Book Reviews

Abi Doukhan, *Emmanuel Levinas: A Philosophy of Exile* (United Kingdom: Bloomsbury Studies in Continental Philosophy, 2012), pp xi + 162, ISBN: 978-1-4411-9576-0.

Abi Doukhan's study of Levinas, *A Philosophy in Exile*, begins with the claim that, "[t]his study of the dimensions of exile in the philosophy of Levinas shall prove profoundly topical and relevant in that it will allow for a reframing of the concept of exile in a more positive light and enable a new perspective to emerge on the present problem of exile undergone by our societies" (p. 3). For a philosophical work not necessarily aimed at religious studies, this statement is important. Exile, equally termed diaspora in certain contexts, is a fact of religious life. As Doukhan notes in the opening pages, Levinas' philosophy is acutely aware of the problem of the 'other' faced by all societies. As such, this is a book that scholars of religion should be interested in, so long as it can shed philosophical light upon topics we are already engaged with. The question, of course, is whether the content justifies that interest.

Each chapter deals with the question of exile in relation to the topics of ethics, politics, love, epistemology, metaphysics, and aesthetics respectively. Underwriting all these chapters is the thesis that exile, rather than being detrimental to the social fabric of our lives, is the glue that holds it all together. Such an understanding of exile may not sit well with Western readers. Nor should it, as Levinas' philosophy is a stern critique of the Western ethos, and as Doukhan argues, it has more resonance with Judaism. For those of us rendered squeamish by theologically-injected religious studies, for once, at least, the theology is not Christian. Such qualms are, however, unnecessary. Doukhan devotes a number of pages to the theological status of Levinas and makes the interesting point that he was not using philosophy to bolster Hebrew thought, but rather using Hebrew thought as a tool to challenge the orientations of our Western thought. While Levinas may use Hebrew tools, Doukhan informs us, his starting point is first and foremost phenomenological.

It must be admitted, however, that Doukhan's study is largely underwhelming. In each individual chapter, Doukhan notes some of the detractors of Levinas' philosophy in that particular area and goes on to explicate why they are wrong. More often than not, these explications are less than convincing, and do not address certain key issues. The problem is that Doukhan is so desperate to demonstrate that exile is a fundamental concept in all these areas that she does not really devote enough time to them (the book is only 124 pages long). This is most apparent in the chapter on exile and love.

Doukhan is so concerned to shoehorn exile into the debate that certain concluding remarks struck me, even as a male reader, as rather odd. We are told that, in the Levinassian perspective, woman gains her status as a person by man's hospitality (p. 66). Doukhan, as a female author, raises no objections to this point whatsoever. As for exile in the case of love, it may be made to fit, but in all the other cases I am left with the impression that exile does not add much to the discussion. Constant uses of such phrases as "…even exile," "…or exile," and "…and exile" give the impression that exile is being strained to cover topics that already have adequate conceptual terms available.

Nevertheless, this book contains some useful discussions. The chapter on epistemology and truth is particularly interesting. Doukhan's strongest argument is in response to Foucault and subsequent thinking that would lead to an abandonment of truth. It is followed by an equally interesting argument that truth can only be properly be reached by the interrupted self, that is, a self that has put itself into question. Similarly, the first section of the chapter on metaphysics presents a novel approach understanding belief in God. The second part, however, falls into sketchy theological territory that serves to underwrite the general problem of the whole book. Doukhan's opinion that exile should be portrayed in positive lights seems at odds with the historical opening recounting Levinas' own experiences of exile. The portrayal of exile is far too optimistic and, as such, strains the argument of the book. Doukhan's optimism never seems justified, and while I am convinced of the importance of exile to society, the positive reading of it as the glue that holds society together appears flimsy. For readers of Religious Studies and the topic of exile generally, there is not much that is new, but those with a keener interest in the philosophy of Levinas may find the study more relevant. The basic flaw of this book is its length. There is too little space devoted to each topic to give a convincing argument and there is a problematic lack of detail. Had Doukhan focused on just the one area I would probably have been more convinced of the validity of her argument.

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Richard Gombrich, *What the Buddha Thought* (London and Oakville: Equinox Publishing, 2009), pp. xvi + 240, ISBN: 9781845536145 (Pbk).

Richard Gombrich is a well-known British Scholar of Early Buddhism. His book, *What the Buddha Thought*, is based on a series of ten lectures he gave at

the School of Oriental and African Studies at London University in 2006 under the general title, 'The Original and Greatness of the Buddha's Ideas' (p. vii). Gombrich intends the book for two audiences: for experts in the field, and for a wider public with some prior familiarity with Buddhist thought. Written in a relaxed and accessible style, one feels as though one is invited on a journey of discovery with the author. From the outset, Gombrich argues against the scholarly idea that we cannot know what the Buddha thought; that Buddhism "is a ball that was set rolling by someone whose ideas are not known" and "can never be known" (p. 194), that we only know what was preserved in the earliest scriptures which were begun to be written some 150 or so years after the Buddha's death.

Conversely, Gombrich argues for the idea that it is possible to know what the Buddha thought, and sets out to explain how the coherent set of core concepts of the Buddha's worldview took shape within the context of Brahmanical thought. He argues that the Buddha's attacks on Brahmanical ideas were conducted using metaphor and irony, and that the substance of the Buddha's arguments therefore lose something if one attempts to take them literally. To aid his cause, Gombrich maintains that in order to fully appreciate the formulation of the Buddha's worldview as a response to Brahmanism and Jainism, one must understand the entire set of key Buddhist terms and explore the semantic range of each one, including their literal and metaphorical uses. He applies this method throughout the set of chapters devoted to exploring key Buddhist terms such as karma, 'no soul' (Skt: *anatman*), compassion, non-random causation, and nirvana.

Gombrich states that he has used 'no soul' and karma (moral causality) as the starting points for his explanation of the Buddha's core teaching, rather than the Buddha's own—and the entire Buddhist tradition's—starting point of the Four Noble Truths, the truth of *dukkha* (Pali, usually translated as suffering), because the Buddha was preaching to an audience who had preconceptions different to ours, which included rebirth of a continuous essence, and some notion of karma as moral causation (p. 16). In the Buddha's thought, the concept of 'no soul' has to be understood in terms of the doctrine of karma, because the view of the soul or self that is subject to change according to the action of karma as intention rather than as ritual action, means that salvation is possible through mental purification. The Buddha made the belief in the law of karma, 'right view', the first step on his Noble Eightfold path to Nirvana; in so doing, says Gombrich, the Buddha was the first to formulate an "ethicization of rebirth" (pp. 31-32), which included the means to generate good karma, rather than just eliminate bad karma, as Jainism had held to. Whilst I confess to having some reservation about how certain we can be in

regard to the facts concerning the historical Buddha at this remove, I am impressed by both Gombrich's scholarship and by the favourable treatment it receives in the review by Dhivan Thomas Jones in *Western Buddhist Review* 5 (2010).

However, as an ethnographer interested in contemporary expressions of the Buddhist tradition, I am intrigued by Gombrich's starting point, and by the fact that he leaves meditation and the Monastic order "almost entirely outside the scope of the book" (p. 17). Much Buddhist scholarship in the West, and also Buddhist practices favoured in the West such as Zen and Vipassana meditation, which have contributed to the formation of a *modernist* Western Buddhism, have emphasised the monastic over the lay expressions of Buddhism, and the means to attain personal salvation largely without reference to the doctrine of karma and rebirth. Similarly, the contemporary dialogue between Buddhism and Western Psychology has maintained a focus on the efficacy of Buddhist meditation practices as self-transformative and therapeutic techniques isolated from their traditional framework. Perhaps an unintended benefit of *What the Buddha Thought* is its demonstration of the centrality of the doctrine of karma and rebirth to the Buddhist worldview.

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William D. Romanowski, *Reforming Hollywood: How American Protestants Fought For Freedom at the Movies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. xv + 298, ISBN: 97801 95387841 (Hdbk).

There is a long history of American cinema's entanglement with authorised and unauthorised forms of censorship. Thomas Doherty's comprehensive study of Hollywood's pre-code era (1999) accounts for the complex interrelationship of production, distribution, and consumption of Hollywood's output. Gregory Black's two influential studies of the Catholic confrontation with the 'movie establishment' (1994 and 1998) provide a full account of the religious and moral foundations of Hollywood's encounter with American mores. What sets William Romanowski's recent *Reforming Hollywood* apart is a detailed, analytical, and thoroughly engaging account of the impact of Protestant religious machinery on the development of the studio system. Prior studies have correctly emphasised the importance of Catholicism's Legion of Decency (formed in 1933) in providing an ethical life of cinema through the administration of the Catholic Church. Romanowski, however, counters the

discourse that sets the framework as a confrontation between only two major players: the studio system (and its oligopolistic organisation) and the Catholic Church. But as *Reforming Hollywood* clearly shows, equally important is the Protestant contribution to the American film experience, which instantiates a confrontation both with Hollywood and the Catholic Church. The movies provide the expression for a hotbed of "ethno-religious rivalries" (p. 13).

Precisely how did the 'movies'—that behemoth of American twentieth century culture—evolve as a moral, ethical, social, and cultural phenomenon? For Romanowski, as for many other commentators, the movies are a part of an American industrial machine that gives rise to various processes of cultural modernisation. Yet rather than displaying an abrupt departure from a religious cultural history, the movies negotiate and actively work with the powerful moral imperatives of Protestant and Catholic instruction. As movies become a mass culture, so the American religious establishment intervenes in the dissemination of this new mass-cultural art form to steer it toward the pursuit of instruction, guidance, and virtue. By 1915, the Protestant National Council of the Churches of Christ "hinged on assuring that audiences would encounter nothing indecent or harmful at the movies" (p. 21). This was not censorship, which the council fought against. Rather, it was a form of moral and ethical guidance that fundamentally designed (in collaboration with profit-motivated corporations) the American movies in the pre-code era (-1933), the era of the Hays Code (1933-1968), and, as I would argue, the current output of America's newly integrated studio system.

The structure of the book maps the history of the development of cinema as an early mass cultural form (studio distribution and broad-based theatrical exhibition) to the era of the Hays Code, and concludes with an examination of the gradual fragmentation of the code and cinema's governing bureaucracies. Chapter 1 sets the groundwork with a detailed study of the Protestant National Council and its focus on guiding the development of cinema. A brief though fascinating piece on Griffith's *Birth of a Nation* (1915) describes the framework for later negotiations between the National Council and the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association (headed by Will Hays). The decades long struggle between the Protestant Council and the MPPDA forms the guiding dramatic narrative of the book. As Romanowski's engaging style reveals, this is as colourful a history as the tumultuous history of the studio system itself.

The book devotes significant space to the Hays Code era, as it must. Yet here again the material feels fresh, inflected as it is through the marginalised perspective of Protestant governing bodies. Alongside the widely accepted histories of Hays, Breen, and the studio era under the code, fascinating also is

the substantial contribution made by Protestant organisations: church groups, governing bodies, media sources, even Protestant filmmakers. Several case studies make what could have been a dry history a dramatic and fascinating narrative. The monumental success of DeMille's *The Ten Commandments* (1956) is matched by the failure of *The Greatest Story Ever Told* a decade later. As late as the mid-1960s, in the era of Lumet's controversial *The Pawnbroker* (1966) and *The Graduate* (1967), the American 'movies' were still uncensored, self-regulating, and heavily influenced by the moral and ethical imperatives of the American religious establishment. At the point of the collapse of the code, and for decades after, American movies and American religion were tightly knitted and mutually affecting.

Romanowki's *Reforming Hollywood* is an important, timely study. It redresses a lacuna in the historical foundations of Hollywood, deftly accounting for the crucial role Protestant religious bodies had to play in the development of an American cinematic imaginary. But Romanowski also reminds us just how complex the edifice of 'the movies' is. The end of the code and the turn toward more clearly regulated guidance of movies (classification rather than censorship) matches the profound, ground-shifting change in the movies themselves. *The Graduate* and *Bonnie and Clyde* (1968) are not precisely 'late' or 'post'-code films, but are fundamentally part of the institution of American cultural life. This life, as Romanowski's book suggests, is expressed in terms that included the cinema output under the Hays Code and the post-code classification system. For Romanowski, "the rating system contributed to the making of a 'Hollywood Renaissance'" (p. 185). That Renaissance was a rebirth precisely because it rubbed against the grain of a moral and ethical establishment that had governed the American movies since its inception.

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Joyce Ransome, *The Web of Friendship: Nicholas Ferrar and Little Gidding* (James Clarke, Cambridge, 2011), pp. 291, ISBN: 9780227173480.

The settlement at Little Gidding, in the abolished county of Huntingdonshire, near Cambridge, is best known today as the subject of the last of T.S. Eliot's *Four Quartets* where the poet writes of his visit to the church there in 1936, and also of King Charles's visit, in 1645, as "a broken king," after the defeat at Naseby in the Civil War. "You are here to kneel," Eliot declares, "where prayer

has been valid." For an Anglo-Catholic of literary and historical interests, such as Eliot, Little Gidding had powerful associations with such seventeenth-century poets as George Herbert (who bequeathed *The Temple* to the community's founder) and Richard Crashaw, and with the upheavals of ecclesiastical and political life in those years; but also, by virtue of its ordered community structure, with a version of monasticism and a sense of retreat from the world. It was criticised, in its day, as 'the Arminian nunnery'.

Joyce Ransome's new study puts these notions and the somewhat romanticised ideas that have developed through the centuries about the individuals gathered in Christian community at Little Gidding under scrutiny, rigorously although sympathetically—this is not a new-historicist demolition exercise—and shows that the place, its principles, its personalities, and its story, at large, are more complicated than we had supposed and, thereby, more interesting.

What emerges is a "new and complex picture" (p. 13) of Nicholas Ferrar, the founder of a community which, Ransome argues, was not static but "evolving" (p. 20). Her emphasis on its voluntary nature—a major theme of the book—clearly differentiates the communal life of Little Gidding from the vowed obedience of a religious order. She also stresses the emphasis on women's education in a situation where women outnumbered men (p. 15), but does not underestimate the gifts or influence of Ferrar, the "unusually pious and intellectually able" celibate in charge (p. 29). But

> his character was neither simple nor without fault. He was a model of piety, a generous and learned friend, an ingenious and dedicated teacher. Yet he could be at once controlling and self-effacing, open and secretive, wary of spontaneity while valuing voluntarism, a mystic and a micromanager (p. 23).

Details are given of Ferrar's education and travels on the continent (where, in Holland, for example, he experienced various sects and voluntary Christian societies, although he would never countenance separation from the established Church at home) and of the subsequent familial financial issues behind the eventual removal from London to distant Huntingdonshire of the wider Ferrar family. The purchase of Little Gidding was not inspired merely by renunciation of "the world," Ransome insists—it was not "a simple exchange of hectic London life for contemplative country retreat" (p. 50). Yet surely, like George Herbert's recourse to Bemerton in Wiltshire, there was more of this element than Ransome is willing to concede in her determination to differentiate Little Gidding from monastic withdrawal: it was "a family household and not a cloister" (p. 72) she maintains. But strict observance of such as a version of the monastic hours and Laudian liturgical innovations (processions, obeisance to the altar, and so forth) contradict her presentation of

a more temperate Anglicanism. Ransome is wise, however, as she traverses the theological and liturgical minefield of early seventeenth-century faith and practice, to reflect:

> Perhaps doctrinal consistency under whatever label is not a helpful measure of the 'practical divinity' of either Ferrar or Herbert or indeed many of their contemporaries (p. 122).

Those keen to label George Herbert and his poetry as Calvinist (the current reading)—or as Laudian, for that matter (as in the past)—should take note.

If Gidding was a "family household," it was a decidedly odd family, with the diaconal patriarch unmarried, requiring uniformity of habit-like drab clothing by his female attendants and eliciting letters of "anxious confessions of sin" from his nieces (p. 73) in "a household dedicated to God's service" (p. 79). As in the cloister, indeed, the ordinary worship required of the laity in *The Book of Common Prayer* was insufficient, and there were "hourly readings from the gospel harmony" (p. 79), for which Gidding became famous, and memorising of the psalms. Ferrar wanted the place to be "a Light on a Hill" for a corrupt age (p. 134).

But the Psalmist's vision of "brethren dwelling together in unity" was not fulfilled there. One of the most interesting (and, perhaps unintentionally, amusing) characters in the narrative is Ferrar's sister-in-law, Bathsheba, "deeply antipathetic" to Nicholas, "and to the life he had established for the household at Gidding" (p. 81). Bathsheba appears to have taken opposition to the regime as her *métier*, resisting any proposal from Ferrar, her husband, or their sister Susanna, "even were it something that she would otherwise have wanted to do" (p. 109). She, for one, was not about to submit to the insisted-upon quality of temperance to which her husband's unfortunate financial circumstances had consigned her, let alone its "web of friendship" presided over by her brother-in-law.

Ransome gives a detailed analysis of the thirteen complete harmonies – singular narratives of Christ's life synthesised, with illustrations, from the four Gospels. One was made for King Charles, at his request, in 1635; George Herbert having received his in 1631. The scholarly activity continued after Nicholas's death in 1637, under the direction of his gifted nephew, also Nicholas, known as 'The Linguist of Little Gidding' (p. 174).

Less persuasive, with regard to the fame of the place, after the demise of the community in the Civil War, is Ransome's chapter on it as an inspiration of voluntary societies in the Church of England in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But her brief note that the somewhat romanticised memory of Gidding may have had some influence on the revival of monastic

life by the Catholic movement in Anglicanism in the nineteenth century rings true.

This valuable book of careful scholarship, impeccably published by James Clarke, and well written, is important for all who are interested in seventeenth-century English Church history and of the golden age of Anglican divinity, nowhere more brilliantly espoused than in the poetry of the age – from which, rather surprisingly, Dr Ransome quotes not a single line.

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William Lad Sessions, *Honor for Us: A Philosophical Analysis, Interpretation and Defence* (United Kingdom: Bloomsbury, 2012) pp. xiii + 210, ISBN: 978-1-4411-4638-0

Honor For Us is an interesting consideration of the concept and conceptions of personal honour. Sessions' book is primarily a philosophy text and is aimed at an audience for whom discussions of the concept of honour have fallen by the wayside. However, despite his oblique reference to the social sciences, I would suggest that this book has more value for such an audience than it does for philosophers.

The book is divided into three sections. In the first section, Sessions delineates the field of study highlighting that this book is about a particular concept of honour; personal honour. Briefly defined, personal honour is "adhering firmly to the *honor code* of some *honor group* and being loyal to its *members*" (p.26) and is differentiated from five other concepts: conferred honour, recognition honour, positional honour, commitment honour, and trust honour. Sessions' argument is that while there are similarities between these various different concepts, and aspects of the others are found within personal honour, it is a distinctive category of its own. Further to this, Sessions also argues in subsequent chapters that personal honour, while relatable to, is not equivocal with either religion or morality. He also addresses the question of 'deviant honour' as it occurs within sociology, and argues that we cannot label honour groups deviant from the level of honour groups, and such a position requires an objectification of one society's standards.

In the second section, having laid out the criteria for personal honour and honour groups, Sessions makes the case that these groups are not just something 'they' have. He notes that in social scientific literature there is a tendency to view honour as an archaic concept that 'Other' groups have and

that 'our' groups have long since grown out of. To show that honour is in fact a relevant concept as much for 'us' as it is for 'them', Sessions identifies various cases that he argues are classifiable as honour groups. These cases are: warriors, sportsmanship, patriotism, academia, and professions (specifically law). With each, he tries to show that these groups can be adequately understood in terms of personal honour.

In the third section, Sessions makes some normative arguments regarding this notion of personal honour and honour groups. In the first chapter, he makes a defence of honour against the various charges: that personal honour is little more than conferred or recognition honour; it is confined to limited conditions and is relative; honour groups are small, non-egalitarian, violent, and patriarchal. For the final chapter, Sessions makes some arguments as to the benefit of having honour groups in our society and how thinking in terms of personal honour can overcome a number of dichotomies such as insider/outsider and improve the individual's self-regard.

The strongest section of this book is the first in which Sessions makes a strong definitional case for the concept of personal honour. He clearly defines the criteria so that if applied to actual contexts they can be easily identified. His arguments as to what personal honour is not are lucid and clear, and the only fault with them is the assumption of universality that underpins his understanding of morality. He takes it for granted that morality should be universal and does little to question why this might be the case. Aside from this, the following two sections become progressively weaker. Having made a strong case for the analytic concept of honour, the second section is then filled with rather general cases of where it might be applied. Rather than selecting specific case studies with identifiable samples, he suggests the various ways in which honour can be applied to whole classes of people with very few examples. There are a few too many cases of "honour could…" and "honour might…" with no real backing from actual examples. This is particularly apparent in the case of professions and patriotism. The latter is an especially weak case and there is the sense that he is struggling to fit patriotism into this analytic concept. The difficulty of reconciling the diffuse number of patriots with the idea that honour groups must be, if not small, at least clearly demarcated, suggests that he is trying to extend the concept far beyond its own reach.

Sessions' tendency to talk in generalities is also the downfall of his normative section. Many from the social sciences would be naturally wary of such a section, but it must be remembered that Sessions is aiming his book at the philosophical community. Even then, the majority of his arguments are fairly weak and his defence of personal honour does not satisfactorily address

some of the criticisms. Take the case of inegalitarianism for instance. Sessions tries to show that honour groups do not have to be superior, but fails to realise that by definition as a "group" this is exactly what happens. This then causes confusion in his arguments about the moral treatment of outsiders. Another tension is the individual; in the second section, Sessions provides a strong critique of individualism, but by the third section he reverses his position and argues that personal honour defends individuality. In many other places, we are informed what honour can do (honour does not have to be violent for example) but rarely does Sessions justify why it should do that. The overall impression becomes one of a series of statements regarding honour rather than arguments for it.

Honor For Us is a frustrating book; the concept of personal honour is potentially one of great analytic value and could have numerous applications, but Sessions does too little to capitalise on these. Philosophers may be underwhelmed by his arguments and many readers will find the vagueness of examples inconclusive. These weaknesses of the book should not put the reader off however; Sessions does at least show that honour is a concept that still has relevant application not just for 'them' but for 'us' too. The only downside for the reader is that if they come to do such an application, there is no benchmark against which to adequately compare their own results.

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Rosemary Hill, *Stonehenge* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008) pp. 1 + 242, ISBN 978-0-674-03132-6 (Hdbk).

This small format book is a popular study of Stonehenge that takes the model of reception history to assess the importance of the world's most famous Neolithic monument. In Chapter 1, Hill situates Stonehenge in the academic discourse of contemporary archaeology. This chapter traces the development of its construction as it is currently understood, and highlights the sociologically interesting fact that "after the Middle Bronze Age, the history of Stonehenge is one of disuse and dilapidation" (p. 17). Chapter 2 reverts to the Middle Ages and considers medieval authors who speculated upon Stonehenge, including Henry of Huntingdon and Geoffrey of Monmouth, and comments on the sparse illustrative record (reproducing a small drawing from a Chronicle of the World dating from around 1440 CE). The bulk of the chapter is a discussion of the early modern antiquarians like John Aubrey, Aylett Sammes, John Toland, and

William Stukeley. The fanciful connection of the Druids with the monument is a major theme, and the revival of Druidic activity by Iolo Morganwg at Primrose Hill in London in 1792 is connected to the surge of interest in Stonehenge and the Druids fostered by antiquarianism.

Chapter 3 considers Stonehenge as it was received by architects, in particular Inigo Jones, his pupil John Webb, and John Wood, who constructed the Circus in Bath on the model of the great Neolithic ring. Modern readers will be amused by the heated arguments as to whether Stonehenge was Roman, Tuscan, or Buddhist. Hill's treatment of John Wood's *Choir Gaure, Vulgarly Called Stonehenge, on Salisbury Plain* (1747), in which he argued that the stone circle at Stanton Drew was a Druidic university, and invoked Joseph of Arimathea, Glastonbury's occult Christian heritage, and Bladud the legendary king of Bath, is extremely entertaining. Chapter 4 discusses the Romantic reception of Stonehenge, focusing on the poets William Wordsworth and William Blake, and artistic renditions by J. M. W. Turner, John Constable, James Barry, and others.

Chapter 5 traces the Victorian idea of Stonehenge, commenting on the emergence of archaeology as an academic discipline (with the discovery of ancient cities including Nineveh, Troy and Babylon) and the emergence of a movement dedicated to the preservation of national monuments and treasures. The particular contribution of John Lubbock (1834-1913), who was the son-in-law of General Pitt-Rivers the first appointed Inspector of Ancient Monuments, is treated in detail. Chapter 6, 'Archaeology, Astronomy, and the Age of Aquarius', brings the story of Stonehenge to the present with a brief but informative sketch of twentieth century developments such as the findings of scholarly archaeological excavations, the sustained campaign by modern Druids to have access to the stones at certain sacred times of the year, the free festival movement, and the appearance of Stonehenge in popular cultural forms, tourism posters, rock film-clips, and the like. The final chapter discusses archaeological discoveries from the most recent dig, the Stonehenge Riverside Project, led by Mike Parker-Pearson of Sheffield University (which has yielded much fascinating information, especially regarding the nearby henge at Durrington Walls). It also considers the effects of Salisbury Plain being classified a World Heritage Site, and offers tips for the modern tourist. Hill's *Stonehenge* is a marvellous book, aesthetically pleasing, filled with intriguing information, and drawing attention to many understandings of the monument over time that are still fascinating and relevant. It is highly recommended.

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