious contexts along these lines. Increasing tension, fear, US scepticism and Euro-scepticism can be seen in many former colonial regions. The process of globalisation needs to carefully answer the issues of culture, although some cultures like those of Japan, Korea, Singapore and even China are becoming more interactive and dissolving, involved in neo-nationalistic reaction and cultural autonomy in the wake of a dynamic and interactive global cultural flow.

Globalisation means global, transnational interactions of people, shared cultures, information and technology, education, economy and value systems beyond the cultural divide of West and East, Orient and Occident. Willis, in his earlier paper, emphasises that globalisation is a new narrative of transnational interactions, transnational contexts and transnational processes that are institutional, societal, and cultural.

Consequently the world has already witnessed a dramatic increase in multicultural, bicultural, transcultural and transnational people who have plural personal, ethnic, national and global identifications as well as transnational and transcultural organisations and institutions.

BEYOND ORIENTALISM AND OCCIDENTALISM IN GLOBALISATION

Globalisation can transcend Orientalism and Occidentalism. Orientalism is Western centred-conceptions of the Orient. Occidentalism is Eastern-centred views of the West and Europe. Said (1976) defines Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. Historically, there have been many disdainful descriptions of the Orient by Westerners. Evolutionism or progressivism propounded by 19th century thinkers like Hegel is likely to lie behind these views of the Orient. For example, Hegel wrote about the Orient:

> *The Orient has not attained the knowledge that Spirit—Man as such—is free; and because they do not know this, they are not free. They only know that one is free... The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free, but they, and the Romans likewise, knew only that some are free... not man as such.*

> *.... The German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first to attain the consciousness, that man, as man, is free: that is the freedom of Spirit which constitutes its essence.* [1]

Hegel examined the history of the world and the ancient Orient in terms of the development of the spirit of freedom and stated that only the German world could realise the freedom of spirit. Hegel concluded that the history of the world is nothing but the development of the idea of the spirit of freedom and that it is not until all people of all nations attain freedom of spirit that world history will come to an end.

Said criticised this Western-centred assumption which he named Orientalism. His contention in Orientalism is that the Western-centred concept of the Orient and the inalienable sense of Western superiority over it which are logically tied up with Darwinian or Hegelian progressivism, colonialism, Eurocentrism and ethnocentrism, have been manifestly and subconsciously represented in all the texts on the Orient by Western intellectuals.

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1 G.W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, Trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publication Inc, 1956) 18.

A contemporary example of Orientalism can be seen in the discourse of Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996). Japan has been a visible incarnation of Japan's Orientalism in Asia and Pacific, too, which consequently caused the scourge of war and untold sorrow to people in neighbouring nations and the Japanese themselves during World War II.

As educators dealing with language and culture in a global and local community we must foster multicultural, transcultural and transnational perspectives among students, respecting each other's cultural identity rather than jumping into the abyss of the cultural and religious fault lines or battle lines in the name of the clash of civilizations. Our fragile world has already been hurt enough.

Going beyond the walls of Orientalism and Occidentalism, the fault lines of the West and East, Orient and Occident, and the "We"/"They" binominal theorem is a prerequisite of globalisation. In a new paradigm of globalisation in a new cross-cultural century, we need a more flexible and more eclectic attitude towards other people and other cultures for the purpose of multicultural coexistence.

CULTURAL HYBRIDITY AND JAPAN

Globalisation does not mean westernisation and neither does modernisation mean westernisation. Japan's modernisation, for example, is not intrinsically a matter of westernisation. Historically, Japan modernised herself in the name of *"Wakon Kansai"* which literally means "Japanese spirit combined with Chinese learning" by learning Chinese culture and the Confucian work ethic without losing her own cultural identity. Japan drank in Chinese culture and Confucianism and reconstructed Japanese culture by emphasising the strength of group harmony and balance.

Since Japan opened her feudalistic door in 1868 after a 250 year-isolation policy, Japan has modernised herself by learning Western systems and technologies without losing her own cultural strength and spirit, this time in the name of *"Wakon Yosai."* The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines *"Wakon Yosai"* as Japanese spirit combined with Western learning. White (1987) states that in Japan, to be modern is not, in any pervasive sense, to be Western.

What, then, has been the secret of Japan's modernisation after a long period of national isolation? Japan's modest and intellectual attitude of being on the periphery and Japan's willingness to learn and borrow from others, respecting group harmony and balance (equilibrium), have often had an energising effect on Japan's modernisation as well as on her economic and technological progress. This must be a kernel of Japan's cultural strength and the heart of the Japanese system.

As Willis describes in his earlier paper, Japan can be seen historically as a society of active hybridity and borrowing, which always results in a more powerful Japan. Japanese culture is not something monolithic or static: for Japan the ability to act culturally guarantees the possibility of change. The innovation of *cultural hybridity and borrowing* have brought about Japan's energising power to modernise the formerly most encapsulated and isolated country in Asia.

ISSUES OF CULTURES IN GLOBALISATION

The process of globalisation needs to carefully respond to the issue of culture for the purpose of a multicultural and equitable coexistence. In many multinational companies, understanding culture is more important than understanding technology. Being ahead of the

competitor in terms of cultural understanding is increasingly more important. Culture is the way people approach and resolve dilemmas. Culture is a dynamic process of solving human problems, and these problems come to us as dilemmas. "Dilemma" comes from the Greek word meaning "two propositions" (Trompenaars, 1998).

Then how should we cope with different cultures with an effective strategy for cultural confrontation and opposing values? The key answer is *awareness, respect, communication and,* as Trompenaars (1998) emphasises, *reconciliation from your cultural strength.* We can summarise the necessary attitude toward the issues of cultures as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Necessary Attitudes toward the Issues of Cultures

Awareness	• Understanding of other cultures is a lifetime commitment. • Cultural borders are not where civilisations clash but where civilisations flourish. • Cultural Relativism with transcultural perspectives. • Clear understanding of explicit cultures and implicit cultures. • Avoiding negative stereotypes and prejudice. • Stereotypes and prejudice comes from lack of information and direct contact.
Respect	• To be respected we must respect others. • Even if we don't understand each other, we can respect each other. • Respect is a good start for communication.
Communication	• Effective verbal and nonverbal communication has a dramatic power. • Communication overcomes ignorance, indifference and intolerance.
Reconciliation	• Reconciling from our cultural strength in order to integrate seemingly opposing values on a higher level. • Integrating the dogma of individualism and that of communitarianism.

ENGLISH AS AN INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE IN GLOBALISATION

As history taught us at the end of colonialism and the arrival of our post-modern orientation, we have already seen the end of linguistic imperialism symbolising American English and British English. We now see a variety of *Englishes* in today's world. It can be said that we have entered the age of *Englishes* within the framework of English as an international language and global/world language. One of the most well known models is that of the concentric circles found in David Crystal's *Encyclopedia of the English Languages*. In this model, the inner circle is occupied by speakers of English as a native language, the outer circle by speakers of English as a second language and, beyond that, the expanding circle by speakers/learners of English as a foreign language (Crystal, 1997; Watkins & Hughes, 2001) We can mainly classify how *Englishes* have been used as a means of communication as follows in Table 2.

Observing the variety of *Englishes* in today's world, the significance of English as an international language (EIL) is becoming more vital as a means of global communication. Smith (1976) defines EIL as a language that is used by people of different nations to communicate with one another. He predicted the future of English as an international common language as follows:

> English is a means to communicate to the rest of the world their identity, culture, politics, and way of life. One doesn't need to become more Western or change one's morals to use English well in international situations. English can and should be international. (Smith, 1981)

Table 2. Classification of Englishes[2]

ENL	Inner circle countries where English is spoken as a native language - 377 million native speakers of English (North America, UK, Australia, New Zealand, etc)
ESL	Outer circle countries where English is spoken as a second language - 375 million second language speakers of English (India, Singapore, Philippines, etc, where English is an official language)
EFL	Expanding circle countries where English is spoken and learned as a foreign language - 750 million learners of English (China, Korea, Japan, etc)
EIL	Global circle countries and societies where English is spoken as an international language or world language for communication - 1,500 million people user of English as an international language or global language

The essential point is that English Language Teaching (ELT) has already gone beyond language within the framework of global education. Consequently EFL teachers involved in EIL can be multicultural citizenship educators for global symbiosis in this cross-cultural century. Ultimately, English as an International Language belongs to no single culture, but rather provides the basis for promoting cross-cultural understanding in an increasingly global village (McKay, 2001). The very fact that English is an international language means that no nation can have custody over it (Widdowson, 1994). Also, as McKay (2001) notes, learners of an international language do not need to internalise the cultural norms of native speakers of that language as the ownership of an international language becomes de-nationalised.

GLOBAL LITERACY: A NEW PARADIGM FOR EIL EDUCATION

Multicultural and transcultural perspectives, respecting each cultural identity would be more vital in a true sense of globalisation, which should be primarily cultivated as a kernel of global literacy through language and culture education. There must be several basic attitudes to be cultivated as a new paradigm of EIL educators.

First of all, EIL educators should be very aware of the historical background of how English has become a lingua franca in many parts of the world. Secondly, we should clarify the true meaning of globalisation in intercultural and multicultural context with clear understanding of the causes and effects of Orientalism and Occidentalism. Thirdly we should plant seeds of global literacy deep in students' habits of their hearts and behaviours.

Global literacy includes cross-cultural competence/sensitivity with multicultural, transcultural and transnational perspectives. It also develops cognitive, affective and social skills to reconcile from one's own strength and integrate seemingly opposing values on a higher level for the purpose of equitable coexistence on this fragile earth. Also, it requires communicative competence in EIL for global and peaceful dialogue in order to share and solve human problems with people of the world.

Global literacy in this context addresses literacy as reconceptualised citizenship, called multicultural citizenship, which will enable students to acquire a delicate balance of cultural, national and global identification (Banks, 1998). This multicultural citizenship is not the

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2 The figure is based on D. Crystal, *English as a Global Language*, (Cambridge University Press, 1997) and Y. Funabashi, *Aete Eigo Kouyougo Ron* (Discussion on English as an official language, Bungei Shunjyu 2000).

assimilationist ideology of a mythical Anglo Saxon Protestant conception of the "global citizen," but a multicultural ideology that enables people to work together as multicultural citizens of the world in order to participate in a dynamic process of solving human problems on our planet. Fisher (1985) states that global education promotes the knowledge, attitudes and skills relevant to living responsibly in a multi-cultural and interdependent world.

As a new paradigm of EIL education in globalisation, educators should foster global literacy in the hearts of a new generation which willingly respects individual cultural values and religious faith. We should respect democratic freedom, common interest in a sustainable global society, intergenerational equity, faith, hope and love in Christianity, the Confucian work ethic and benevolence, and the strength and harmony of the Japanese work ethic. As Gore (1993) emphasises respect for the central concepts of Islamic faith in the Qu'ran—*tawheed* (unity), *chalifa* (trusteeship), and *akhrah* (accountability) which serve as the pillar of the Islamic environmental ethic; the ancient Hindu dictum: "The earth is our mother, and we are all her children"; and the spiritual significance of Sikhism, we should respect the heart of these and other world religions as a global legacy and asset of all humanity beyond the limits of individual cultures and religions. With this global literacy in mind we will be able to transform the jangling discords of today's confused world into a beautiful symphony of global solidarity in a magnificent ethnoscape.

RATIONALES: EIL EDUCATION AS A PART OF GLOBAL EDUCATION

Kofi Anan, the UN Secretary General states: "Ours is a world in which no individual, and no country, exists in isolation. All of us live simultaneously in our communities and in the world at large" (*Newsweek*, Dec. 1999-Feb. 2000 issue.). However, we have seen the large scale violation of human rights around the world. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its Human Development Report in 1997 noted that 1.3 billion people in developing countries make ends meet with less than one dollar per day. Women comprise 70 percent of the world's poor. Also, some 160 million children are moderately or severely malnourished. Some 110 million are out of school and more than 120 million children are forced to work in poverty in today's world. What makes the matter worse, the new century has already seen a large-scale influx and efflux of refugees (22 million in 2001), immigrants and marginalised people that are now struggling and settling in nations throughout the world. Consequently, we have witnessed the continuing existence of institutional racism and racial animosity and xenophobia, which widens the structural gap between haves and have-nots all over the world.

The lesson that we have learned from history is that the most serious problem that all humanity is facing today comes back to the issues of cross-cultural confrontation, such as ethnocentrism, racial animosity and discrimination, racial and religious prejudice, xenophobia, ethnic cleansing, Orientalism, Occidentalism and Eurocentrism. What is really vital for global symbiosis is understanding how we can transform the attitude of ethnocentrism into multi-cultural citizenship fostering transcultural and transnational perspectives in order to be able to transcend the limits of individual cultures.

McKay (2001) emphasises that the teaching of culture should not involve a mere presentation of facts but a critical and social process of trying to understand other cultures in relation to one's own. This is the point of departure for multicultural citizenship for human symbiosis.

As Mother Teresa bridged the divides of culture, class, race, ethnicity, and religion in fighting for the dignity of the poorest of the poor in a foreign land, future generations should be encouraged, empowered and enlightened to be transcultural and transnational for the

purpose of peaceful human symbiosis with equitable participation in both local and global communities.

How can we develop global literacy as a multi-cultural citizen of the world through EIL education? An assumption is that EIL speech communication competence will be a significant part of global citizen education which focuses on cultivating global literacy. Therefore, the integration of global issues into EFL speech communication, using English as an International Language, can be a process of developing global awareness of human symbiosis with a clear cultural, national and global identification. The point is that EIL students can learn their own culture and global village concern in relation to other cultures. And by expressing and exchanging their own ideas on global issues using EIL, students can sharpen cross-cultural literacy and a needed intercultural spirit. By orally presenting their perspectives on global human rights issues before the class as the outcome of the problem-solving strategies for conflict resolution, students become aware of the significance of self-expression and transcultural perspectives as multi-cultural citizens of the world.

There are five rationales why EIL instructors should include global education in the syllabus. First, world problems, especially global issues affect every member of the human family on this planet. Second, globalisation has created a more interdependent context on the earth, namely what happens in one place affects others in different parts of the world. Third, the attitude of many young people in the "North" is that they need little knowledge about other cultures. Fourth, in the "South" young people tend to copy their peers in the North without giving a critical thought of the effects such a life style has on their families, communities and the earth. Fifth, teaching of intercultural tolerance towards diversity and respect of nature and human rights must start as early as possible at school. With these five rationales in the midst of today's confused world, it seems self-evident that EFL instructors should be encouraged to play key roles in integrating controversial global issues into the EIL class as a part of global education.

INTEGRATING GLOBAL ISSUES INTO EIL EDUCATION

Content-based EIL education in an academic approach raises the motivation of students dramatically. A traditional "language classroom" is then transformed into a "language home for global dialogue" with a low affective filter. The idea is to develop content-based instruction and English as an international language. Naturally, this idea needs to create a learner centred-communicative and interactive classroom. Students will then have a desire to use the target language and to be understood by others, especially other people of the world.

An experimental assumption here is that this integrated academic approach, in which students organise a coherent speech on global human rights issues by gathering information and discussing and debating with classmates, enables them to sharpen their transcultural/transnational views for global literacy and speech communication skills. As a result, they can transform their global knowledge into democratic and civic actions in regard to several controversial human rights issues of their own free will.

As an effective strategy, integrating this academic approach into presentation in an oral and written form with discussion and democratic debate are vital for EIL. Reading skills (skimming, scanning and inference) rather than translation skills should be developed as an academic writing skill. Process writing which respects the processes of outlining, first drafting, sharing, peer editing, revising, supervising and final drafting should be focused, in addition to the use of transition devices and rhetorical tools. Based on this process writing using an academic approach, EIL communicative competence and oral presentation skills should be encouraged within a framework of global education for global literacy.

It can be safely said that integrating global issues into the EIL speech communication class, focusing on the problem-solving process as a core concern of the education process, will develop students' global awareness and skills for self-representation. The process of thinking, sharing and discussing global issues related to global human rights, and consequently the process of organising, drafting and revising one's own ideas for oral presentation is the process of academic approach and problem-solving based on John Dewey's five steps of reflective thinking. The prerequisite of EIL Speech Communication as a part of global education includes a basic academic approach to problem solving. We can summarise the basic academic approach and problem-solving approach to global human issues as illustrated in Table 3 and Table 4.

Table 3. The Process of the Academic Approach in EIL Education for Global Literacy

Gathering information on global human issues

Sharing relevant information, facts and evidence

Processing the necessary information for outlining and drafting one's own speech

Organising and constructing one's own opinion in written and oral form

Table 4. The Process of the Problem-Solving Approach in EIL Education for Global Literacy

Narrowing down one relevant issue from relevant global human issues

Defining the problem in the relevant global issue

Analysing the causes and effects of the problem

Exploring possible workable solutions as a brainstorming (Sharing)

Suggesting possible workable solutions with each other (Sharing)

Selecting the best solution or integrated solutions

Implementing ways of carrying out the best solution.

The merit of using both an academic approach and a problem-solving approach in an interactive EIL classroom is that of integrating global human rights issues through public speaking. Students can cultivate a spontaneous urge to express themselves orally with greater inter-/cross-cultural literacy and global awareness.

Classroom procedures include a brief lecture and introduction of several global issues such as the environment, sustainable societies for intergenerational equity, war and peace, today's significance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, child labour and the plight of world children, hunger in Africa, gender issues with the latest feminist theories, the turmoil of Japanese education, Japan and the Japanese (Who killed Japanese cultures?), and contemporary marriage styles and divorce. Provocative news shows and documentaries (BBC World, CNN International, CBS News, NHK Special, etc.) are utilised to visualise certain realities. Students then gather and read relevant materials to conceptualise the problem, followed by interviews and analysis sessions with classmates. Students organise their own speech, developing it with logical reasoning and valid evidence to persuade the audience. Finally public speeches and a follow-up democratic discussion are held.

By presenting their own perspectives on global human rights issues as the outcome of content-based instruction involved in this academic approach for problem solving, students are able to develop speech communication skills for articulating global concerns and active participation in their community with global perspectives.

The results of this study reveal that the majority of the students involved in this EIL global education demonstrate a positive response to this program and many students developed confidence in EIL speech communication. Such skills will aid students in coping with global/social issues, as well as giving them greater freedom and confidence in public self-expression in the target language.

FINDINGS

Questionnaires on this EIL program were given to junior and senior students taking the advanced speech communication class at Konan University, Kobe, Japan at the end of each semester from 1997 to 2001) (see Appendix 1). The number of participants in this class over these five years comprised 200 students, who came from the Departments of English & American Literature, Japanese Literature, Sociology, Psychology, Economics, Law, Business Administration/Management, and Engineering & Science.

The majority of students generally have a positive outlook regarding the integration of human rights issues with the EIL speech communication class. The results from the student responses reveal that a considerable number of students felt the significance of learning human rights issues in EFL education (Q14: 96%). All students felt they became aware of social and global issues (Q6: 100%) and most students enhanced their global village concern (Q7: 86 %). One of the significant results of this class is that more than 84 percent of students want to participate in NGO or NPO activities to serve hungry children and the most impoverished people in the near future (Q10: 84.5%). Some of the students taking this program have already started to study Development and Conflict Resolution in developing countries in the graduate programs of universities in the United Kingdom, and they are planning to be involved in NGO activities in their own ways. Also, one of the students in this course has gone to Jordan to participate in a Japan Youth Overseas Cooperation program sponsored by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for two years. Another student finished Development Studies in the graduate program in Leeds University, one of our sister universities overseas, and is now working for an UNDP regional office in Nairobi, Kenya, as an internship. Also, some junior and senior students are planning to study these problems in their own exchange programs in their affiliated universities. As a result of this integrated program many students felt a keen need for awareness of global issues and confidence in expressing their own ideas in public as being important in their future life (Q13: 95.5%).

The first reason that many students support such an integrated program is that they can enjoy expressing their own ideas freely while acquiring basic problem-solving strategies and skills for organising and constructing logical and persuasive speeches. The second reason is that the students' motivation to speak up about their own opinions is significantly raised by the selection of human rights topics involved with global issues, and the inclusion of teacher's encouraging comments. The third reason is the dramatic impact of a learner-centred communicative approach with the philosophy of sharing information and ideas with classmates in a trusting classroom atmosphere.

CONCLUSION

In this study I have empirically examined the validity of the integration of global issues into an EIL speech communication class for Japanese university students, discussing the necessity of global literacy with EIL speech communication competence as a part of global education.

The results from the students' responses to the questionnaires and their speeches on global issues reveal considerable satisfaction with the integration of global human issues with oral presentation in a learner-centred classroom. The remarkable development of student's skills in making persuasive public speeches with valid evidence and sharing their ideas with each other gave students enjoyment and confidence in self-expression and self-representation in the target language, especially English as an international language. Also, students have developed and sharpened their own academic approaches and problem-solving expertise through the process of web research and sharing necessary information and resources. Consequently, as a result of this integrated EIL speech communication class, students could cultivate their global literacy, creating a warm classroom atmosphere, closer in atmosphere to a target language *home* rather than a traditional teacher-directed language classroom in Japan.

We have reviewed a practical college-based experiment conducted to enhance the awareness of global citizenship and human solidarity, and have argued that self-expression with global perspectives in English as an international language is a goal that should not be overlooked by EFL language educators. The integration of global human issues into EFL speech communication class is an invitation to be challenged and enlightened for all EFL instructors and their students.

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APPENDIX 1: STUDENTS' SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
(N = Number of students)

1. Do you think you have become more confident in public speech in English through this class?
   Very much (10%) (N=20)   Yes (73%) (N=146)   Don't know (17%) (N=34)   No (0%) (N=0)

2. Do you think you have improved your communicative competence in this class?
   Very much (17.5%) (N=35)   Yes (72.5%) (N=145)   Don't know (10%) (N=20)   No (0%) (N=0)

3. Do think you have overcome stage fright in this class?
   Very much (25.5%) (N=51)   Yes (64%) (N=128)   Don't know (10.5%) (N=21)   No (0%) (N=0)

4. Do you think there is a close relationship between writing coherent paragraphs and making a good public speech?
   Very much (22.5%) (N=45)   Yes (72.5%) (N=145)   Don't know (5%) (N=10)   No (0%) (N=0)

5. Do you think a good writer can become a good speaker?
   Very much (70%) (N=140)   Yes (30%) (N=60)   Don't know (0%) (N=0)   No (0%) (N=0)

6. Do you think you have become more aware of social and global issues?
   Very much (49.5%) (N=99)   Yes (50.5%) (N=101)   Don't know (0%) (N=0)   No (0%) (N=0)
   Reason (Because this class gave us many chances to research serious global issues which we seldom study and discuss in Japan)

7. Do you think you have become more aware of a global village concern?
   Very much (26%) (N=52)   Yes (60%) (N=120)   Don't know (14%) (N=28)   No (0%) (N=0)

8. Are you interested in NGOs and NPOs?
   Very much (39.5%) (N=79)   Yes (60.5%) (N=121)   Don't know (0%) (N=0)   No (0%) (N=0)

9. Do you think NGOs and NPOs will play a key role in promoting peaceful coexistence of the world for the next century?
   Very much (69.5%) (N=139)   Yes (25.5%) (N=51)   Don't know (5%) (N=10)   No (0%) (N=0)

10. Do you want to participate in an NGO or NOP to serve hungry children and people in impoverished situations?
    Very much (24.5%) (N=49)   Yes (60%) (N=120)   Don't know (15.5.%) (N=31)   No (0%) (N=0)
    Reason (Because I would like to participate in them in my way and do something for them as the same human beings on this earth.)

11. Do you think your urge to express your own ideas and opinion on global issues has become stronger than before through this class?
    Very much (39.5%) (N=79)   Yes (49.5%) (N=99)   Don't know (11%) (N=22)   No (0%) (N=0)
    Reason: Because I feel excited when my classmates listen to my opinion and discuss each serious global topic in international English.

12. Do you think you have developed critical and analytical thinking through this program?
    Very much (35%) (N=70)   Yes (43%) (N=86)   Don't know (22%) (N=44)   No (0%) (N=0)

13. Do you think social/global awareness and confidence in expressing your own opinion in public will be helpful in your future life?
    Very much (28%) (N=56)   Yes (67.5%) (N=135)   Don't know (4.5%) (N=9)   No (0%) (N=0)
    Reasons; Because I would like to work for a multinational company or organisation in the future. Because I would like to work for an environmental organisation in the world. Because I have to exchange these problems with many international people.

14. Do you think it is significant to learn human rights issues in EFL Class?
    Very much (69%) (N=138)   Yes (27%) (N=54)   Don't know (4%) (N=8) No (0%) (N=0)
    Reasons: Because we have few opportunities to express our own opinions in English in many Japanese universities. Because it is very important to learn these serious human rights issues directly from BBC and CNN News in English.

Psychological Struggles
Of Korean International Students in Japan

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This paper examines the human relations of Korean international students in Japan. The data were gathered from the free-answer responses of 96 students at a national university to a request to write their opinions regarding foreign student life in Japan. Qualitative analysis of the data revealed three major categories: financial and systemic hardship, difficulties and rewards of their study experience, and reactions to Japanese society and human relations. The final category was further analysed and divided into four themes that form the major content of this paper: moral versus prejudiced, diligent versus inhuman, true feelings versus formal behaviour, and resignation versus perseverance. These data shed light on the nature of the psychological struggles of Korean students in Japan.

International students, Japanese university, Korean students, Japanese society

BACKGROUND

In 2001 there were 14,725 South Korean students studying in Japan, comprising the second largest national group after Chinese. At the University of Tokyo, which has the largest population of foreign students, there are nearly 500 Korean students, 24 per cent of all international students. They are clearly a major part of the increase of international students to Japan and have a significant presence at many schools and university campuses.

The huge influx of Korean students into Japanese universities from the mid-1980s has been spurred by their desire for advanced degrees and educational opportunities unavailable in Korea. Surveys on Korean students in Japan have shown that, more than students from other countries, they believe that a degree from a Japanese university is highly valued in their home country (Iwao & Hagiwara, 1991). However, more recent data indicate their concern that a degree from Japan – even from the elite University of Tokyo – will be less valued than degrees from the United States of America (Higashi Chiiki Kenkyukai, 1997). Although some Korean students who once would have gone to the USA for Japanese Studies are now coming to Japan, many are discouraged by the reliance on American and Western European research even in this area.

Some Korean students report that their images of Japan worsened as they spent time in Japan and along with language improvement (Iwao & Hagiwara, 1991). Compared to when they first arrived, Korean students who have been in Japan one year are less likely to see Japanese in such favourable ways as kind (*shinsetsu*), warm (*atatakai*), easy to get along with (*tsukiayasui*), easy to become close to (*shitamiyasui*), unprejudiced (*henken ga nai*), and trustworthy (*shinrai dekiru*) (Iwao & Hagiwara, 1991). Other Korean students say that at first they were impressed by Japanese people but as time passed they became upset that they did not get along well (*ki ga awanai*), and complained that they found it difficult to make friends (Suhara, 1996). They began to say that they could not understand what Japanese are thinking or feeling (*honne ga wakaranai*) and wondered about Japanese

attitudes toward them. Some became bothered that they are always reminded by Japanese that they are outsiders and from what is seen as an inferior country.

According to the U-curve theory of cultural adjustment this change is to be expected (Ward, Bochner, & Furnham, 2001). The initially positive feelings students experience in their study abroad often turn negative after a while in a foreign country. However, attitudes should later improve, but at present there are no data to indicate whether or not this pattern holds in Japan.

There are anecdotal data suggesting that some Korean students learn to make a distinction between their self chosen road of study abroad and the suffering associated with it, and their attitudes toward Japan (Suhara, 1996). The previously mentioned study on Koreans at the University of Tokyo showed that nearly half of students' attitudes towards Japan improved as a result of their study in Japan, while only 17 per cent claimed that they had worsened (Higashi Chiiki Kenkyukai, 1997). And surprisingly, the opposite was true of their attitudes toward Korea, with 26 per cent reporting that their image of Korea worsened and only 12 per cent claiming it had improved.

There are also data suggesting that attitudes toward Japanese become even more positive after returning to Korea and former students are more likely to look favourably on their experience in Japan (Iwao & Hagiwara, 1991). Students with Japan study experience were also more likely than students in Korea to see Japanese as warm and kind, trustworthy, frank, and responsible, and individualistic (Iwao & Hagiwara, 1991). Studies in Korea have shown that students who have studied in Japan are more likely than other Koreans to absolve Japan of responsibility for the colonial period and to see Japanese as peace-loving (Chung, 1998). They are also more open toward daily contact and even marriage with Japanese (Chung, 1998).

However, there are signs that the experience for many is unsatisfactory. A study by Marui and Lee (1995) revealed the stresses on Korean students related to financial hardship, study pressures, and family-related troubles. Although economic problems were a major concern, students were also afflicted with other stresses such as worries about employment after graduation, housekeeping problems of living alone, and problems of the living environment such as climatic changes, high rents, and small living spaces. The nearly 10 per cent of married students who nevertheless lived alone were identified as a group particularly prone to stress. In a 1997 survey of Korean students at Tokyo University only half (54%) reported that they would make the same choice for study abroad if they could do it over again (Higashi Chiiki Kenkyukai, 1997).

The same survey reports that half of the Korean students experienced discrimination in housing and half believe that Japanese hold prejudicial attitudes toward Asians (Higashi Chiiki Kenkyukai, 1997). General attitudes toward Japan and Japanese are also divided, with half of the responses reflecting positive attitudes stressing advanced technology, high public morals, preservation of traditional culture and an adept incorporation of other cultures. On the other hand, negative attitudes included difficulty of human relations, low public morals, and problems understanding distinctions between true feelings and formal behaviours. Students reported that they experienced Japanese as anti-Korean, and looking down on Korea as backward. They also thought that Japanese regarded Koreans as too emotional and direct.

The increase of Korean students in Japan has been encouraged by Japanese government policy designed to internationalise higher education. One of the fruits of this investment is the development of human resources that contribute to cooperative relations between the

two countries. Students who come to Japan ideally return to Korea and become bridges with Japan in various fields. The long anguished history between Japan and Korea makes these cultural ambassadors especially important. Therefore the experiences of Korean students in Japan have a special significance for improving human relations between the citizens of these neighbouring countries. This study aims to examine some data that may shed some light on the nature of these human relations and related psychological struggles of Korean students.

METHODS

The purpose of this study was to examine the feelings of Korean international students regarding human relations with Japanese. The data were gathered from the free-answer responses of 96 students to a questionnaire written in Hangul on stress, living conditions, and health that was distributed to 505 students at Tokyo University in 1995. One of the major problems faced by researchers on foreign students is their reluctance to give honest answers. This study attempted to overcome this barrier by writing the questionnaire in Hangul and requesting responses also in Hangul.

Responses were received from 96 students, 77 (78.5%) males and 19 (21.5%) females. The largest number were between 30-34 years old for males and 25-29 for females; 51 (66%) males and 6 (32%) females were married; 58.7 per cent lived with some family member, while 36 per cent lived alone, including 10 per cent of the married males.

At the end of a questionnaire students were given the following item: "Please write freely your opinions regarding such matters as your expectations and reality of foreign student life in Japan, enjoyable or difficult aspects of study abroad, positive or negative aspects of Japan or ways of solving or overcoming problems."

Qualitative analysis of the data revealed three major categories of responses. One concerns economic and bureaucratic matters (47 responses). These responses consisted of complaints about the hardship of financing their education in Japan due to the high cost of living and the poor exchange rate. The need to work part-time jobs to make ends meet was mentioned as negatively affecting their studies and health. Comments were also received about the excessive demands of the immigration system and the poor treatment by officials at the immigration office. In addition, legal troubles and housing problems were mentioned.

Another category was related to various aspects of study, such as merits and demerits of study abroad and specific aspects of their situation at the university. These 52 responses are almost equally divided into positive and negative comments. Positive statements were made about the joy of being an international student and the excitement of new experiences in a different society. Some students wrote that encountering cultural differences was a good experience. The freedom of the research atmosphere and the opportunity to study among bright professors were also cited. On the other hand, some students noted how tough research was, specifically identified the lack of faculty guidance as a problem. Others cited the difficulty of adjusting to a foreign climate and cultural environment as adversely affecting their studies. Inability to enjoy life in Japan due to their financial pressures and research demands was also noted. Some students complained about poor university facilities such as library hours and limited places to study.

The third category of responses was about Japanese society and human relations with Japanese. Nearly 75 per cent of these 89 responses were classified as negative, and the other 25 per cent as positive. The remainder is paper will deal exclusively with this third category. The data are further divided into four themes that were identified: moral versus prejudiced;

diligent versus inhuman; true feelings versus formal behaviour; and resignation versus perseverance.

MORAL VERSUS PREJUDICED

Seventeen students expressed their feelings and perceptions regarding the manners, morals, and social attitudes and behaviours of Japanese. Some students pointed out the high morality and order in the society as a positive aspect of Japan and Japanese people. They felt that the sense of responsibility in Japanese helped make living in Japan easy for them and that this was an area for Koreans to model in building their own society.

> *Japanese are conscious about social rules and orders and I think it is good that they respect public morals.*

> *The Japanese respect rules, so it is convenient for foreigners like me.*

> *Japan is truly an advanced nation technologically. Sometimes I am reminded of my own country's past, and realise that we have to put a lot of effort to achieve progress, and therefore I apply myself to my work. Most Japanese are kind I think. Therefore Korea also has to join the advanced nations, and in so doing will achieve spiritual freedom.*

However, these positive impressions of Japan are not shared by some other students (5), who claim that on the contrary, Japan is not morally conscious enough to overcome the racial prejudice and discrimination that exist in society. These students feel prejudicial attitudes directed toward them or claim to experience discrimination. They believe that Japanese treat Americans and Europeans specially, and regard Asians far less favourably.

> *The Japanese students in the laboratory discriminate against foreign students, especially toward Asian students compared with European students.*

> *What I don't like about Japan is the Japanese discrimination and pride towards other Asians. I also don't like the unity and exclusiveness of the Japanese.*

Feelings of prejudice and discrimination were also expressed in descriptions of Japan as a society for Japanese only, but closed to others. Students attributed the strong sense of group-consciousness as creating a barrier for foreign students by making groups exclusively for Japanese. Some went further in declaring that this exclusiveness negatively affected their studies and human relations with Japanese.

> *The Japanese closed, discriminating, and wrong way of thinking and ways of doing things are causing much stress that hinders my research and study.*

> *Group-consciousness (shudan-shugi) has continued since a half century ago as one of the Japanese strong points. But in fact, I cannot trust Japanese even now because of that.*

> *It is difficult to make true friendship with Japanese. I have been here over two years. But I have only acquaintance level relationships. We always are treated special, I feel. People are the same wherever you go, and if you can understand the environment around you I thought it was possible [to make friends]. In that way I feel it is very different from other countries.*

In contrast to these views, was the perception of Japanese as kind. Several students (7) mentioned the kindness of Japanese as an impressive feature of their stay in Japan.

> *People are kind in Japan. That is a very good impression I had.*

> *The Japanese spirit of kindness and not bothering others is something that we should learn from them.*

DILIGENT VERSUS INHUMAN

Another major theme observed in responses on Japanese society and human relations with Japanese describes observations of Japanese at work; 23 respondents expressed admiration for the diligence and serious working attitudes of Japanese. Some (7) attributed these

attitudes and behaviours of Japanese regarding hard work and a sense of responsibility to Japan's status as an advanced nation with a highly ordered and stable society.

> *The Japanese have strong feelings of responsibility in their own work.*
>
> *I think that they are responsible and they engage in their given work with enthusiasm.*
>
> *Professors are always working eagerly.*

In contrast to these positive evaluations of Japanese working attitudes, 16 Korean students also included complaints about the poor communication and lack of meaningful human relationships with Japanese people. While praising them as hard-working, they also described Japanese as closed (*heisateki*), preoccupied (*yoyu ga nai*), inhuman (*hiningenteki*), cold-hearted (*joh ga nai*), unemotional (*kanjoh ga nai*) and individualistic (*kojinshugi*). These students criticised an excess in work that led to an inhuman quality.

> *What I can learn from Japanese is that they will certainly complete their work. But on the other hand, the communication with Japanese is problematic.*
>
> *The graduate students at the University are working hard, but most of them are zero in humane aspect. They may not be zero, but personally, I see very few students above 50 points.*
>
> *The Japanese in the lab are extremely different from Koreans. I speak to them, but they are reluctant to carry on a conversation with me. That may be why I feel so much stress.*

These observations were not limited to Japanese students, but also included their academic advisers. While the lack of meaningful social contact with fellow students gives them stress, the absence of communication with their professors obviously has more direct ramifications for their research. Not only the lack of time with advisers, but also the absence of supervision and support were cited.

> *There is not enough extensive communication with professors.*
>
> *Professors never praised nor encouraged in my three years of study.*
>
> *For 20 months, my academic advisor never mentioned about my research in our conversation.*
>
> *You can't have enough communication on a wide level with professors, so it gives me a dreary feeling. I can't feel Japanese are interested in human relations.*

Observations of Japanese at work extend to attributions of spiritual emptiness. Some Koreans see the Japanese working style as pitiful since it makes them limited human beings who don't know how to enjoy life. Their lack of social skills, the limited nature of interpersonal contact, and lack of interest or understanding of foreigners are all seen as negative aspects of Japanese attitudes toward work.

> *They don't know how to enjoy themselves.*
>
> *As long as I stay in this country, I feel pity for them. Because they work so hard; but for what? They may have much money but I feel that they are unhappy people.*
>
> *There are so many Japanese who don't know how to rest. Therefore it is difficult to live with them. There is a proverb saying that those who don't know how to rest, don't know how to work.*

TRUE FEELINGS VERSUS FORMAL BEHAVIOURS

Nine students mentioned the Japanese sense of distinction between true feelings (*honne*) and formal statements (*tatemae*) as problematic in their relationships with Japanese. They regarded Japanese as distinguishing strongly between their private feelings and those that they are willing to express. These distinctions in Japanese behaviour made understanding problematic.

> *It's hard to interact with Japanese, because I don't know what they're thinking.*

The difficulty of communications with Japanese is a problem. I have become tired of the way they cannot open themselves and reveal their attitudes.

However, other students were more negative in their interpretations of the usage of these distinctions. Some claimed that Japanese are polite to your face but talk badly about you behind your back. Others said that Japanese kindness is simply a facade of good manners concealing a prejudiced character. Trusting Japanese was made difficult by these kinds of behaviours.

The way in which Japanese distinguish in their hearts between honne and tatemae is hard to understand. The research lab is a silent battleground. To win one can only write one's dissertation.

The unbelievable amount of individual attacks that occur in talk behind your back means basically a feeling of trust doesn't develop. The difficulty of communications with Japanese is a problem. I have become tired of the way they cannot open themselves and reveal their attitudes.

Some students cited the ritualistic nature of Japanese behaviour as problematic. These students saw certain behaviours as done automatically out of a sense of propriety, rather than from a genuine feeling. They therefore felt thwarted in their attempts to establish more intimacy with Japanese.

Because Japanese are so individualistic they sometimes lose their humanity. When I give something just because I want to, they immediately return something, so I feel uneasy. Japanese obey rules well, but they lose their flexibility. But you get used to this lifestyle and it becomes convenient. Daily interactions are okay, but it is hard to have conversations in which we open our hearts.

You feel a psychological barrier as Japan and the Japanese are so formal and don't have spirituality, so it is very hard to get close.

RESIGNATION VERSUS PERSEVERANCE

The responses of students also revealed how they chose to deal with the conflicts they encountered in Japan. Unfortunately, some found that the disappointments were too great to overcome. They simply resigned themselves to putting up with the situation until they could obtain their degree and return home. Others resolve to keep making an attempt at communication despite the setbacks and discouragement they face.

My expectations are so different from reality that I feel a disappointment in myself and in Japan and human relations here. Not only in the research room but outside as well, it is hard to make Japanese friends -- actually I should say it is impossible.

Despite difficulties, I keep trying to develop contact with Japanese students and professors that involves mutual understanding.

I had no particular expectations, I just wanted to study so I decided to come here. It is hard to understand Japan from inside the lab. However, from the atmosphere and students' attitudes I feel that I don't fit. Now I just want to hurry and graduate to escape. Until then, I can just endure.

Some students develop an attitude as an adversary. They reject Japanese because they feel rejected by them. Their nationalistic feelings as Koreans are thus strengthened. Then they resolve to utilise their study to acquire knowledge that will enable Korea to overtake Japan.

I am aware of the contradictions in understanding Japan. In particular, the degree, almost to a sickness, that they hate Korea and Koreans. Some Japanese reject U.S., but distinguish between omote *and* ura *(front and rear or outside and inside). I realised that I didn't feel my self-pride as Korean, but now I enthusiastically encourage myself to persevere in defeating Japan.*

Other students learn to develop a new and more open perspective, looking at Japanese and Koreans objectively without prejudice. Although they are critical of Japanese they also begin to look critically at their relations with fellow Koreans. Communication and understanding are viewed as requiring mutual effort to become more open and flexible.

> *Study in Japan is difficult because of research itself, but also life in the lab. Especially in my case, my whole school life is in the lab. Now my research is not progressing so I feel lots of stress. And my Japanese colleagues in the lab with whom I am always in contact are so different from Koreans. Even if I speak to them they don't really respond much, so I feel stress. However, even between foreign students I often feel the same tension. Therefore, the interaction between Korean students may be even worse than that with Japanese.*

> *Because I enjoy my research, I try to cope with difficulties of life and fulfil various roles as student, wife, and mother with appreciation and effort. As a foreigner, I feel I must accept a country's cultural differences and try to resolve problems. Foreigners and Japanese need to mutually rid themselves of prejudice and resolve from their particular social position to recover their humanity.*

COMPARISONS WITH KOREAN STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Comments by Korean international students in this study show both positive and negative aspects of their experience as foreign students in Japan. Some are impressed by the Japanese sense of responsibility and serious approach to work. They also find a general sense of respect for rules and good public behaviour impressive. Some are moved by a kindness exhibited by Japanese.

On the other hand, some students are disturbed by a feeling that Japanese are closed to them and lack sufficient interest, understanding, or compassion for their situation as foreign students. The general lack of interaction and the difficulty of understanding the little communication that does take place were mentioned as causes of discontent. And the perception of prejudice was seen as a strong barrier to human relations.

However, these negative perceptions are hardly surprising since foreign students in any country experience considerable stress and become discontent and complain about the host country people. Even in the USA, which has a long history of accepting foreign students, an established system of support services, and a reputation as a friendly society, for many years foreign students have reported difficulty making friends with Americans (Alexander, et al., 1976). The difficulties of Korean foreign students are also experienced by foreign students everywhere, sojourners to foreign lands, young students anywhere, or Korean students in Korea or abroad (Leong & Chou, 1996; Ward, Furnham, & Bochner 2001). Therefore, one of the challenges for researchers is to determine how much of the negative experiences or perceptions of Korean students in Japan are due to these other general factors and how much are specific to being a foreign student in Japan.

Comparison with Korean students in the USA shows that they also experience considerable difficulties, although of a different nature than those met by Korean students in Japan. Those in the USA encounter problems that are based more in the difficulty of managing daily life, in particular, language demands and related communication problems. However, while language problems are relatively easily overcome by Korean students in Japan, communication problems linger. Problems in Japan seem more related to their interaction with the manners, customs, and social attitudes of Japanese. In the relatively safer and seemingly more similar Japanese society, Korean students manage daily life more easily than those in the USA, but human relations problems weigh heavily on them.

Although some students anticipate it, prejudice and discrimination bothers many Korean students in Japan. But looking at this situation in an international perspective, we can see a similar phenomenon occur in the USA. Many foreign students are concerned about what they perceive as prejudice or condescension from Americans (Althen, 1995). In the USA, this prejudice is partly due to ethnocentrism in Americans who regard the rest of the world as revolving around their nation. But there is also the aspect of the loss of status suffered by foreign students when they come to the USA and trade in their professional status for student status which commands little respect. They are then vulnerable to feelings that natives do not treat them with the respect that they deserve relative to their age, experience and status in their home country.

Similar phenomena occur in Japan where ethnocentric attitudes toward other Asians certainly exist. And even more than in the USA, foreign students may suffer from status loss, especially in graduate schools. Japanese graduate students tend to be young, usually just out of college, and generally inexperienced in society. Foreign students, on the other hand, are older and often come with work, military, and family experience. But in the hierarchy of their department they find themselves at the bottom, due to their language difficulties and inability to serve as a respected senior (*sempai*) who will help the Japanese student now and in the future.

The well-established system of welcoming foreign students in the USA ensures that Korean foreign students experience fewer problems related to the foreign students system of the university or in human relations. In Japan their problems are due more to what may be issues related to introducing foreigners into what had long been an exclusively Japanese university system and general society. Although the USA has tremendous ethnic conflict, there is an ideology of openness and ethnic diversity that contrasts very sharply with Japan's ideology of a monoethnic nation. The more problematic historical relations between Korea and Japan compared to those between Korea and the USA would also indicate the likelihood of greater interpersonal conflict for foreign students in Japan (Lee & De Vos, 1980).

BARRIERS TO UNDERSTANDING

The problems of Korean students in human relations with Japanese can be partly explained by differences in sense of self and communicative style. Encounters with natives for foreign students are often uncomfortable or problematic because of a difference in what discussion topics and styles of interaction are considered appropriate. The different sense of "private and public selves" between peoples of different cultures means that the difference of what aspects of the self are regarded by an individual as expressible in public and what aspects are considered as purely part of the individual's private world leads directly to misunderstandings and conflicts (Barnlund, 1989). Cultural differences, specifically differences among expectations concerning how acquaintances and friends will behave are the source of human relations problems between foreign students and the natives (Brislin, 1993).

Communicative style among Japanese is characterised by marked distinctions among public and private, expressed in Japanese by expressions such as inside (*uchi*) and outside (*soto*), front (*omote*) and rear (*ura*), *tatemae* and *honne*. While such distinctions are universal, they appear to be especially extreme in importance among Japanese (Doi, 1986).

Although they are often struck by how similar the cultures are, some Korean students express confusion about the Japanese distinction between *honne* and *tatemae*. They claim

that they do not understand what the person is thinking. Or they understand *tatemae* is being used but find it offensive and it strikes them as dishonest or insincere.

Korean students appear to expect more intimate communication in their interactions with Japanese. They expect the research lab to become an intimate setting in which members become part of the *uchi* rather than *soto*. But they find that the environment is cool and members remain aloof or individualistic, in particular from the foreign student, who may not be admitted into the inner circle that does exist. The result ranges from disappointment to negative attitudes toward Japanese.

Foreign study in Japan is filled with problems related to economic and systemic barriers. With the exception of those who receive Japanese government scholarships or similar support, the financial problems of Korean students in recent years are severe. These problems can be overcome simply through the allocation of more scholarship money, but other barriers to their study remain that must be overcome. The experience of Korean international students in Japan is characterised by mixed reactions to the quality of the study environment. Their experience with immigration officials is negative, although relaxation of regulations is likely to lead to improvements. The remaining barriers may be more in human relations and this is an area where we will have to turn our attention.

The negative feelings of Korean students are not surprising because of the long history of animosity between Japanese and Koreans. Surveys still indicate the existence of mutual distrust between the neighbours. Koreans are educated to regard Japanese as aggressors historically who now have something to offer due to their advanced economic development. Because relations are still strained, the experiences of Korean students in Japan have a special significance for evaluating the potential benefits of international educational programs involving foreign students.

But while young Koreans have heard about Japanese prejudice, they have never experienced it themselves and are therefore relatively open to changing their attitudes. Whether the problems they encounter in Japan are problems related to foreign students anywhere or whether they are problems particularly for Koreans in Japan is the question we need to ask. Historical data on the problems of foreign students indicate that the nature of Japanese society's high degree of cultural homogeneity may lead to difficulties (Nagai, 1977). Although there has been openness in Japan to adopting and absorbing foreign cultures, it cannot be denied that there is also the closed attitude that the society is composed only of Japanese and others should not be allowed in. Japanese are often accused of having a particular problem in relating with foreigners and this is a great handicap in fulfilling major roles and expectations in the global community. The recognition that international educational programs involve a mutual meeting of people of different cultures and mutual learning is clearly essential.

The increase in international students in Japan has been fostered by Japanese government policy designed to internationalise higher education. This investment in bringing students from various countries to Japan and joint efforts in education and research is aimed at contributing to the development of human resources that are essential for international cooperation. Ideally, the students who come to Japan eventually return to their home countries and become bridges with Japan in various fields. However, it is obvious that many students are dissatisfied with the education and social treatment they receive in Japan. Although they appear to become more positive after returning home many do not come to fulfil the ideal of becoming cultural bridges between their home country and Japan.

Student exchange represents a possible source of resolving the difficult relations between people of different countries. However, the results of this survey indicate several areas of concern where the hardship of Korean student life in Japan may interfere with such a desirable outcome for them. Overcoming these hardships is both a personal challenge for students and also an important priority for the government and universities in making a success of the dramatic program of internationalising Japanese higher education.

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